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United States NEWS

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THE ONLY MAGAZINE

DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO

REPORTING . . . INTERPRETING

AND FORECASTING THE

NEWS OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS

★ ★ ★

PUBLISHED WEEKLY
AT WASHINGTON

Copr. 1945 by U. S. News Pub. Corp.

REG. U. S. PAT. OFF.

TESTS OF 'BIG 3' PLAN

★

A CONGRESS REVOLT

★

WHAT WE'LL EAT IN '45

★

NEW CURRENCY BASE?

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

General Wedemeyer . . . U.S. Commander in China
(See National Week)

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ALL THERE IS IN BEARINGS

Sometimes There's Quite a Crowd

Maybe you don't realize it, because so many Long Distance calls go through so promptly.

But sometimes, in some places, there's an extra heavy rush and all available circuits are in use and people are waiting.

Then the operator will make this wartime suggestion—"Please limit your call to 5 minutes."

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

The March Of The News

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

Mail for Luzon prisoners. The Army said that mail to military and civilian personnel freed from Japanese prison camps on Luzon Island in the Philippines should be addressed as follows:

Name of person (use serial number for military personnel), American Red Cross, Civilian War Affairs Section, APO 442, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

For the time being, mail is limited to letters and post cards. The Army promised every effort to send all mail by air.

"Baby bond" maturities. The Treasury called attention to the fact that the first series of "baby bonds," issued ten years ago, will begin maturing on March 1. The Treasury said the owners could take them to nearly any bank and receive $4 for every $3 originally invested. Or the proceeds can be reinvested immediately in Series E war bonds. The latter, if held for ten years, the Treasury added, will yield a return of 77 per cent, for the full 20-year period, on the original investment.

Special gasoline ration. OPA special gasoline rations will be issued to war veterans and displaced war workers for use in seeking jobs, the Office of Price Administration announced. The rations will go to those who find it necessary to travel by automobile to a job interview arranged by the United States Employment Service, the Railroad Retirement Board Employment Service, a county agricultural agent, an agricultural extension labor office, or a union authorized by the War Manpower Commission to recruit workers. Qualified applicants are to be allowed gasoline for a maximum of 400 miles in a 30-day period.

Winter clothing. Action to increase next winter's supply of men's, boys', children's and infants' cold-weather wear was taken by the War Production Board. Included in the program are the special production of 7,500,000 infants' and children's snow suits, legging sets, and snow or ski pants, and 9,960,000 men's, boys' and juveniles' mackinaws, peacoats and cossack jackets.

Cigarettes. After an investigation of the cigarette shortage, the Federal Trade Commission said the scarcity probably would increase this year, owing to higher demands by the Army. The Army, it said, plans to take 77,000,000,000 cigarettes in 1945, as compared with 68,000,000,000 last year, and there is little chance of increased production.

Steel for civilians. WPB officials said drastic cuts in the amount of steel available for civilian products were to be expected. Even some less pressing military demands may have to be trimmed, they added.

Copper shortage. The flow of copper wire to civilian retailers, owing to scarcity of copper and increased military needs, was cut off temporarily by the WPB. Retail stocks of such wire, it was said, were sufficient to meet civilian needs until the middle of the year, with a possibility more can be spared to civilians then.

Vegetable production goals. Goals for the production of vegetables for canning in 1945 were increased by the War Food Administration, from 2,010,000 acres to 2,155,000 acres. Support prices for growers, WFA said, would be continued at 1944 levels for all affected vegetables except snap beans, which will average $6 a ton less than last year.

Increased butter production. Dairy production rates, to encourage an increased production of butter, were changed by the WFA. The change, a reduction in whole-milk rates while holding butter rates stable, is intended to divert more milk into butter production than in recent months. Payments for whole milk deliveries will drop 25 cents per 100 pounds in April, May and June, but butterfat rates will remain at 10 cents a pound through September and then take a sharp jump to 16 cents in the last quarter.

Income payments. The Commerce Department reported income payments to individuals at a record level in 1944. The total was $156,777,000,000, as compared with $143,134,000,000 in 1943. Increased military payments comprised the biggest factor in the advance. Increased wage and salary payments in manufacturing, transportation and the service industries were next in importance.

Tax collections. Federal tax collections in 1944 totaled $42,125,986,550, an increase of $10,201,456,234 over 1943. The bulk of last year's total came from individual and corporation income taxes, which aggregated $34,130,123,089, as compared with $25,326,635,548 in 1943. Withholding taxes brought in $9,842,349,391, and employment taxes totaled $1,785,165,770.

Retail sales. Retail sales rose 9 per cent in 1944, to reach a total of $69,275,000,000. The year was the sixth in succession to show such an increase. The rise was attributed in part to a 3 per cent increase in retail prices over the 1943 average. Departing from the usual pattern, the heaviest buying came in November, rather than December, reflecting early purchase of Christmas gifts for servicemen overseas.

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Cover: General Wedemeyer; see National Week, page 19. (Official U.S. Army Air Forces Photograph)

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THIS SANDWICH GREW NEAR GIBRALTAR!

Sardines are hiding in that double-decker . . . little fish that start in the blue Mediterranean and end up between slices of American bread — but they refuse to make the long swim across the Atlantic. Like so many other familiar things you eat, wear or use, sardines must be brought to you by seagoing merchant ships.

By a special Act of Congress, we are assured control of this important overseas trade. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 makes it national policy that we have ample U. S.-flag merchant shipping "*constructed in the U. S., manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel . . . owned and operated under the U. S. flag by citizens.*" Such a merchant marine, in the Act's words, is "*necessary for the national defense and development of (our) foreign and domestic commerce.*"

War emphasized our need, and under the guidance of the Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Administration, America has built the world's largest merchant fleet in record time.

At American Export Lines, we are using all our operating experience, all our knowledge of Mediterranean and Indian Ocean ports, to help this fleet supply Allied fronts. We've operated, managed or acted as agents for thousands of voyages by the ships that carry precious troops and supplies. In peacetime, we will once again supply *your* needs . . . *what you and other Americans want to buy or sell abroad will determine our cargoes and ports of call.*

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"We make fire control instruments for the navy and intercommunicating telephones for industry. The huge naval expansion program intensified our efforts to increase production, for which we have received four Army-Navy "E" awards.

"With only twice the number of workers we are producing over 7 times the volume. This increase is due *in no small measure* to our successful use of Remington Rand Punched-Card Accounting in providing production control data whereby we could increase output by reducing waste of manpower and machine time.

"Three important reports are produced punctually every morning under a schedule that makes speed paramount:

1. Machine Shop Piece-report shows the number and kind of pieces produced during the previous day and night shifts. This report, completed by 9:15 each morning, goes to the Schedule, Methods, and Expediting Departments, and to the Vice-President in charge of production.
2. Daily Machine Report, distributed 45 minutes later, goes to foreman of the Machine Shop for checking previous shift performance and for assigning work and machine loading; to the Scheduling Department for comparison with and revision of planned performance; and to the Expediting Department for following up urgent jobs.
3. Lost-Time Report, ready at same time as the second report, shows personnel lost-time data and goes to department foremen and Personnel Department.

"The obvious results of having complete and accurate production reports on executives' desks each morning have been that we are able to schedule machines and jobs more efficiently; methods-men can check actual with estimated output of men and machines; expediters know more closely how important jobs are progressing; idle machine time is lowered; lost hours by employees are spotlighted and reduced. All of these results increase production."

Certified Report #4311-4B, covering details of how Control Instrument Co., accomplished this great production increase, is available to interested executives by writing to our branch office nearest you, or direct to Remington Rand Inc., Tabulating Machines Division, New York 10, N. Y.

• KWIK-FAX •

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FROM THE NATION'S CAPITAL

Tomorrow

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

A LOOK AHEAD

Newsgram

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off

2201 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

If anything is clear about the war prospect, this much is.....

Germany is down and mighty close to being out.

The German air force is not far from grounded. German armies lack the strength to strike back effectively at Russian armies destroying Germany.

Germany's industrial heart is wide open to air attack.

Yet: It is not possible to say that German surrender is or is not just around the corner. There is nobody in Germany who can surrender except Hitler himself, and he won't. War will go on until Germany simply disintegrates.

Midyear, or earlier, should see that process completed.

On the other side of the world, in the Pacific war.....

Japan's weakness on land, in the air, at sea, is amazing.

If U.S. carrier-based planes can hit at Japan's vitals once, they can hit many times; they can seek out and deal with the Japanese fleet.

If carriers get away with what they are getting away with, battleships next can move in and do a job on Japanese cities with 16-inch guns.

Japan will be making peace offers before long. They will not get much attention, will not be acceptable. Japan will go the way of Germany. She will have to take her beating. She will have to surrender unconditionally.

There isn't a chance that U.S. will get war weary before beating Japan.

As a result of the Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill meeting.....

U.S. forces of occupation will be in Europe for several years, not one.

This country will join in with decisions fixing boundaries, setting up governments, deciding political issues in Europe prior to a general conference around a peace table. That's a basic departure from traditional U.S. policy.

A military alliance of U.S.-Britain-Russia, not a loosely knit coalition, will underlie the proposed new league of nations. That's fundamental, too.

U.S. will accept a partition of prewar Poland and of Germany in interest of Russia and probably of France. U.S. apparently will go along with Russian-British division of interest in the Balkans, with Russian absorption of the Baltic States. U.S., however, will insist upon elections to determine the kind of governments to be set up. It is not clear whether U.S. will do the policing of those elections, whether it will make sure that everybody votes freely.

Of course, the U.S. Senate may balk but that's the meaning of agreements that Roosevelt entered into with Churchill and Stalin.

Two big unanswered questions that are all-important are these:

1. Will the kind of Europe being devised by Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin work in an economic way; will it result in prosperity and contentment?

2. Will the new league of nations really have power to say "No" to Russia or U.S. or Britain if one of the Big Three seeks to control governments, or to reach out for bits of territory in neighboring states?

If not, this war will not settle much; will not prevent a recurrence of

(over)

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frictions, of discontents, of political maneuvers that lead to new trouble.

In the postwar Europe, as things definitely are shaping.....

France will develop a brand of state socialism, will have joint employer-labor-Government management of key industries, will go in for state planning. That is the line de Gaulle is deciding to take. Labor gets a key role.

Belgium will follow rather closely the example of France.

Germany will be impoverished; will be stripped of heavy industry; will be on short rations as she works off very heavy reparations. Germany will face no alternative to widespread socialization; will tend to orient her economy toward Russia as she pays major reparations in that direction.

Poland, economically, will be forced to a Russian orientation. That may be the case politically, too. It suggests a definite left-wing turn.

Balkan areas will lose normal German markets, will be forced to look to Russia for outlets for surpluses. It will be the same with Czechoslovakia.

Italy will be impoverished; will tend to be leftist in economic policy.

Japan will be ruined; will offer little trade opportunity.

Result is that U.S. may find little world company as a strictly capitalist nation, may find the going a bit rough in seeking to induce the outside world to turn back toward freer trade, toward less state control over the economy. Even Britain is thinking in terms of a Government-business partnership, in terms of controlled exchange, controlled imports, planned exports, more use of Empire preferences. The postwar world definitely will not look like the prewar world.

A new league of nations, as now designed, stands a bit better than a 50-50 chance of Senate acceptance. If U.S. doesn't join, nobody will.

A World Bank for postwar lending will get Congress approval. It is no more than a 50-50 prospect, however, if that, that Congress will agree to the present plan for currency stabilization. We tell you the story on page 15.

Lend-Lease will be extended for one more year without major change.

Johnson Act repeal is probable.

Export-Import Bank lending power will be increased.

U.S. is more in a mood to try international co-operation than most other nations; is much more ready to join up and play a part than after World War I.

On the domestic side of things, as they are working out.....

Debt limit increase to $300,000,000,000, reduction in gold backing for the dollar from 40 to 25 per cent will not in themselves undermine the dollar.

There is beginning to be questioning of the dollar's future. There is some worry over the effect of a change in amount of gold back of the dollar.

That really isn't the point. Actually, the dollar was cut loose from gold back in 1934. The dollar today is not directly tied to gold except for the purpose of selling trade balances abroad. Gold will not be paid on demand in exchange for dollars. A 25 per cent backing won't differ much from 40 per cent.

Only real measure of the dollar today is in purchasing power, in what it will buy in the way of goods. On that basis, it is about a 95-cent dollar if 1926 is used as a base. That still is a pretty good dollar, in spite of the numbers outstanding. The measure of its worth is in the price level.

Henry Wallace seems sure to get Commerce Department control. That will not mean much in the way of power. It won't make very much difference.

The whole White House staff, or nearly all of it, is in Europe trying to blast loose some food supplies, some other supplies from French and Italians.

Mr. Roosevelt's health again is not what it should be. Reports were permitted to come through censorship that the President is not well.

See also pages 11, 19, 45.

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FOUR OF A KIND

Here is a power unit made up of four General Motors Series 71 6-cylinder Diesel engines driving a single shaft. The unit may be operated on one or more of the engines, as required.

It's called the "Quad," and two of them power each of the famous LCI landing boats. Quads save space and weight so more troops, equipment and fuel can be carried.

Half a "Quad"—two 6-71 engines mounted side by side—is a "twin," and these power Army tanks and tank destroyers.

Here is economical power for many postwar uses—power at less than 15 pounds per horsepower—power for applications where space and weight are at a premium.

Now all these GM Diesels (singles, twins and quads) are busy with war. In their tough, exacting work they are displaying stamina and dependability which emphasize the important place they will fill wherever efficient, economical power will be needed in peace.

KEEP AMERICA STRONG
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DIESEL POWER

ENGINES . . 15 to 250 H. P. . . **DETROIT DIESEL ENGINE DIVISION,** Detroit 23, Mich.

ENGINES . . 150 to 2000 H. P. . . CLEVELAND DIESEL ENGINE DIVISION, Cleveland 11, Ohio

LOCOMOTIVES . . . . . ELECTRO-MOTIVE DIVISION, La Grange, Ill.

Actual photograph of scratched aluminum plate; small section, enlarged 9 times.

what happens to a SCRATCH at 400 miles per hour?

The tiniest surface scratch . . . so small you might never notice it . . . can often grow big and serious under the constant shock and pounding of *vibration*. For a scratched part is a weak part that may open the door to fatigue failure.

To minimize this possibility in their products, experienced aircraft engineers use forming blocks fabricated from Laminated INSUROK, Grades T-601 and CG. They have found that by using this precision plastic they can *cut costs, save time* and *do better work* . . . both in rubber pad and direct forming of lighter metals.

Laminated INSUROK does not mar materials; it is approximately half the weight of aluminum; therefore easier to handle regardless of size; and oils, greases and other lubricants have no deteriorating effects.

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

Forming Dies of Laminated INSUROK, shown here through the courtesy of Republic Aviation Corporation.

INSUROK

Precision Plastics

The RICHARDSON COMPANY

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NEW BRUNSWICK, N. J. INDIANAPOLIS, IND.

News-Lines

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

What you as a businessman CAN and CANNOT do as a result of federal court and administrative decisions:

YOU CAN be required to pay an income tax on a single-premium annuity contract that you receive from your employer even though it has no cash surrender or loan value. In one case, a circuit court of appeals holds that employes receiving such annuity contracts from their company were taxable on them in the year they were received, with the taxable amount being the purchase price paid by the employer.

* * *

YOU CANNOT obtain more than 2,240 pounds of ***antimony*** in any one month unless you get special authorization from the War Production Board. Strict allocation controls are restored over antimony in various forms such as ore, metal and alloy.

* * *

YOU CAN raise the price of the hardwood ***lumber*** that you produce if you operate a mill in the Southern region. The average increase allowed by the Office of Price Administration is about $3 per thousand feet board measure.

* * *

YOU CANNOT fail to set aside for Government purchase 70 per cent of your utility-grade ***beef*** if you are a packer operating under federal inspection in any State except Washington, Oregon and California. War Food Administration raises the set-aside except for the three West Coast States, where it remains 50 per cent.

* * *

YOU CAN, on behalf of the management of your company, solicit proxies in advance of the mailing of an annual report if solicitations are being made in opposition to the management. In approving this procedure, the Securities and Exchange Commission specifies that the management must undertake to supply the annual report at least 20 days before the meeting.

* * *

YOU CANNOT, as a producer of ***matches***, dispose of your supplies as you wish. WPB is setting up an allocation system to control distribution of matches at the producer level, in order to meet increased military demands and requirements for liberated areas.

YOU CAN follow a simpler procedure than heretofore in seeking an extension of authority to use allocated ***chemicals***. All details of your application now can be handled in a single letter to WPB's Chemicals Bureau in Washington.

* * *

YOU CAN be denied, as an income tax deduction, the entire amount of salary or wage paid by you, as employer, in contravention of the Salary Stabilization Act. This interpretation is made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

* * *

YOU CAN apply to WPB for authority to produce more than your approved quotas of certain types of ***farm machinery***, if your plant is not running at full capacity and the necessary labor is available.

* * *

YOU CAN probably send a letter to your employes, prior to a collective-bargaining election, setting forth views on their benefits without a union, in addition to a statement of the employes' rights, under the Wagner Act, without violating the Act. The ruling of a circuit court of appeals holds one employer was within his legal rights in distributing such a letter.

* * *

YOU CANNOT charge more than ceiling prices for ***rubber bands*** which now are to be manufactured from Buna-S synthetic rubber. OPA fixes ceilings, based upon 1942 prices, for manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers.

* * *

YOU CAN increase by $1 a ton the ceiling price on ***pig iron*** that you produce. OPA reports that this increase is required to restore the industry's earnings to prewar levels and to maintain fair and equitable ceilings.

* * *

YOU CANNOT, as a retailer, sell odd-lot ***shoes*** ration free to another dealer. OPA allows you to sell them only to consumers. Manufacturers and wholesalers, however, can sell odd lots ration free to other dealers.

Conclusions expressed in these paragraphs are based upon decisions and rulings of courts and Government bureaus. In making their decisions, courts and bureaus consider many facts which, for reasons of space, cannot be set forth in detail. THE UNITED STATES NEWS, *on written request, will refer interested readers to sources of this basic material.*

WHAT NEXT...

WILL THEY DO WITH THESE

FIBERS OF GLASS?

ARMY AND NAVY food containers, refrigerators and household refrigerators are more efficient, more economical, thanks to *Fiberglas Thermal Insulation.* Made of fine fibers of glass, interlaced to form a lightweight, non-settling, odorless insulation, Fiberglas helps your refrigerator keep foods fresh longer. And, since Fiberglas retains its insulating efficiency indefinitely, it helps to keep operating costs down.

STEEL PIPE LINES are now being "wrapped" in glass—yes, strips of felt-like, inorganic *Fiberglas* Mat*—for added protection against corrosion and electrolytic action which "eat out" buried pipe line. Pliable and strong, Fiberglas Mat holds in place protective coatings. Together, they add years to the life of a pipe line, vital carrier of gas, crude oil and refinery products.

PENICILLIN, the latest "wonder drug", is produced in glass fermentation flasks stoppered with fluffy *Fiberglas Fibers.* While gases can easily escape through these fibers, ruinous air-borne bacteria are kept out. Moreover, Fiberglas Fibers withstand repeated sterilization by steam.

• Here are only a few of the hundreds of ways in which engineers, technicians and product designers have used Fiberglas to distinct advantage in bettering their products or processes through this wartime period. You may be interested in knowing how Fiberglas can do a better job for you now and postwar. Samples for experimental purposes are available. Write *Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 1805 Nicholas Building, Toledo 1, Ohio. In Canada, Fiberglas Canada Ltd., Oshawa, Ontario.*



ELECTRIC MOTORS, generators, transformers and other electrical and communications equipment for military aircraft, ships and war-producing industry use *Fiberglas Electrical Insulations*—yarn, tapes, cord, sleeving and cloth. These glass textiles, being inorganic, strong and highly resistant to heat, moisture, oil and corrosive vapors, are doing a great job on war and home fronts.

ARMY E NAVY

FIBERGLAS

*T. M. Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

Motor Transport Pays Its Way . . *and More!*

TAXES—collected from highway users—built America's roads and are maintaining them.

The government does *not* subsidize the operators of motor vehicles. They pay their way—and more.

This is the definite conclusion of one of the most comprehensive and thorough government studies ever undertaken!

Under the title "Public Aids to Transportation", the late Honorable Joseph B. Eastman, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and previously Federal Coordinator of Transportation, published a conclusive government report which definitely settled the subsidy question.

This monumental work was the result of seven years of careful investigation and research to determine how much, if any, government money is being received by the various forms of transportation.

The work was carried on under the personal direction of Mr. Eastman and Dr. Charles S. Morgan, former Interstate Commerce Commission Economist.

While so voluminous and technical as to prevent thorough reading by the average citizen, the business press of the country was quick to hail its masterful thoroughness and significance. Typical press excerpts are:

". . . report has shattered irrevocably the contention of the railroads that their highway competitors are 'subsidized' by the Government."—*Detroit News.*

". . . ideal man for this job was quiet, learned, earnest, long-laboring Coordinator (now ICC Chairman) Joseph B. Eastman, whose honesty is honored by railroad men, railroad-baiters and shippers alike."—*Time Magazine.*

". . . certain types of heavy motor vehicles used in competition with other forms of transportation have paid substantially more than their fair share of highway costs."—*Wall Street Journal.*

America's highways, like all roads from the beginning of history, were built primarily for commerce. No other purpose could sustain the cost of building and maintaining these highways. But there have been those who have stated that motor transport competed unfairly with other types of transportation because it did not pay for the cost of highways upon which it operated.

This accusation was exploded once and for all by Eastman who said, ". . . there has been no public aid to motor-vehicle users as a class since 1926" . . . He reported that overpayments of motor vehicle users—consisting of State gasoline taxes and registration fees, miscellaneous State taxes and estimated municipal and county and local motor-vehicle taxes—beginning in 1927, reached the huge total of $385,360,000 in ten years. The overpayments range from $5 annually for farm trucks *up to $287 for truck-trailers of over 5 tons capacity.*

Well over 90% of the inter-city motor freight handled by for-hire carriers travels in these truck-trailer combinations of more than 5-tons capacity.

Besides the indispensable service Motor Transport has rendered the American public and American business, these over-payments have lightened the burden for other highway users, particularly the private motorist.

Furthermore, the payments per vehicle mentioned by Eastman do not include the so-called "legal diversion" deducted from highway user revenues. Neither are Federal excise and other general taxes included.

Motor Transport pays its way—and more! Eastman proved this scientifically and conclusively. Nobody has been able to refute him.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

EASTMAN REPORT HIGHLIGHTS

Highways users pay more than their fair share of road and street costs. Overpayments beginning in 1921 had reached the huge total of $385,360,000 by 1937. Highway transportation is handicapped by costly restrictions (YOU, the public, pay for this).

In one comparable year:

	OVERPAID
Highway transportation	$110,722,000
	SUBSIDIZED
Railroads	$ 35,635,000
Waterways	128,528,000
Airways	21,010,000

- Highway transportation saves consumers "tens of millions annually."
- The size and capacity of vehicles have but little influence on highway costs.
- Theory that highways are constructed for government "profit" is exploded.
- In the typical year of 1932, "for-hire" trucks above 1½ tons capacity overpaid their share of highway costs by $4,500,000.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

World's Largest Builders of Truck-Trailers *Service in Principal Cities*

FRUEHAUF TRAILER COMPANY • DETROIT 32

VOLUME XVIII—No. 8 The United States News WASHINGTON, D. C.
Title Reg U.S. Pat. Off.

The National Week ★ ★ ★
Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

TESTS OF 'BIG 3' AGREEMENT: FREE ELECTIONS, SOUND TRADE

First Trial in Ruling Germany and Realigning Europe's Economy

Issues of who will supervise Polish voting, of dollar's ability to save world finance

Four basic results now are to flow from decisions taken by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin at their meeting in Russia's Crimea that ended February 11.

First, decision was reached to destroy the military power in Germany by eliminating her warmaking industries, by cutting off areas having resources needed by those industries, and by military occupation and control of her territory.

Second, there is agreement to create a new league of nations within the framework of which settlements can be sought for the potential war-producing issues that will arise in Europe and in the Far East after this war.

Third, Russia will give U.S. and Britain help, at some point, in the final stages of fighting against Japan. This decision, for obvious reasons, was not announced.

Fourth, the United States has reversed her long-time policy and has agreed to take an active part in current settlement of issues inside Europe as they arise. This country will join with Russia and Britain in holding elections to permit liberated peoples to choose their own governments.

To win acceptance of the second and third points and to get approval of the idea of free elections, President Roosevelt, for the United States, found it necessary to make some concessions. He went along with Russia's claim to the eastern portion of prewar Poland. He agreed to the Russian idea of collecting reparations in kind from Germany. He also agreed to a compromise on the plan of voting in the proposed World Security Council.

Mr. Roosevelt also held out promises of other things from the United States. In line with one such promise, he already has asked Congress to repeal the Johnson Act, which bars loans at present to Russia, Great Britain, France, Belgium and Italy. He assured strong support for plans to create a new World Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for a larger lending power in the U.S. Export-Import Bank, and for an International Monetary Fund through which the U.S. would use dollars to help stabilize world currencies. In brief, the U.S., as the one world power with adequate resources, is to take over the task of underwriting world recovery after the war.

The test of these decisions and plans, however, will be in their actual working, and not in the words of the published statements of the Big Three. Testing grounds will be those that follow.

Germany. The first real test of workability of the Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill plan will come in Germany. That nation, when defeated, is to be divided up and occupied, probably for a long time. Rule will be military. In the U.S. and British zones, judging by experience, right-wing groups inside Germany will be favored. In the Russian zone, left-wing Germans will be favored. In the French zone the center of control may lie in the middle. A top military commission of generals will try to resolve the resulting difficulties.

Almost immediately there will be a basic problem of economic reorientation. Germany, even in peacetime, was the center of trade on the Continent. European trade and finance now must be reorganized. Balkan areas and Poland, which had depended heavily upon German markets, probably will need to gear themselves to Russia. Eastern Germany may do the same. Western Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Northern Italy will need to orient themselves to a stronger France. It remains to be seen how well Europe will thrive with a weak Germany in its center. This Germany is likely to be socialistic. Russia is a socialist state. France is planning to develop state capitalism. Old-style capitalism, as U.S. knows it, seems destined to disappear on the Continent.

Reparations. The Germany that remains will be presented with an immense bill for war damages. The collection agency to make sure that bill is paid is to be located in Moscow, where the chief claimant re-



—U. S. Army Signal Corps

THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE
. . . Mr. Roosevelt conceded

AT MALTA

—U. S. Army Signal Corps Photos

AT YALTA

. . . for Americans the stakes were the highest in history

sides. Russia will insist upon labor battalions of Germans to work in Russia. These probably will be the prisoners of war now there. She will insist upon stripping much of German industry of its machinery. She will expect Germans to devote to paying reparations as much of their national energy as they devoted to preparation for war. United States-Britain-France had difficulty collecting reparations after the first World War because they insisted upon payment in money and not so much in goods, which competed with their own production. Russia's economic organization permits her to accept goods in unlimited quantities.

Spheres of influence. On its surface, the agreement of Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin calls for an end of sphere-of-influence operations by individual members of the Big Three outside of the Balkans. There must be joint consultation of the Big Three when issues are to be resolved. Elections are to be held to determine who shall rule in liberated nations. The United States, for the first time, assumes responsibility for taking a hand in current decisions affecting problems in Europe. Yet the test of this policy will come when interim governments are created and when elections are held. It remains to be seen whether this country will put an army in Poland, for example, to make certain that the people enjoy the same freedom of choice in an election that they enjoy in the United States. Experience of the past in Europe suggests that elections very often go almost unanimously in favor of the big power that polices the balloting.

Vatican vs. Russia. The Vatican in the past has expressed opposition to the type of settlement that now has been agreed upon for Poland. It doubts the permanence of a peace that will split Germany into segments and leave deep, permanent scars in the center of Europe. Because of the Vatican attitude, Government-controlled newspapers in Russia are taking verbal shots that cannot do other than disturb relations with the Catholic Church, which exercises a very important political influence in much of Europe. Vatican organs are replying. Any settlement, in the long run, will be tested severely by whether or not Russia and the Vatican can compose differences of viewpoint.

Outcome of these tests in Europe, and later in Asia, will be determined in part by the workability and effectiveness of the world organization now to be set up, if the U. S. Senate approves. That organization will get its constitution from the meeting to be held in San Francisco starting April 25. The objective will be to get Senate approval and to have this organization functioning before the end of 1945.

The core of the new league, as it is shaping, will be what amounts to a military alliance between the United States, Russia and Great Britain. These three major powers will expect to run the world with the advice and consent of the other members of the league. The test of the league, in turn, will depend upon two factors: (1) whether or not nations other than the Big Three will be satisfied with the treatment they receive and will go along willingly; (2) whether or not the world that comes out of the war is one that can work to produce a relatively high level of prosperity and relatively full employment everywhere.

The United States will get the job of assuring this prosperity. It will get that job because it is only when the United States is prosperous that the remainder of the world, outside of Russia with its closed system, can be prosperous and contented.

Mr. Roosevelt's recipe for postwar prosperity calls for very large-scale lending of dollars abroad. It calls for stabilization of world currencies by assuring an adequate supply of dollars. It calls for dollar loans through a new World Bank. It involves broad reduction in U. S. tariffs to enable other nations to sell more goods in the United States on a more favorable basis in order to obtain dollars to pay back loans. It calls for stabilization of basic commodity prices by agreement with other nations. In brief, the Roosevelt plan is a plan for the United States to put the world back on its feet after this war with loans that can be used to buy in the United States the machinery and other things needed to get the world into an efficient operating position.

If the U. S., as the great economic center of the remaining capitalist nations, cannot assure the basis for worldwide prosperity, then the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin agreement, and the alliance it represents, could end in a new argument suggesting more trouble for the world.

A Congress Revolt: Difficulties Facing FDR

Opposition of Lawmakers to Drastic Change in Our Economic Life

Fight over Wallace nomination symbolic of conservative trend

Congress is in revolt. It is lambasting President Roosevelt's nominees. It is ignoring his recommendations for international economic agreements. It is shying at his suggestions for economic and social changes at home after the war. It is in a mood to withdraw some of his wartime powers. All this while the President, with a new electoral mandate to win the war, is facing the toughest job of his career.

The revolt stops short of the President's conduct of the war and his plans for a world peace agency. These do not appear to be affected. In the Senate, Mr. Roosevelt's Crimean agreement is being well received. The main thought of both parties is pointed toward a world agency to keep the peace. But Congress is fighting against any change in the economic and social structure that existed before the war.

That fight kept the old Dies Committee on Un-American Activities alive as a permanent agency in the House. It brought the Senate up in arms against the nomination of Henry A. Wallace to be Secretary of Commerce. It put the social thinking of Aubrey Williams under fire in a Senate committee when his name came up for chief of the Rural Electrification Administration. It is standing in the way of any new social security and economic planning legislation.

Mr. Wallace as symbol. The battle over the Wallace nomination provides a clearly visible clue to the congressional thinking that will dominate the conversion of the nation from war back to peace.

Mr. Wallace is regarded in both houses of Congress as a thorough-going symbol of the New Deal. He has flung that slogan into the teeth of Southern Democrats many times. They fear that, if given the opportunity, he will translate the words into deeds. Some Southern Senators, like Josiah W. Bailey of North Carolina, say that they were horrified at the picture Mr. Wallace painted in his testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee.

What Mr. Wallace had done was to outline anew, in deadly earnest and with some detail, the so-called economic bill of rights that Mr. Roosevelt had proclaimed in one of his campaign speeches. The eight things that Mr. Wallace recited as the economic right of every American were: a job; wages high enough for a decent living; a fair price for farm goods; fair competition for big and little business in an open market; a decent home for every family; adequate medical care for all; adequate protection against old age, sickness, accident and unemployment; a good education.

All of these things had made good listening in the campaign. But Mr. Wallace convinced the Senators that he had deeds, not words, in mind; that he seriously intended to try to use the Government as an instrument for having these things done. To Southern Democrats like Mr. Bailey and Senator George of Georgia, this sounded like a dramatic turn toward socialism. Many a Republican felt likewise.

Mr. Wallace had mentioned the use of Government loans to foster small business. Neither in testimony nor in the debates that followed did the Defense Plant Corp. figure largely. But business-minded congressmen shudder when they think of the billions of dollars' worth of industrial plants that are owned by the Government and now are making war goods. These, too, would be under the control of Mr. Wallace.

Coalition at work. The old coalition of Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans went to work on Mr. Wallace. Elections had cut down its margins of vote superiority over New Deal-minded legislators in both houses, in both parties. But the nucleus of co-operative agents was still there; the framework still exists. In the Senate, the like-minded opponents of Mr.



—Harris & Ewing

BARKLEY & WALLACE

—Harris & Ewing

WALLACE & BAILEY
. . . the South was split

—Acme

PEPPER & WALLACE

Wallace in both parties were numerous enough to make it evident that he could not be confirmed for the Commerce Department post unless the Reconstruction Finance Corp. were separated from that Department.

Eleven Southern Senators quit the Administration on the Wallace question. But Senators Barkley of Kentucky and Pepper of Florida, leading the fight for Mr. Wallace, held nine Southerners with them. On the surface, the South split in half. But this vote will shift, according to the issues in the battles over economic, social, labor and tax legislation that lie ahead.

—Harris & Ewing

REPRESENTATIVE RANKIN



—Harris & Ewing

REPRESENTATIVE PRIEST

. . . the coalition is faced with competition

Half a dozen Republican votes lie, also, in a shifting middle ground in the Senate. They often may be found voting with the Administration on social and economic questions. Among them are the new Senators Wayne L. Morse of Oregon and Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, along with Senators Burton of Ohio, Ball of Minnesota and Austin of Vermont.

However, in the Senate shifts that lie ahead, when the test comes on major issues of economics and taxes, the North-South coalition of anti-New Dealers has a slight edge. This domestic voting edge hardly will reach into the question of a world peace agency, because many a Southerner who votes against the Administration on domestic issues has been, throughout the war, a consistent supporter of its international position.

Closer margins. The voters cut down the power of the coalition in the House. The show of strength that it made at the outset of the session, when Representative John Rankin, the Mississippi Democrat, had the old Dies Committee on Un-American Activities established as a permanent committee, was somewhat misleading. Many a former member of the House already was on record in favor of the Committee in past sessions and did not wish to change the record.

On hot economic, social, tax and labor questions, Representatives Rankin, Eugene Cox of Georgia and Howard W. Smith of Virginia usually can swing from 30 to 35 Southern votes with them. If these are pooled with the 190 Republicans, most of whom Representative Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts, the Republican Leader, usually manages to hold in line, the coalition can sweep the House on most questions.

But the voting is far closer now than it was in the last Congress. The Democrats now have a numerical superiority of 52. At the end of the last session, their majority had dwindled to the vanishing point and the Republicans were discussing whether they should try to take control of the House.

In one way or another, some of Mr. Rankin's teammates, such as Representatives Dies and Kleberg of Texas, Starnes of Alabama, Green of Florida and Whelchel of Georgia, vanished with the autumn elections. Similarly, there have disappeared from the Republican side such former coalition Representatives as Day of Illinois, Fish of New York and Treadway of Massachusetts.

In their stead is a group of new members. This trimming down of coalition strength enabled Administration leaders to pass the George resolution unchanged and send it to the White House. They beat down by eight and ten-vote margins all coalition efforts to overhaul the measure.

A new type of Southern member, one little interested in coalition, is growing up in the House. It is represented by men like Percy Priest and Albert Gore of Tennessee and Brooks Hays of Arkansas. Their thoughts on social and economic problems do not fit the pattern of the coalition.

Battle against the coalition. Both among Democrats and among Republicans, the talk of a coalition is decried. During the Wallace fight in the House, Democrats were incensed when a report spread that Representatives Rankin and Martin were meeting to discuss strategy for opening the George resolution, which would separate the RFC from the Commerce Department, to Republican amendments. The working relationship always has been of an informal nature. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats liked the inference that they were deserting their own parties.

That was one of the points that Herbert Brownell, the chairman of the Republican National Committee, took up with congressional leaders when he was here last week with Governor Thomas E. Dewey. They do not like the fact that Representative Rankin, the Mississippi Democrat, often has been referred to in the newspapers as the House Republican Leader. They would rather evolve a Republican program of their own.

Natural alliances. Irrespective of their wishes, however, a certain kinship exists between the economic thinking of Southern Democrats from rural areas and that of Middle Western and Northern Republicans from rural areas. The pressures that are applied upon them from their districts are much the same. Their constituencies are similar. On economic and social problems, their voting is likely to be much alike whether or not there is any agreement between them.

Certain alterations, already discernible in the splits that show up in the voting of the Southern Senators and Representatives, are taking place in the districts of these members. Some districts have been industrialized during the war. Labor influences are making themselves felt in the voting. This accounted for several changes in the last election. And wiping out of the poll tax in Georgia will bring tenant farmers to the polls in many districts.

Whatever changes lie in the future, however, will not alter the fact that the membership is stacked against broad-scale changes in economic, social and tax legislation in this Congress. Unless the situation is drastically changed, or necessity prods hard, Mr. Roosevelt may expect little legislation of that nature. This applies also to international economic agreements. But the prospects are good for his world peace agency.

NEW BASE FOR CURRENCY? MEANING OF MONETARY FUND

Importance of Dollar in Proposed International Fiscal Machinery

How Administration would underwrite the peace. Points of criticism in Congress

America, after spending $250,000,000,000 on war, now must decide whether to put up as much as $6,000,000,000 to help the world get back on its feet after the war. That is the investment the U. S. is asked to make in creating two new pieces of international machinery for postwar finance.

The two pieces of machinery which now await approval from Congress are an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to make world loans, and an International Monetary Fund, to serve, in effect, as a new base for currency values. Both depend on the backing of the United States, with its dollar supply and its ability to produce quickly the capital equipment the world needs, if they are to work. Yet Congress is wary at this early stage of consideration.

The wariness of Congress arises from a fear that this country is being asked to set up a scheme for world boondoggling; that the Bank and the Fund may turn out to be just another handout, to go the way of past handouts. Then there is concern about whether the program is a New Deal scheme for world currency inflation.

The general public has not yet had much detailed information about what is proposed, or what safeguards may be used. Essentially, these proposals are made:

World Bank. This country is being asked to pledge $3,175,000,000 to the International Bank, which would have total resources of $9,100,000,000. The Bank's loan fund would consist only of $1,820,000,000, or 20 per cent of its capital, and this country's initial contribution would be only $635,000,000 in gold or dollars. Other countries also would be required to pay 10 per cent of their contributions in gold or dollars, or $118,500,000. The remaining subscriptions are to be used as a reserve which the Bank can draw upon to pay losses on its obligations.

Bank loans and guarantees would be limited to loans that could not be floated privately and then only for specific projects that offer a fair chance of paying out. Yugoslavia, for example, may want a $10,000,000 loan to repair and expand its electric power system. Yugoslavia has not been too good a credit risk, so may not be able to get a loan from private interests. Thus, the Yugoslavs go to the Bank.

A committee investigates, writes a report recommending the loan. After the loan is approved, the Bank may: (1) loan directly, (2) borrow money to make the loan, or (3) guarantee a loan by private investors. If the Yugoslavs want American equipment, they will want the loan in dollars. However, the Bank cannot grant a dollar loan without the consent of the U. S. If the loan then is cleared, Yugoslavia gets the money at interest rates determined by the Bank. If the Bank borrows the funds advanced, or guarantees a private loan, it cannot charge less than 1 per cent commission or more than 1½ per cent. And, if the loan is made to a private concern, Yugoslavia, too, must guarantee repayment.

This procedure corresponds with orthodox banking practice. Loans must be sound, they must be guaranteed and they cannot be made if private lenders will make them. Finally, the risk is spread among all member countries and defaults are shared so that the U. S. alone would not shoulder losses. With these safeguards, this part of the program is generally approved and there appear to be few doubts that Congress will accept it.

The Monetary Fund is another matter. This is a more complicated proposal to steer a middle course between the old gold standard and the currency wars and controls that marked the prewar period. Essentially, it is an $8,800,000,000 pool of currency and gold, into which the United States would put $2,750,000,000, including a required $687,500,000 in gold. Each country would be entitled to tap the pool by exchanging its own currency for other currencies in the pool, up to the amount originally deposited. However, only a fourth of this sum could be withdrawn in any one year.

Russia, for example, would deposit $300,000,000 in gold and $900,000,000 in rubles—$1,200,000,000 in all. This would entitle the Soviet to take $300,000,000 in dollars out of the pool each year by depositing an equal amount of rubles, at a fixed rate of exchange. Russia could do this, for example, if the dollars received for shipping furs and ore to the United States failed to equal the dollars owed for U. S. machinery.

The dollar is the key currency in the Fund. Nearly every country in the world is expected to want more dollars to buy U. S. goods than they can earn by selling goods to the United States, at least in



—Harris & Ewing

SENATOR TOBEY . . . A SPONSOR IN THE SENATE
. . . Congress is wary about global boondoggling



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early postwar years. Critics of the Fund thus foresee a run on dollars that could drain the pool of U. S. currency and fill it with rubles, francs, lire, pesos and pounds that might not be much in demand.

To guard against this development, the Fund can take certain positive steps. It can sell its gold to the United States for dollars; it can seek dollar loans to itself; it can recommend that this country buy more goods from abroad, or make more overseas loans, or else curtail its sales abroad. Finally, the Fund can ration its supply of dollars and authorize other countries to control the spending of any dollars they may possess. Since the United States has only 28 per cent of the Fund's votes, critics see in this power a chance for the Fund to influence U. S. trade policies and to limit American sales abroad.

Penalties apply, however, on the use of the Fund by nations who will want to draw dollars from it. A service charge of ¾ of 1 per cent is imposed for each withdrawal, and added charges, ranging from ⅜ of 1 per cent in the first year to 5 per cent after 10 years, are imposed for repeated drafts. Also, if a country has gold and dollar reserves of its own that exceed its quota, it must draw upon these in an amount equal to drafts on the Fund. And, when its dollar position improves, it must buy back its own currency in the Fund with half of the additional dollars it earned.

In addition, countries that continually buy more than they sell, and thus have to tap the Fund year after year, can be told to change their trading practices by importing less or selling more. At this point another dispute enters.

Currency values can be changed. Any country is entitled to reduce the value of its currency, in terms of gold, by 10 per cent, and, upon approval of the Fund, another 10 per cent or more. England, for instance, can reduce the pound from $4.00 to $3.60, and, with Fund approval, to $3.24. That would make British textiles cheaper than U. S. textiles in terms of dollars, and thus would give the British goods a competitive advantage in both world and U. S. markets.

Here, again, critics of the Fund contend that this allows too much leeway, and express fear that the Fund may develop into a successive cheapening of foreign currencies at the expense of the dollar. Fund supporters, on the other hand, claim that some flexibility is needed to correct basic trade problems; that Britain, perhaps, may have to sell more goods abroad so that more can be bought from abroad.

An alternative to the Fund is suggested by the American Bankers Association and other banking groups. This proposal is to establish the Bank and authorize that agency to make currency-stabilization loans to various member countries. The point is made that this would be a familiar method, more simple and more flexible.

The Administration, however, is asking Congress to approve both institutions. A bill sponsored by Senator Wagner (Dem.), of New York, and Senator Tobey (Rep.), of New Hampshire, would authorize the President to accept U. S. membership in the Fund and the Bank. This country's gold contribution would be made from the Treasury's $1,800,000,000 Exchange Stabilization Fund, and its dollars would be supplied through special issues of non-interest-bearing Treasury notes.

U. S. risks would be safeguarded by provisions that the value of the dollar, the nation's quota in the Fund, and its subscription to the Bank cannot be changed without the consent of Congress. Congress also would have to approve any further dollar loans to the Fund or the Bank. In brief, the Administration is willing to risk $6,000,000,000, and no more, to get new financial machinery started.

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

STRATEGIC COAST OF CHINA: INVASION BASE FOR ALLIES

Opening of Battle for Vital Zone, Key to Asia and Japanese Islands

Cutting foe's land, sea lines and supplying Chiang's army as initial aims of campaign

The China coast, long a zone of mystery to outsiders, is the next big battlefield of the Pacific war. That shore is the key to Asia and a steppingstone to Japan. Thus, the struggle for mastery of China's coast is a vital part of the general campaign now under way to bring the Pacific war to a victorious end.

The first round of the battle for the China coast already has begun. Along that coast, American planes from fields in China, from carriers, and from the Philippines are attacking Japanese ships and bases. In the interior, Americans under the command of Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer are preparing to drive toward the coast to form a junction with the forces that are to come by sea. And over Japan, the U. S. Navy's great carrier strike at Tokyo aids the China campaign by hitting Japan's sea and air power at home.

Although Japan may be crippled by direct blows, the bulk of her war industries on the mainland of Asia must be disposed of to complete her defeat.

Basic strategy of the coming invasion of China is being brought into the open. First aim will be to win shore bases. Once those are secure, expansion of the American expeditionary force as needed will be possible. Possession of the bases will clear the way for a series of moves, the time, place and sequence of which are secret. Thus:

Supplies for China can pour in to equip large numbers of Chinese foot soldiers. Half a million Chinese are being conscripted to support the U. S. invasion. They can back up a campaign spearheaded by hard-hitting and fast-moving American armored forces.

Air and sea blockade of Japan can cut her off from vital outside sources of food, oil, iron and coal. Her industries will be blasted, her people starved. Her warships and planes will be forced to fight or be destroyed in the harbors or on the ground.

Cutting of Japan's land route in China to her outlying empire will be possible. Already severed is her route by sea to Southeast Asia and the East Indies.

A drive up the China coast toward North China, Manchuria and Korea could strike at Japan's inner empire in Asia. If Russia should enter the war, that empire would be caught in a two-way squeeze.

Sea-borne invasion of Japan could administer the knockout. American troops would land on a weakened Japan, under protection of fleets of U. S. planes and ships having command of the air and sea.

As shown by the map on pages 20 and 21, the coast of China looks forbidding to the invader. Favorable landing places on the northern part are heavily guarded. The parts nearer the Philippines are wild and rugged. Good harbors are few. Some fastnesses still are lairs of pirates. Back of the coast, the land is broken by hills and mountains. Roads to the interior are poor and scarce. Only the cities, together with connecting strips of land along the railroads and in the river valleys, are held by the Japanese. Sporadic war is waged between them and Chinese guerrillas.

Numerous landing places along this forbidding coast are open to American attack. Each has its advantages and drawbacks.

The Hong Kong and Canton area would open a route by railroad and the West River to the interior of China. It would give the nearest connection with the Chinese and American forces based on Chungking. Any invasion of this area, however, would have to run the gantlet of the formidable defenses centered around Hong Kong. And the Japanese now have full possession of the railroad connecting Canton with Hankow.

Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, Wenchow, farther up the coast, would afford valuable airfields for American use. Possession of any or all of these ports would outflank Formosa. Drawbacks are the lack of good harbors and the fact that connections with the interior are difficult. No railroads touch any of these ports, and roads and rivers reach only a limited distance inland.

Shanghai, still farther north, is the industrial capital and strategic center of China. In peacetime this city had a population of 3,500,000. It lies on a flat coastal plain near the mouth of the Yangtze River. From Shanghai and nearby Hangchow and Ningpo, railroads lead inland and connect with both South and North China. The Yangtze River is navigable by warships for nearly 700 miles, to Hankow, and by barges for 1,600 miles, to Chungking. The terrain around Shanghai would afford excellent opportunity for operations by American tanks and mobile artillery. These, however, would have to overcome fixed defenses and opposition from strong Japanese forces.

Regardless of the point or points selected for the first landings, geographic and strategic factors will tend to bring about a campaign that sooner or later will involve the Shanghai area. The Japanese themselves recognized the importance of Shanghai when they made an attack upon that city the starting point of their war in China in 1937. After taking Shanghai, they went up the Yangtze River and captured Nanking and Hankow, but were stopped between Hankow and Chungking.

When and if the Americans reach Shanghai, they can, if they choose, follow the Japanese strategy. That would

—Justus in Minneapolis Star-Journal

THE KEY TO THE LOCK



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mean fighting their way inland along the Yangtze River. In any case, however, their route seems certain to turn north ultimately, following the railroads toward North China, Manchuria and Korea. Somewhere in that northern region they would hope to link up with the Russians, driving south.

A land campaign into North China would bring U. S. forces for the first time into head-on collision with the full power of Japan's land Army. From Shanghai north to Tientsin and Peiping—a distance of 600 miles—there is a continuous stretch of level plain, where a war of maneuver could be fought. This region is the most densely populated in all China, and the military forces opposing the Japanese there are mainly Chinese Communists.

American armies fighting in China would meet a whole new set of difficulties. They would find the climate rainy and cold in winter and hot and dusty in summer. On top of natural difficulties would be the handicaps arising from the lack of a strong central government. The deep division between Communists and the Kuomintang Party, of which Chiang is the head, has not been healed. When the American campaign in China goes north, it will head right into the area where the Communists are in control and where civil war threatens to break loose at any time. Thus far, the U. S. Government has made no attempt to supply and equip the Communist troops.



Japanese armies in North China, Manchuria and Korea, numbering 2,000,000 men, could be expected to battle fiercely to stem an American attack. They would be defending the core of Japan's continental empire, supplying a big portion of her iron and steel, coal, chemicals, synthetic gasoline, and food. Japan's war industries are being transferred from the home islands to this area.

The big problem for the U. S. high command is how large an army will have to be sent to fight in China. Early in the war, it was hoped that the job could be done by the Chinese, armed and equipped by this country. China's weakness and internal troubles, however, have brought American military opinion around to the idea that total U. S. forces ranging from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 men may be needed. This is indicated by present expansion of the Army to more than 8,000,000 men, regardless of prospects for an early end of the European war.

It is unlikely that Russia will come into the Pacific war to share the job of defeating the Japanese on the Continent until an American force is well established in China. That may not be until her non-aggression treaty with Japan expires in April, 1946. As for conquest of the home islands of Japan, that is a job calling for special equipment and experience in blockade and amphibious warfare. All or most of that job is almost certain to be done by the U. S.

SEA-AIR SQUEEZE ON JAPAN

Blows of Planes and Ships as Prelude to Crushing Drive on Land

Tightening of our blockade to isolate enemy homeland from essential materials

American sea power and air power now are closing in on Japan—if possible, for the kill. From now on, the war is to be taken home to the Japanese. The first carrier-plane strike in great strength against Tokyo and the U. S. Navy assault on Japan's inner islands reveal the pattern.

Japan's air force is to be compelled to fight for its life in the home skies. Japan's surface fleet is to be forced to come out into battle, or else, ship by ship, is to be sunk in the harbors at home. Japan's cities are to be bombed from the skies and bombarded from the sea. A blockade tighter than any other nation ever has faced is to be clamped down upon her.

America's victories by air and sea now are raising, as to Japan, a question somewhat similar to that which once was raised as to Germany. That question is whether Japan can be beaten by sea power and air power, helped by the troops needed to secure bases, but without involving campaigns by huge American land armies.

Chances for scoring a knockout without using vast U. S. land forces seem somewhat better in the case of Japan than they have proved to be in the case of Germany.

Japan's vulnerability to U. S. sea and air attack is based on these factors:

Her island position exposes her to blows from every side. It makes her dependent for her very life on imports and on ships that can be sunk. Japan must get from outside sources much of her food, nearly all of her oil, most of her iron and part of her coal. If cut off from these sources, her whole economy will face collapse.

The concentration of her industries close to the coast makes them good targets for airplanes and long-range naval guns. Congestion and flimsy construction of buildings make her cities especially vulnerable to fire.

Her weakness in the air is Japan's greatest source of danger. Destruction of her air force may be a matter of weeks or months, rather than years, as in the case of Germany. Right now, her losses of planes far exceed her production rate of 1,500 planes a month.



—Press Association

SWARMS OF HELLCATS, HELLDIVERS, AVENGERS STRUCK

Effectiveness of U. S. planes enables them to make the most of Japan's air weakness. The Navy's aircraft carriers can be shifted to launch attacks on Japan from every side. At the same time that she is trying to cope with fast and maneuverable carrier-based planes, she must defend herself against heavy bombing by high-flying, long-range Superfortresses. Her whole aircraft industry is being pounded to pieces.

U. S. naval supremacy eventually will extend the sea blockade to all the waters surrounding Japan. That will mean total destruction of Japan's naval power and of the merchant fleet upon which she relies for supplies from the mainland.

Thus, sea and air attacks promise to reduce Japan to a state of helplessness and complete inability to strike an offensive blow at America. Even so, there is no assurance that the war can be ended by that means alone.

Japan's ability to hold out in her home islands is based on factors that may outweigh those that make her vulnerable.

Transfer of her industries underground now is beginning. While the output of these will be too little to support offensive war, it should be enough to give purely defensive ground forces the supplies to keep fighting indefinitely.

Her tradition of suicidal resistance means that her people are likely to fight on and on, regardless of all hardships. They are used to living on little food, and with a minimum of comforts. Although millions might starve, the rest might support their Government in refusing to surrender. The Germans have shown how apparently hopeless resistance can be prolonged.

Experience both in Europe and in the Pacific has proved that strongly entrenched land power cannot be destroyed by sea and air attack alone. Airplanes by themselves can inflict damage, but they cannot take territory. Japan's Army numbers at least 4,000,000 men, of whom at least 1,000,000 are at home. That force can be increased by reserves mobilized from a population of nearly 75,000,000.

The conclusion drawn by officials is that the U. S. cannot risk dependence exclusively on bombing and blockade to defeat Japan. Barring the possibility of complete collapse of her home front, or sudden surrender by her Government, a large-scale land invasion of Japan's home islands almost certainly will be necessary, either before or after her armies on the Continent are destroyed.

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

● TRUE YESTERDAY —

PLYMOUTH BUILDS GREAT CARS

● IN TRUST FOR TOMORROW

WHAT WE'LL EAT IN '45

More Meat, Butter, Canned Goods for Civilians After Fall of Reich

Prospect of continued scarcities of many foods until military needs are met

U. S. civilians are to get decidedly more food after the German war ends. They will get much better food, too. Shortages that compel housewives to scramble to buy unfamiliar cuts of low-grade meat, when and if obtainable, will be relieved, if not altogether ended. Probably there will be enough butter to go around. Cheese, canned vegetables and canned fruits will become at least moderately plentiful. Very probably less food will be rationed, once the country has only one war to fight. Certainly the food will be less tightly rationed, easing the struggle with red stamps and sugar coupons.

This prospect of greatly improved civilian food is supported now by official information and official planning. The Government is not talking about it in statements for the general public. Instead, those statements, partly propaganda to maintain food production at a high level, put the emphasis on presently rising military requirements for food. This rise in requirements is real, of course. It is making present food shortages, and those in immediate prospect, the most severe of the entire war period. Civilians must be prepared to face such shortages, and even a tightening of the pinches, as long as the German war continues.

What is new, and really significant, is the official admission now being made to Congress that the Government's buying of food for military use is to be cut down radically after that war ends. Official plans are built on the expectation that the Government will buy only half as much food as it buys now. That would mean that only 12 per cent, or a little more than that, of the country's total food, would be needed for the Army and Navy and Lend-Lease use, instead of the present 25 per cent.

What makes that cut possible, once the German war ends, is the huge stores of U. S. food that have been accumulated for two wars. The United Kingdom alone can release 2,000,000 tons after the German war. The U. S. Army can release hundreds of thousands of tons of combat rations bought for use in Europe. Together, these stocks, with the food being produced in Europe and North Africa, appear sufficient to meet relief needs in Europe, making it unnecessary to supply much relief food from this country.

Thus, the longer-term needs for food for military use are declining, even though the shorter-term needs now are increasing. However, chiefly as "insurance" against military or other setbacks, the Government is working hard to keep food production high. Any loss that this may entail, if the German war ends suddenly, is to be borne in whole or in part by the Government. That loss will be borne by Government purchases of food, through the Commodity Credit Corp., to support prices. Congress has been asked to provide nearly $900,000,000 expressly to put special price supports, or "floors," under the prices of pork, milk, butter, cheese, potatoes, eggs, dry beans and peas, corn and wheat, in the 12 months after the German war ends.



MEAT: EVENTUALLY, NOT NOW

COFFEE: PLENTY; SUGAR: TIGHT

—Acme Photos

BUTTER: STOCKS SLIPPED ... Nazi defeat would tip the scales

The upshot of all these food plans will be to assure civilians of adequate food of some kind until the German war ends and of decidedly better food after that. Specifically:

Beef will grow scarcer until the German war ends because the Government is buying from 60 to 80 per cent of many grades of beef for military use. After that, the military set-aside may be cut back to 25 or 30 per cent.

Pork supplies are short, owing in part to a lag in production. A third of the pork supply is taken for military use. The result is that, until military requirements are cut down, civilians will get 20 per cent less this year than last, and hams and bacon will remain scarce.

Veal is little affected by military use and will be slightly scarcer than it has been recently.

Lamb and mutton supplies will be little changed.

Poultry will be fairly plentiful countrywide even while both wars continue, but it will be very unevenly distributed. Fifteen per cent is being bought for military use, creating shortages in the cities, where the buying is done.

Butter stocks are low, with a drop in production expected. While 25 to 30 per cent of the butter supply continues to be taken for military use, civilians will get even less than they have been getting.

Sugar, too, will become even scarcer until the German war ends. One fifth of the total supply is reserved for military use. When the military buying is cut down, sugar is likely to be fairly plentiful. The Philippines will provide sugar for this country, though it may not reach U. S. markets before next year.

Eggs are to remain abundant even during the period of war stringency.

Potatoes are in small supply, and 20 per cent is bought for military use. There will be few for civilians for the next two months, enough after that, and an abundance after military buying is reduced.

Canned vegetables will be scarce for a few months, or until the German war ends. Forty per cent is reserved for military use.

Coffee will be plentiful even while both wars continue.

All in all, the U. S. is eating very well even while the pinches are tightest. It will eat much better after one war ends.

BURDENS OF A PEACEMAKER

After Yalta, the Responsibility of Soothing France and the Vatican

Tiring jobs for Mr. Roosevelt. Another, untangling mix-up over liberated areas' relief

President Roosevelt is making an effort to wipe out the suspicious gleam with which the Vatican and the French Government are eyeing the Crimean Agreement. In spite of the strains that the long trip and the work of the conference put upon his health, Mr. Roosevelt is making certain that Italy and France get an explanation of the plans that the Allies have in mind for the Europe of the future.

The Vatican was upset by the decision to divide Poland. That country has a long history of loyalty to the Church. The Pope is inclined to view with alarm any part that Russia may have in shaping the new Poland. Failure of the conferees to mention Catholic Italy also did not sit well at the Vatican. Nor did the lack of any mention of freedom of religion in the published decisions of the conference. All of these points found their place in the talks that the President had in Italy.

In France, Mr. Roosevelt found Gen. Charles de Gaulle and his Government—which has been supported, given a freed country and raised to power as a result of Allied victories—jealous of French sovereignty and clamoring for recognition of its right to greatness. The view was taken there that Marshal Stalin had his way on the Dumbarton Oaks plan and on the division of Poland; that Mr. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill won the acceptance of an inter-Allied regime for Germany instead of a puppet government.

But the French official statement which took cognizance of the Big Three decisions showed no tendency to rejoice over the actions that had been taken at a meeting to which the French had not been invited. The French took for granted that they would help to occupy Germany. They were disappointed that German armistice terms seemed to have been agreed upon without their help and they were suspicious that hidden meanings might lie behind the statement of the conferees.

Mr. Roosevelt's job. It fell upon the President to smooth out these ruffled feelings. It was a role that neither Mr. Churchill nor Mr. Stalin could fill. But Mr. Roosevelt's Administration has had good relations with the Vatican in the past. And France has less reason to suspect the motives of America than those of Britain.

Moreover, the President wanted to look into the relief situation in the liberated areas. His aide, Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, had preceded him with studies in Italy, France and others of the recently occupied countries, gathering data with respect to present and future needs. Reports indicated Mr. Rosenman had found that Mr. Roosevelt's directives calling for more relief to the French civilian population had not been fulfilled.

Reports that crept through censorship said that one of the war's greatest scandals might develop out of the relief situation when Mr. Roosevelt got to France. Previous reports had indicated that military men have shunted aside supplies for civilians in order to hasten the movement of munitions. But the French problem already is complicated by black market scandals that have involved large numbers of military personnel, officers and men.

Mr. Roosevelt's health. The diplomatic maneuvers, the inquiries, the travels, all of these imposed new strains upon the President. Though less exacting than the conference, the work still was difficult, requiring great finesse. As Mr. Roosevelt moved forward with it, his aides worried about his health. There were no indications that he was ill, but the strain was beginning to leave its mark.

At the conference, the President had appeared drawn. New lines showed in his face. But he had presided over the work of the meeting, and James F. Byrnes, the Director of War Mobilization, credited him with proposing the solutions for two of the thorniest problems taken up by the conference: the Polish question and the manner of voting in the council of the projected world peace organization.

The Polish decision was a compromise, like many of the others. Mr. Roosevelt won on some points, lost on others. The trade and machinery that Russia wants from the United States after the war was a bargaining point in his favor.

The Flynn mystery. Mr. Byrnes said his own presence at the conference was to supply answers on economic, political and legal questions that arose. He did not explain why Edward J. Flynn, the Bronx Democratic leader, went to Yalta.

The official explanation was that Mr. Flynn was headed for Moscow and that Mr. Roosevelt, an old friend, suggested that he go along to Yalta on the way. Mr. Flynn had no part in the conference. But no one said why he was going to Moscow.

—U. S. Army Signal Corps

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CRIMEAN "CABINET"

(Clockwise) Secretary Stettinius, Admiral King, General Marshall, Ambassador Harriman, Admiral Leahy and President Roosevelt at a conference in the palace of the former Czar, Nicholas II.

"In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."
GEORGE WASHINGTON

The United

(These two pages present each week the opinion of The Editor. The other members of the staff who report, interpret, and forecast

February 23, 1945

★ "LET SAN FRANCISCO REVIEW YALTA"

By David Lawrence

Did not the American people envision an organization of nations with democratically chosen representatives which would sit like a court of judges and develop an equitable formula for handling the major problems growing out of this horrible war—adjustments of boundaries and territorial changes, vital questions of self-government of peoples, and the humane treatment of millions of men, women and children forced to move from one country to another?

Did we not envision a tribunal of justice which could sit sternly in judgment on the sins of the enemy but at the same time would see to it that the innocent peoples of all European countries had a chance for economic sustenance? Was not that the kind of a peace conference which we have thought would be held at the end of this war?

Instead we have three men already making commitments in secret and pledges that will bind the so-called peace conference which at best can now be only a perfunctory mechanism of ratification.

The meeting at Yalta, in the Crimea, was the most important international parley since the peace conference at Paris in 1919. And history has repeated itself President Roosevelt has been out-traded and out-maneuvered by the pragmatic-minded statesmen of Europe, just as was President Wilson.

Mr. Roosevelt pins his hopes on the curative potentiality of the United Nations organization as Mr. Wilson did with his League of Nations. Europe, which at the Paris Peace Conference sold out idealism and principle for territorial greed and aggrandizement and a punitive peace, finally produced an embittered Germany that accepted Hitler as a better alternative than the misery and chaos of economic ruin forced upon her by excessive reparations. The League proved powerless to correct the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty

Is the same thing in evolution now?

A reparations commission has been ordered. It will sit in Moscow, of all places. Germany's economic mechanism is to be destroyed and she is to make payments "in kind," which means she is to be deprived of the sinews of economic recovery or rehabilitation. It is easy for the Allies to announce that they have no intention of destroying the German people but realistically their program of reparations means exactly that ultimate result.

After the last war, the Allies for years extracted locomotives, coal, machinery and other payments "in kind" and the struggling Weimar Republic in Germany finally went bankrupt. Economic chaos ensued and unemployment multiplied until Hitler came along with a dictatorship to which millions of Germans in their desperation acceded.

Then the dictators of Europe began to trade with each other. Mussolini made a deal with Hitler and afterwards Hitler and Mussolini made a deal with Franco. Soon Hitler made a deal in 1939 with Stalin and let loose the Nazi bombers on Warsaw. Presently Stalin made a deal with the totalitarian government at Tokio. The objective was always supposed to be "peace."

Yes, it was this same Stalin who insured Hitler's armies against attack from the east in 1939, so that an opportunity was afforded Russia to grab the Baltic States and administer a death blow to Poland.

It was the same Stalin who formally subscribed to the Atlantic Charter in January 1942 and, joining us, demanded a second front in Europe while he retained his friendship and trade with Japan in the Far East.

Now our President is making a deal with Stalin, and Churchill is standing by. Let us see what each gets out of this extraordinary performance wherein the United States is committed to post-war agreements on territory and other understandings of a far-reaching nature without so much as a representative of the United States Senate present, to say nothing of the absence of a treaty for submission to the Senate—by which method alone, our Constitution says, the authority of the United States can be lawfully pledged.

We are told "hard bargains" were driven at the Crimea Conference.

What did Stalin get? Acquiescence in his grab of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Annexation of territory that previously belonged to Poland. Acquiescence in the "sphere of influence" setup which will mean Stalin-controlled governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and in the Baltic areas. Reparations from Germany that could include forced labor. More lend-lease dollars and goods from America.

What did Churchill get? Acquiescence in the "sphere of influence" idea which assures British domination of the Mediterranean and North Africa. A

United States News
Title Re... U. S. Pat. Office

"I wholly disapprove of what you say but will defend to the death your right to say it."
VOLTAIRE

Editor. The ...er pages of The United States News are written in their entirety by ...ional news irrespective of the editorial views expressed here.)

Atlantic Charter disregarded and old-style buffer states restored with dangers to world security instead of assurance of Peace—What did American people get out of the Crimea Conference?

promise of continued American military power to enforce whatever settlements have been privately agreed upon.

What did Roosevelt get? The widely heralded honor of being "chairman" of a conference consisting of three men. The doubtful privilege of sponsoring a new voting procedure in the soon-to-be-erected organization known as the United Nations Security Council, whose academic scope is already foreclosed by the practical process of "Big Three" conferences from which all the other nations, large and small, are excluded. A promise of a formula of "free elections" in liberated areas, which, of course, is meaningless while military controls are present. Russian aid in the Far East—perhaps of doubtful value in the long run because of the consequent need of dividing the energies of our navy in opening up new supply lines in the foggy and weather-bound North Pacific.

What did the American people get? A promise of continued war with heavier and heavier casualties against a stiffened and perhaps fanatical resistance by the German people, who have everything to gain now and little to lose by adopting desperate measures. A promise of a big standing army and compulsory military training for American youth as we furnish men and materials to keep Germany's underground forces permanently disarmed and to suppress rebellions in the liberated countries, while American boys are killed by snipers and guerrilla fighters for years to come.

This isn't a promise of peace for anybody. This is a promise of more war, because economic anarchy breeds gangsterism and dictatorship and incessant strife. The high-sounding phrases of the Crimea communique can be found almost verbatim in the communiques issued after the Moscow and Teheran conferences in 1943. A European Advisory Commission was set up then by Russia, Britain and the United States to deal with all problems arising out of the liberated countries. Joint and not individual action was pledged then, too. But Stalin ignored the pledge and so did Churchill, and now we resolve again with more phrases about Allied solidarity and unified action.

Many of us will still believe that the President's position at the Crimea Conference should have been that which we took earlier in this war, namely, that peace settlements must await the day of victory and that the peace conference must be free from any previous commitments or pledges on territorial questions made in secret or otherwise.

Russia could not quit the war against Germany if decision on her territorial demands were deferred any more than we could turn from the fight against Hitler because we failed to persuade Russia to wait for the awards of a peace conference, at which all interests, including the people of Poland, would have had a chance to be heard through a government of their own choosing, as specifically provided for in the Atlantic Charter, which says:

> "They (Russia, Britain, the United States, etc.) desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."

We cannot concede that Russia is winning this war alone against Germany and so deserves everything she asks for. If American lives had not been sacrificed on the Western Front and if we had not supplied airplanes and other materials under lend-lease, Russia could not have mounted her offensives. The American viewpoint has back of it moral right as well as sacrifices of our manpower thousands of miles away from continental United States.

For American idealism was defeated at Yalta. American constitutionalism was scorned at Yalta, and the pledges given in the Atlantic Charter that no nation—neither Russia, nor Britain nor any other country—will seek "territorial aggrandizement" were flagrantly violated at Yalta.

The Covenant of the League of Nations provided a machinery for periodic revision of the peace treaty itself. The United Nations Charter must also provide a means of review of the agreements reached at the conference of the "Big Three" at Yalta. Unless this is done, it is not likely that the United States Senate will ratify the treaty or furnish the other guarantees that are expected to supply American military power to enforce the settlements made at the close of this war.

"Let San Francisco Review Yalta" was the title over an editorial in the Scripps-Howard papers last week. It is an excellent slogan for the American people. For it points the way to a means of correcting the mistakes at Yalta and of really fulfilling the promises explicitly written in the Atlantic Charter.

We've Been Asked:

ABOUT NEW FEDERAL AID IN ROAD BUILDING

An elaborate program for road building, to commence right after the war ends, is now being drawn up. Congress recently authorized the spending of $500,000,000 on highways in each of the first three years after the war. States are supposed to put up an equal amount. And both federal and State officials are working on detailed plans for national highways, rural roads and city thoroughfares that are to be part of the three-way program.

The backbone of the projects is to be a network of cross-country trunk roads—a national system of interstate highways—the routes of which will be designated this year. There also will be a series of secondary roads, leading from farms to markets, the first extensive program of such rural roads in which the Federal Government has had a part. In addition, there is to be further work on the federal-aid system of road building on which federal and State governments have been co-operating since 1921.

All of this is expected to provide many jobs in the coming period of reconversion. Furthermore, besides traffic lanes for peacetime, it is designed to provide a system of superhighways across the country for national defense.

Several important changes are being made in the Federal Government's policy on road building. First, take the new system of rural roads:

The Government is setting aside $150,000,000, out of its annual $500,000,000 appropriation, to be used exclusively for building secondary or feeder roads. These are to be farm-to-market roads, rural mail routes, school bus routes, etc., which are not on the present federal-aid systems. This is a new program and is aimed at giving farmers and other rural dwellers better traffic lanes to cities and nearby communities. As in the other federal-aid road programs, individual States must match the money put up by the Federal Government for these projects.

This system of secondary farm-to-market roads will be selected by State highway departments in co-operation with county supervisors, county commissioners and other local officials. Approval of proposed construction must be obtained from the Public Works Administration before federal aid is forthcoming.

Next, federal aid for constructing thoroughfares through cities and towns:

Of the Federal Government's annual contribution, $125,000,000 is to be used each year to help build highway systems in urban areas. This might involve routes leading to and from cities and towns or actual traffic lanes within municipalities, connecting with highways outside. Some will be highways leading to or near to the centers of cities. They may involve overhead lanes, depressed highways, through streets or parkways. For some cities, there will be both routes running into the cities as well as highways bypassing them for through traffic.

Now, as to plans for a network of interregional highways:

Plans for this project are being pushed right now. State highway departments have been asked to designate certain routes within their borders as links in this national system, co-ordinating their selections with those of neighboring States. The Public Roads Administration hopes to have all of these State designations by July 1. Then they will be meshed into one pattern, possibly at regional meetings attended by State officials and representatives of the PRA. This pattern will serve as a blueprint for the future national interstate highway system.

Present plans call for this national highway system to be completed in from 10 to 20 years. It will cross each State and will connect nearly every principal city and industrial area and many smaller cities and towns. In many sections, particularly in the congested areas of the East and West, it eventually will involve four-lane divided highways. Since Congress designated that this highway system must be limited to 40,000 miles, present plans are for it to include only the most important main highways.

What the Federal Government will do:

In addition to the federal aid for urban and rural road construction, the Federal Government will provide $225,000,000 a year for three years for the federal-aid highway system already in existence. Since the new national interstate system is to be included in the old federal-aid system, both this $225,000,000 and the $125,000,000 for urban construction will be available for the new national system.

The PRA apportions the federal-aid money among the 48 States in accordance with a formula that has been in effect for some time. It has just announced the apportionment of $500,000,000 for the first postwar year. Of this amount, $100,000,000 can be obtained by States this year to make surveys and plans, purchase right of ways and for construction. The rest will become available after the war ends.

The Federal Government is making two other important changes in its prewar policy of aid for road building. It now will pay one third of the cost of acquiring right of ways. This was not done before the war. Also, the Government will pay the full construction cost of eliminating railroad-highway-crossing hazards, and 50 per cent of the right-of-way costs on these projects. In cases where railroads benefit, the Government will expect to collect part of the cost from them.

What individual States must do:

States must decide, first of all, how they will finance their share of the road-building cost. Some already have enough, or nearly enough, in their highway funds to pay their share. Others will have to raise funds if they are going to receive the federal aid. They may resort to bond issues. In several State capitals, there has been discussion of higher gasoline taxes to finance the new highway program.

In some States, action will be necessary by legislatures before participation in the program. The legislatures of 44 States hold regular sessions this year. Some will consider proposals to speed up procedure in acquiring right of way and to limit right of access by motorists to certain trunk highways. Technical changes in laws may be needed in some States to pave the way for close co-operation between county, municipal and local officials.

Finally, when will the road-building program actually get under way?

Federal and State officials are planning to get part of the program in operation as soon as possible after the war ends. One aim of the entire undertaking is to make jobs during the reconversion period. Some projects can be started at any time. Plans for others will be worked out in the months ahead.

The authorization of $1,500,000,000 for federal aid in road building over a period of three years is far more than the amount spent for this purpose before the war. In recent prewar years, the sums spent by the Federal Government in assisting States in road projects have ranged from $125,000,000 to $200,000,000 a year. In normal times, the Federal Government takes in from taxes on gasoline, vehicles, tires and accessories more than the $500,000,000 a year that it now plans to spend on road building.

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

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Pro and Con of National Issues

Crimea Meeting: Press Appraisal Of the Results

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the Crimea Conference holds great promise for world security, in the opinion of most commenting editors. Adverse criticism centers chiefly on the Polish settlement.

The results "justify and surpass most of the hopes placed on this fateful meeting," says the New York *Times* (Ind.), which calls the reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter "perhaps the most important point."

To the New York *World-Telegram* (Ind.), they represent "a compromise in which Stalin dictated most of the terms, and the Atlantic Charter pledges . . . came off a bad second."

But the Richmond (Va.) *Times-Dispatch* (Ind.-Dem.), which calls the statement "encouraging in every particular," points out that it is "gratifying that Marshal Stalin was as reasonable as he turned out to be."

The Washington (D. C.) *Post* (Ind.) believes the report "will remove a lot of bogeys . . . about the relations of the Allied powers" and put at rest the fear that "Roosevelt and Churchill would have to accept Stalin's diktat." Arrangements for periodical meetings of the foreign ministers, says the *Post*, are "what is most pleasing."

But the Cleveland (Ohio) *Plain Dealer* (Ind.-Dem.) finds it "regrettable . . . that more effective machinery . . . was not created" to work on political problems. "What success the conference attained," says this newspaper, "was in the military rather than the political field."

The decisions on Germany at the Crimea Conference, says the Atlanta (Ga.) *Constitution* (Dem.), "should silence those who have complained about lack of peace terms as well as those who have feared we would be too mild in our attitude toward a defeated foe."

On the Polish agreements, "the manner in which these agreements are worked out," says the Pittsburgh (Pa.) *Post-Gazette* (Ind.-Rep.) "will greatly influence the trend of opinion . . . in this country."

While "the results of the Crimea Conference will hardly be wholly pleasing to any of the parties," observes the *Christian Science Monitor* (Ind.), "we can be grateful for the clear evidence of progress both in the spirit and the practice of co-operation."

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Question of the Week

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

Should draft boards or the War Manpower Commission assign drafted men for industrial work?

To present a cross section of public opinion as to what agency should control job shifting to war plants, involved in the work-or-fight legislation, The United States News *asked members of Congress, labor leaders, industrialists and others the preceding question.*

Answers are printed herewith.

Senator Edwin C. Johnson

(Dem.), Colo.; Member, Senate Committees on Military Affairs, Finance and Interstate Commerce,

answers:

Without a question, the War Manpower Commission should assign men for industrial work.

Draft boards were not constituted to perform such a task and are not qualified. The WMC, on the other hand, has the facilities, trained personnel and experience to do this job well.

Samuel J. Kramer

Camden, N. J.; Director of Publicity and Publications, Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America,

answers:

The IUMSWA is opposed to the drafting of man power in any form. As expressed in the resolution at the CIO convention, the IUMSWA believes that manpower problems can only be solved through voluntary co-operation and teamwork between labor, management, and Government, and by the proper allocation of war production contracts.

Therefore, there can be no choice of the lesser evil as to who will administer any such undesirable measure which is bound to defeat its own purposes.

Rep. James W. Wadsworth

(Rep.), N. Y.; Member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Special Committee on Postwar Military Policy,

answers:

There should be no objection to granting power to the WMC to determine how many additional workers or what kinds of skills are needed. The WMC should inform, advise and require Selective Service to produce the right kind of workers, and in sufficient numbers.

To the draft boards only should we give the power to select the individuals. The boards are in possession of complete in-

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Back

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formation concerning every registrant, are close to the people, and, incidentally, are greatly respected.

T. O. Armstrong

Springfield, Mass.; Manager, Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co.,

answers:

The draft boards are not equipped to handle the placement of men in industrial work. Their function of classifying for service and of counseling the returned servicemen gives them all that a draft board should be expected to do.

The local area man-power setup is the only agency that can do the job. They are the people who know the kinds of work and have the means for classifying and assigning.

L. M. Dexter

Grand Rapids, Mich.; President, National Brass Co.,

answers:

The draft boards should assign men for industrial work, but they certainly should work closely with the WMC. In Grand Rapids, they are co-operating and it is very effective. So effective that I do not believe there is any necessity for the work-or-jail legislation in our community.

J. G. Luhrsen

Washington, D. C.; Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Railway Labor Executives' Association; Former Member, National Management-Labor Policy Committee, WMC,

answers:

The WMC was created to handle man power and its proper distribution and the authority should remain there.

Certainly the workers do not approve giving the military supervision over them through compulsion. In face of the "teamwork and integration of the highest character," as stated by Secretary Forrestal, we believe that voluntarism is functioning and should not be destroyed with untried experiments.

Ernest S. Bradford

New Rochelle, N. Y.; Director, Bureau of Business Research, College of City of New York; Economic Adviser, Federal Employment Stabilization Board, 1931,

answers: (by telegraph)

To provide a full industrial war output, we should know where the need is, its kind and expense, and which men in each community can best be called to do particular jobs. The WMC is better fitted to know the industrial wartime output required while local draft boards know better in what positions their local men can do their best work.

It will require, therefore, a co-operative arrangement in which both the WMC and local boards work together.

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WORLD ROLE OF AFL-CIO FEUD

Handicap to Aims of London Conferees for Strong All-Union Group

Federation's risk of isolation if it continues to boycott new international venture

The bitter rivalry between the CIO and the AFL that has kept the labor movement divided in the United States in recent years now is threatening to prevent the unions of the world from forming an all-inclusive international labor organization.

The shadow of the AFL-CIO feud hung over the world trade union conference held in London during the last two weeks, even though the AFL refused to send representatives to the conference. This shadow caused delegates from the British trade unions, friendly to the AFL, to hold back when representatives of the CIO, the Russian trade unions, the Latin-American Federation of Labor and labor organizations from other countries proposed that a new world trade union group be established to replace the International Federation of Trade Unions.

The IFTU has declined in importance during the war, and is kept alive largely through support from the British Trade Union Congress and the AFL. The CIO does not belong to the IFTU because the AFL has succeeded in barring it.

Refusal of the AFL to take part in the London conference means that whatever new international organization is formed will not be able to present a united front because, unless the AFL drops the boycott, it will lack the support of an organization claiming to represent 7,000,000 American workers. The AFL refuses to have a part in any international organization that includes Russian unions, believing that they are dominated by the Soviet Government and are not free trade unions of the kind that prevail in the U. S. and Britain. The AFL also fears that the Soviets might use the organization as a springboard for dissemination of Communist propaganda among workers of the world.

Line-up against the AFL. As a hold-out from the London conference, the AFL stands alone against most of the major labor organizations of the world. Even the British, who were less eager to scrap the IFTU than the other delegations to the London conference, are not likely to join the AFL in holding out against the rest of the anti-Axis world. Unless the AFL shifts its position—and this is not likely—it may find itself practically isolated from the rest of the world's labor movements.

Represented at the conference were the following unions and nations:

United States. The CIO, claiming to represent 6,000,000 workers.

Russia. All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, with a claimed membership of 27,000,000.

Great Britain. Trade Unions Congress, claiming 6,000,000 workers.

Latin America. Confederation of Latin-American Workers, with 4,000,000 workers in 20 Latin-American countries.

France. General Confederation of Workers, revived after the liberation of France.

Canada. Canadian Congress of Labor, with about 300,000 members.

China. Chinese Association of Labor. This organization, dominated by the Chungking Government, claims 594,000 members. North China unions, representing a million workers, were not invited.

Australia. Australian Council of Trade Unions, with about 1,000,000 members.

India. All India Trades Union Congress, with about 400,000 members.

As a hold-out against such a large segment of the world's organized worker population, the AFL might find its prestige weakened. It would be faced with the choice of trying to keep the IFTU alive, with little chance of support from the rest of the world, or of remaining aloof from international labor co-operation. Such an attitude of isolation would only widen the gap between the CIO and AFL at home.

On the other hand, the CIO, by co-operating closely with the Russian unions, might find itself in an occasional embarrassing situation. For example, the CIO might be called upon to indorse the idea, said to be favored by the Russians, of conscripting millions of German workers to aid in Russian reconstruction after the war. The CIO, like other American labor organizations, is traditionally opposed to slave labor, and has opposed wartime conscription of workers for that reason.

—OWI from Acme

IFTU HUDDLE: KUZNETSOV (RUSSIA), ISAACS (BRITAIN), THOMAS (U. S.)
. . . without the AFL a world-wide united front was impossible

Any international labor organization that emerges from these recent discussions will have as one of its principal goals the representation of labor at the peace conference and at all future international conferences of a political and economic nature. One of labor's current complaints is that it was not represented at Bretton Woods, Dumbarton Oaks, or at the food and aviation conferences because it had no powerful international agency.

Punishing employers. Employers suddenly are learning that the Government has a penalty more severe than plant seizure that it is prepared to use against



NO PLACE ELSE TO USE THEM? (Don't be too sure)

A challenge to executives who want to strengthen the position of their companies in the highly competitive period ahead

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Paper-work savings multiply themselves

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concerns refusing to comply with orders of the War Labor Board. This penalty consists of canceling a firm's war contracts and denying it any priorities for materials. If carried out to the limit, such a penalty could put a company out of business.

This rarely used sanction has been invoked against the E. A. Laboratories, Inc., of Brooklyn. Why it was used instead of the customary seizure was not explained, but apparently it was decided that the concern's output was not sufficiently vital to warrant continuation of the contract.

The new technique points up again the WLB's impotence in enforcing its own directives. In this case, the sanctions were applied by Fred M. Vinson, Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization, after consulting the War and Navy departments and the War Production Board. WLB had no authority to compel compliance.

Congress alone can remedy this situation, and it has shown no great amount of interest in granting enforcement powers to WLB through legislation. Until it does, employers who are willing to defy the Board's orders will continue to face the threat of seizure, if their plants are considered too important to be closed, or take a chance on being forced to close if they are dependent upon controlled materials.

Drafting 4-F's. The first real crackdown on 4-F's who leave jobs in essential industry without permission of their draft boards now is under way. These men are being inducted into the Army, under special draft board quotas, and are being assigned to a special training camp.

This crackdown is the first fruit of the "work or fight" order issued some time ago by James F. Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization. It works as follows:

First. Men who have been inducted for leaving jobs without permission are to be given four weeks' basic training at a regular Army camp. Most of them will be 4-F's, and these will go to Camp Ellis, Ill., an Army Service Forces Training Center, near Peoria. The few men found physically fit for general military duty will be assigned by their boards as usual.

Second. After the 4-F's have completed four weeks of basic training, those with skills needed in industry will be offered a chance to return to civilian war jobs. They will be placed in the enlisted reserve, subject to call to active duty if needed.

Third. Those who refuse to volunteer for work, and who possess skills that are needed in war plants, may be assigned to work as uniformed soldiers in Government-owned plants. This means working at base military pay of $50 a month for privates.

Fourth. Men who neither volunteer for civilian work nor possess needed skills will be retained in the Army and assigned to Army installations. These men can expect assignment to menial jobs at soldiers' pay.

In their basic training courses, the men will receive instruction in Army discipline,

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☐ Likely ☐ Possibly ☐ Unlikely

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☐ Likely ☐ Possibly ☐ Unlikely

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

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and other instruction based on their physical qualifications.

In inducting these job jumpers, draft boards will call them up under a separate quota system. Each board will be permitted to take, in these secondary calls, up to 15 per cent of its regular call. But, there is no compulsion upon the boards to fill these calls, and the 4-F's can avoid induction by staying on their jobs or obtaining permission from their draft boards to change.

Mr. Lewis and the AFL. John L. Lewis apparently is content to play a waiting game in his carefully laid plans to take the United Mine Workers back into the American Federation of Labor. Events of the last week indicate that he is willing to continue to operate independently until the AFL meets his terms for readmittance.

The latest barrier to a reunion between the miners and the Federation is Mr.

—Wide World

MR. LEWIS & MR. GREEN
. . . two on the aisle

Lewis's insistence that he be given a seat on the AFL's 16-man executive council. The council, which met in Miami last week, is the governing board that runs the AFL between conventions, and it exercises powerful authority over member unions. It is headed by AFL President William Green.

Mr. Lewis, whose District 50 is made up of a number of unions operating in the same fields as AFL unions, obviously wants to have a voice in settlement of the many jurisdictional disputes that are bound to arise if and when the miners are readmitted. As a member of the council, he could have an important voice. Without representation on the council, the miners might lose more of District 50 than they are willing to lose.

The AFL council is willing to take the miners back if Mr. Lewis will withdraw or modify his request for membership on the council. The council contends that it has no authority to grant this request, that such a decision must be made by a national convention. If neither side yields, Mr. Lewis may stay on the outside for some time, since travel restrictions may cause cancellation of the Federation's 1945 convention.

Special Report

(This article represents the result of an extensive research on a topic of outstanding importance in National Affairs.)

U. S. AS SHIPPING MAGNATE: PLANS FOR POSTWAR FLEET

Fast, Efficient Vessels as Factors in Peacetime Trade Expansion

Storage of an emergency merchant marine. Price discounts for Americans

Definite plans are taking shape rapidly for the postwar use—and dispersal—of this country's big, war-bloated merchant marine. These plans call for keeping part of the fleet at work, storing another segment, selling a third portion abroad and junking a small remaining percentage. The program was presented to Congress recently by Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman of the Maritime Commission. Related legislation is scheduled for early congressional action. And, where foreign sales are concerned, shipping men were quick to note that Admiral Land was present at the Crimea Conference.

All these developments have quickened interest in the postwar shipping problem. The public, only vaguely aware of the course of world maritime events, now is asking many questions. It wants to know how many ships will be left after the war, their types and relative usefulness. It is asking how the division is to be made among ships used, stored, sold and scrapped. It is curious about methods and terms of sale. These and other questions are answered by Admiral Land's testimony in Congress and by official sources elsewhere. The answers are revealing.

How many ships? The United States is to have at least 56,000,000 deadweight tons of shipping after the war. This is a fleet five times the size of the prewar merchant marine. It is to be nearly two thirds of all the shipping in the world.

What kinds of ships? A number of types are involved.

Liberty ships. The bulk of the fleet will be some 2,400 Liberty ships, of 26,000,000 tons. These emergency-built vessels are poorly adapted to postwar competition. They are slow, 11 knots, powered by old-fashioned reciprocating steam engines and are relatively expensive in operation. Their length is 441½ feet, beam 57 feet, and deadweight tonnage 10,800. Average cost was $1,900,000.

Victory ships. Victory ships, fast, efficient, economical vessels, 500 of them, with a tonnage well over 5,000,000, are to be included. Cargo-carrying capacity is the same as that of the Liberties, but they are a little longer and narrower, more streamlined. Turbine propulsion gives a speed of 15 knots. Some have Diesel engines. They cost, with turbines, $2,600,000; with Diesels, $3,145,000.

C types. There are to be nearly 700 C-type ships, the equal of anything afloat, totaling more than 6,000,000 tons. They attain 14 to 16½ knots. Length varies by type from 413 to 492 feet, and beam from 60 to 69½ feet. Individual tonnage runs from 7,500 to 12,000. They cost from $2,700,000 to $3,500,000.

Tankers. Including prewar leftovers, the list is expected to contain 750 tankers. During the war, 576 such ships, totaling 9,700,000 tons, have been built or are under construction. The new ones are of several types, but all are fast and most have large oil-carrying capacity. Building cost ranged from $2,600,000 to $4,700,000.

Other ships. The remainder of the fleet is to be made up of a few dozen combination cargo-and-passenger ships, vessels bought from other countries, and the surviving portion of the prewar merchant marine.

That is the list. Now, what is to be done with these vessels?

The postwar merchant marine. Admiral Land's program calls for a postwar American merchant marine of not less than 15,000,000 tons and preferably 20,000,000. Such a program would employ all, or nearly all, of the fast, efficient new ships, and keep them in American hands. The Admiral foresees sufficient cargoes in a broadly expanded postwar world trade,

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
AT END OF WAR U. S. WILL HAVE ABOUT 56 MILLION TONS
EXPECTS TO KEEP IN USE UP TO 20 MILLION TONS
EXPECTS TO HOLD IN RESERVE UP TO 20 MILLION TONS
EXPECTS TO SELL TO ALLIES UP TO 12 MILLION TONS
EXPECTS TO SCRAP 4 MILLION TONS
WHAT HAPPENS TO U. S. MERCHANT FLEET AFTER WAR



Winter's **TWO-WAY ROAD TO** Summer

To those who have experienced a winter visit in Florida's delightful clime, this scene will recall the swift, smooth transition from winter to summer provided by the *Orange Blossom Special,* the *Silver Meteor* and other modern trains of the Seaboard's famed passenger fleet. It is also a reminder of the transportation comforts you can expect from the Seaboard in the future, when war's demands have been met.

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

SEABOARD
RAILWAY
THROUGH THE HEART OF THE SOUTH

and urges that American shipping take over a big proportion of the commerce once carried by German and Japanese vessels. Continued operating subsidies, primarily to equalize wage payments to American and foreign sailors, would be necessary, but hardly would be forbiddingly large, he says, pointing out that the biggest annual subsidy payment to the merchant marine between 1936 and the start of the war was $13,000,000.

Many in the shipping industry are hopeful that the Admiral's estimates of postwar American shipping will be borne out. They are inclined to question, however, whether anything like 20,000,000 tons can be utilized.

Ships in storage. The Admiral wants to keep 10,000,000 to 20,000,000 tons of shipping in storage, as an insurance reserve against any third World War emergency. For the most part these vessels would be the less useful Liberty ships. The proposal recalls the hundreds of vessels built in the first World War that rotted in rivers and estuaries in the years that followed. However, new methods of ship preservation have been developed.

There is a new type of paint, and an electrolytic process that keep barnacles from collecting on hulls. Or, Admiral Land says, the ships could be stored in fresh water, in which the life of the hull is considered indefinite. The problem, in the latter event, would be to find fresh-water expanses big enough for such a large number. The Admiral says he knows of a place, but for the present it is a secret. Speculation is that it might be outside the United States. Machinery could be preserved by a coating of white lead and tallow. The total cost is estimated at from $3,000 to $5,000 yearly per ship. The Admiral considers this cheap insurance against having to build vessels at $1,900,000 and up each, if another war should come.

Sales abroad. The third part of the plan is to sell 7,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons of shipping to Allied nations. Behind this is an argument that, as the result of a common war effort, the American fleet has grown, while that of these other nations has been reduced by enemy action and by an inability to build. The figures mentioned are intended to restore the various Allied merchant marines to their 1939 strengths. Norway, Greece and Denmark especially are in need. Great Britain will want ships, but, by comparison with the smaller nations, is in a better position. There also are ideas of helping the Chinese start a merchant marine.

In Maritime Commission circles, it is no secret that the goal is to sell Liberty ships abroad. The Navy, national defense and American interests get first call on the good ships. Under these circumstances there is some doubt that many of the better vessels will be offered abroad. Whether the other nations will want the Liberties is another question. Unless they are sold quick-

For a Quick Recovery



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

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ly, they may not move at all, because British, Norwegian and other shipbuilding capacity is such that their needs could be satisfied within a few years.

Ships to be junked. Admiral Land wants to scrap 4,000,000 tons of ships built before the war, some of them 20 years or more in age. He proposes that at least three shipbreaking concerns be established, with the additional use of one or two Commission-owned yards.

Sales prices. Cut-rate prices are to be the rule. Under the pending legislation, approved by the Commission, American shipping firms can buy the good ships at the prewar foreign cost of building, less depreciation, if the vessels are to be used in the American foreign or domestic trade. Without such strings, the Americans must pay the higher domestic prewar construction price, with depreciation deducted. Foreign sales of the efficient vessels are to be through bidding, but not at less than the depreciated foreign prewar cost. Liberties are to go to Americans or foreigners

—Maritime Commission

ADMIRAL LAND
. . . bargains by the ton

at the depreciated foreign prewar cost. At such rates, prices are expected to run less than 50 cents on the dollar of cost, and liberal terms are to be included.

New construction. Despite the prospective shipping glut, the United States is to be extremely short on passenger vessels. Admiral Land proposes that six to ten be built as soon as war conditions permit. They would cost from $15,000,000 to $25,000,000 each and be assigned as quickly as possible to important routes.

All in all, the disposition of the big postwar fleet is one of the toughest problems with which the planners have to deal. It is a problem that will be present at all the Allied peace conferences. Admiral Land has given an explicit direction to such discussions with his plan of action.

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Inter-America Week
Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

MUTUAL NEEDS OF HEMISPHERE: KEY TO MEXICO CITY DECISIONS

The Western Hemisphere now is faced with the need to prepare for conversion to a peacetime basis. This is the reason for calling a conference of American foreign ministers to meet at Mexico City beginning February 21.

The U. S. lays great stress upon reaching a workable solution to postwar political and economic problems. For this reason it has sent a delegation of about 40 experts to accompany Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Leading representatives from Congress, business, labor, agriculture and the military are included.

Two main problems will confront the conference at Mexico City.

The role of Latin America in world security programs is one major topic on the agenda. The Latin-American position is that more small nations must be represented on the United Nations Security Council than originally planned for, that decisions should not rest solely with the Big Three, or Four, or Five. This country is assuming as its job the working out of a compromise that can serve as a pattern for the United Nations Conference on World Security which will be held April 25 in San Francisco.

Economic readjustments will be the second main topic of discussion at Mexico City. Hemisphere nations during the war have increased output of minerals, rubber, cinchona, insecticides, sisal and other products. These nations want to know what the U. S. will do to absorb their surpluses after the war, to what extent it will help Latin America to convert industries to a peacetime basis.

Actually the U. S. is in no position to give much help on this. It has no stockpile policy, or congressional authority for such a policy. End of the war will mean a sharp cut in purchases, especially minerals. This means some mines may have to be shut down, jungle clearings be abandoned.

Long-range planning. U. S. commitments to buy some goods through 1946 or 1947 will be of some help. But State Department officials consider a prompt start on long-range development and reduction of trade barriers the best means of minimizing conversion problems. Their thinking is along these lines:

As to investments, this country would join with Latin-American capital. Long-term loans would be provided. Interest free or at low rates. Repayment would begin when projects start to earn revenue. This means raising the lending power of the Export-Import Bank. Its president, Warren Lee Pierson, is a member of the U. S. delegation. It also means revamping local banking, credit and tax systems. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry D. White, U. S. expert on monetary plans, is a member of the U. S. group.

As to trade barriers, wartime restrictions would be removed. Quota systems, exchange controls and other prewar practices would be abolished.

As to surpluses, the aim would be for producing and consuming countries to regulate disposal operations.

As to transportation and communication, frequency of service would be stepped up, with reductions in rates. The larger countries would have their own shipping.

As to synthetics, governments would compete with private industry only when considered necessary for the public good. There would be no tariff protection of synthetics against a natural product.

As to agriculture, there would be emphasis on diversifying farm products, on lessening reliance on exports of bananas, coffee, sugar to provide foreign exchange. More families would own land. Transport, storage and credit facilities would be improved to expand markets for farm goods.

As to labor, there would be better working and living conditions. Education and vocational training would be expanded. Collective bargaining would be granted.

As aims, these objectives already have the approval of leading representatives of Government, labor, industry and agriculture in the U. S. The problem is to develop the means to achieve the goals. The State Department hopes that the U. S. delegation of experts will be able to develop an over-all program. This country needs a large export volume to attain a full-employment economy. The American republics need a prosperous U. S. to buy their products. This mutual need is expected to be the key to the decisions to be reached in Mexico City. Technical details will be worked out at the Inter-American Technical Economic Conference, to meet in Washington June 15.

Finance Week

Title Reg U.S. Pat Off

Easing the Task Of Financing War: Treasury Moves

Congress is taking steps to loosen restrictions now placed on Government finances. A series of bills has been introduced to enable the Treasury to borrow the funds it will need this year and to handle the larger debt that will result.

The debt limit is to rise from $260,000,000,000 to $300,000,000,000 under a bill introduced by Representative Doughton (Dem.), of North Carolina, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.

—Harris & Ewing

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This will cover Treasury needs even if the two wars continue through July 1, 1946. Actual cash needs of the Treasury, however, should fall short of the debt limit.

Two war bond drives—probably in May and October—will be required to cover the cash deficit in this calendar year. The May drive is likely to call for $20,000,000,000 all told, with $3,300,000,000 coming from savings bonds, $2,400,000,000 from Treasury notes and $14,300,000,000 from open-market issues.

If war in Europe ends by midyear, the October drive promises to drop to $16,000,000,000, with $2,700,000,000 from savings bonds, $1,800,000,000 from notes and $11,500,000,000 in open-market issues. These sums will be needed to provide the Treasury with additional cash, plus funds to pay for bond and note redemptions. Cash needs from borrowing are likely to be $31,872,000,000 this year, compared with last year's total of $59,104,000,000.

Bond redemptions are to be made easier under the terms of the Doughton

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bill. Secretary Morgenthau is to get power to authorize all sorts of financial institutions, as well as commercial banks, to redeem bonds. This includes savings banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, credit unions and industrial banks.

In his annual report, Secretary Morgenthau expresses confidence that security markets can be held stable in the face of postwar prospects of large-scale sales of bonds by individuals and corporations. The plan is to have the Treasury redeem the bonds, instead of having them sold in the open market, thereby assuring bondholders of par values. To make the redemptions, the Treasury is likely to issue short-term obligations, at lower interest rates than bonds yield.

Gold reserve. Because Treasury deficits have increased the amount of currency in circulation and the volume of bank deposits, the Federal Reserve System's gold reserve may prove inadequate to back the nation's money and credit under present law. Senator Wagner (Dem.), of New York, therefore, introduced a bill to reduce gold reserve requirements to 25 per cent of currency and Federal Reserve Bank deposit liabilities, from the present requirement of 35 per cent backing for deposits and 40 per cent for currency. That will allow the present gold supply to support double the volume of currency and deposits.

Interest on public debt. The close connection between Government securities and federal currency is giving rise to new inquiries about the need to pay interest on federal issues. The annual report of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. recommends that bank examiners value commercial bank holdings of federal bonds at par, rather than at market prices.

The argument advanced is that Government issues always are just as sound as currency, which is required by law to be valued at par. The fact that fluctuating interest rates affect the market prices of bonds is held to have no effect on the true value of those bonds.

A similar argument is used by Representatives Patman (Dem.), of Texas, and Voorhis (Dem.), of California, in sponsoring bills providing for Government ownership, rather than bank ownership, of the Federal Reserve System. The Treasury then would finance itself through issuing noninterest-bearing securities to Federal Reserve Banks, and thereby save the annual service charge on the public debt.

These proposals are not getting serious attention at present from Congress, where prevailing opinion is that federal finances still should be under some outside restraints. However, the rate of interest now being paid on U. S. bonds is under study. Secretary Morgenthau is conferring with bankers on the type of marketable bonds to be offered in the next war loan drive. Indications are that interest charges will be

★

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

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

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

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

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

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



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GORDON B. ANDERSON, GENERAL MANAGER

lowered, either directly through a reduction in rates, or indirectly through lengthening the maturity date of the bonds.

Johnson Act. The Administration apparently is deciding to use the Johnson Act, which bars U. S. loans to governments in default on old debts, as a tool to gain world acceptance of the Bretton Woods monetary and bank proposals. Outright repeal of the Act is not now contemplated.

Instead, the bill providing for U. S. membership in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank also provides that terms of the Johnson Act shall not apply to members of these institutions. Thus, Britain, France, Belgium and other countries in default on U. S. loans would not be eligible for postwar loans unless they joined the Fund and the Bank.

The Johnson Act also would continue to apply to countries not yet invited as members. This would bar loans to Germany and Italy until they are accepted as members of world financial organizations.

Railroad credit. Authority of the ICC to wipe out the interest of common stockholders and other holders of junior securities in railroad reorganizations would be restricted in a bill passed by the House. The measure is sponsored by Representative Hobbs (Dem.), of Alabama.

The bill arises from the fact that railroad earnings now have reached a high level and are believed to be adequate to make some payment on common stock and other junior securities as well as bonds. The major point in the bill is a requirement that ICC base its reorganization values on factors other than estimates of future earnings alone. The Commission would be limited to reducing the capital structures of railroads to either: (1) the amount actually invested in the property, or (2) the physical value of the property previously determined by the Commission, whichever is lower.

Then, if the existing capitalization is higher than the value so determined, one share of no-par stock would be issued for each $100 of the excess. The provision for no-par shares would leave holders of junior securities with an interest in the property that could yield some return in good years.

The House Judiciary Committee, in supporting the bill, reported that, in some reorganizations, actual earnings in recent years far exceeded ICC estimates and would have permitted dividends on common stock, had it not been wiped out. By providing protection for junior security holders, sponsors of the bill hope to improve the credit standing of railroads.

ICC still would be allowed to reorganize lines so that fixed charges could be reduced, but the resulting earnings would have to be spread further. Court review of all cases on their merits also is provided. These provisions, if adopted, will apply to reorganization cases now pending.



FAIRCHILD ANNOUNCES

The PACKET

FOR AIR CARGO



THIS FLYING BOXCAR in military operation can carry 42 fully equipped paratroops and deliver them through *two* rear end jump doors at either side of the huge fuselage. Paracans of equipment are released through bomb bay doors beneath the plane.



LOADING MADE EASY, another Packet feature. A huge split door in the stern, a smaller freight door forward simplify loading and unloading of cargo. The cargo floor parallels the ground *at loading truck floor level* eliminating the need for hoisting devices.



OVER 3,500 MILE RANGE means speedy delivery of vitally needed supplies in military operations—cargoes measured, not in pounds, but in *tons*. Today, for the Army; tomorrow, it's yours!



The PACKET is designed *specifically* to transport cargo and troops by air...to carry boxcar loads at air express speed. It was born of a wartime need. The Army presented the problem to Fairchild engineers:

Build a plane that can utilize average airports and fly long or short distances economically—a plane with huge cargo capacity, for men, guns, trucks, ammunition or equipment.

Such a plane is The PACKET. It is in the air today, the first of many to undergo rigid flight tests. An all-metal, high-wing monoplane, The PACKET is powered by two 2100-horsepower engines. It is designed to operate with the simplicity and economy of twin-engine airplanes.

Fairchild engineering experience has given The PACKET another invaluable quality. While today it can carry the weapons of war, tomorrow, with but minor modification, it can transport the goods of peacetime commerce.

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It never quite came to this...



and it may never come to this, but...

In anticipation of a gradual easing of difficult wartime conditions, we're now planning at the Hotel Pennsylvania, New York's Statler Hotel, for the time when we can out-do even our own prewar standards of Hotel Pennsylvania service.

Right now, of course, our staff is depleted by the absence of trained personnel serving in the armed forces. Naturally, we have been hard pressed to maintain the pleasant and convenient service features that make a stay at Hotel Pennsylvania so agreeable.

Nevertheless, while it may take us a bit longer to attend to your wants these days, we feel certain you'll agree that you've *always* been able to count on us for close attention to your every request, just as you did in peacetime.

Meanwhile, all of us at Hotel Pennsylvania appreciate your past co-operation and hope you will continue to give a thought to these matters . . .

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Treasury is taking this stand on postwar tax reductions.....

1. Little if any tax reduction can be given until both wars are ended.

2. Tax cuts at that time must be related to inflation prospects; must be fixed in time and limited in size so as not to add to postwar inflation pressure.

3. Selective reductions must be made after both wars end, however, as a means of encouraging consumption and stimulating new investment.

4. Postwar taxes, after adjustment, must yield revenues large enough to cover a budget far higher than before the war, and to permit some debt reduction.

Those are points made by Henry Morgenthau, Treasury Secretary. They do not lend encouragement to the idea that big tax reductions can be made after the German war ends. There'll still be a $40,000,000,000 deficit with present tax rates in that one-war period. They do suggest tax cuts after both wars end.

Translated into specific terms, the tax situation as it is shaping in the studies of the Treasury and of Congress tax committees is this.....

If German war ends by mid-1945, tax relief will be limited to increase from $10,000 to $25,000 in excess-profits tax specific exemption, to changes that will make excess-profits tax refund bonds negotiable.

If both wars are ended by early 1946, some relief may apply to 1946 income.

If one war runs past midyear, 1946, very little relief will be applied to income earned in that year. Then 1947 would be the first year to expect cuts.

In terms of specific taxes to be affected by relief.....

Excess-profits tax will be the first to come off. It almost surely will be removed altogether, not reduced, from 1947 income, if wars end in 1946.

Normal and surtax combined rate may be reduced from present 40 per cent to 35 per cent, with 1947 income to feel that reduction.

Capital stock tax, declared value excess-profits tax, taxation of inter-corporate dividends, the 2 per cent differential on consolidated returns stand a very good chance of repeal, effective in 1947. They have few friends.

Carry-forward of net operating losses is fairly certain to be extended over 5-year period. Carry-back of net operating losses is likely to be repealed.

As for individual income taxes and excises.....

Normal tax of 3 per cent will be repealed in 1947, if wars end in 1946.

Surtax rate reduction, effective on 1947 income, is probable. Reduction is to be moderate in upper brackets, substantial in lower brackets.

Capital gain and loss provisions of present law are likely to remain.

Excise-tax reduction will be gradual, starting not earlier than 1947.

It is more and more evident that export trade is looked upon as the new industry that will fill the role after this war that the auto industry did after the last; that fourth-term plans are geared closely to world trade expansion.

If the President has his way with plans now announced.....

Johnson Act will be repealed, opening way to loans to Russia, Britain, France, Belgium and other friendly nations that may have defaulted in past.

Export-Import Bank lending power will be increased to $3,000,000,000.

(over)

A World Bank for Reconstruction will be created with lending power of as much as $2,000,000,000 a year over a period of years.

An International Monetary Fund will be set up with enough dollars in it to tide over nations that temporarily may run short of dollars in postwar.

Trade agreement machinery will be extended and broadened.

A conference of nations will be held to consider general tariff cuts.

A shipping agreement, an aviation agreement, a communications agreement will be worked out with other countries, will govern postwar development.

That's what the President wants. He probably will get Johnson Act repeal, Export-Import Bank loan authority, a World Bank, continued trade agreements. He will have trouble getting currency stabilization, general tariff reduction.

Big point that concerns the White House is this.....

Exports, with Lend-Lease aid, now total nearly $15,000,000,000 a year.

A postwar reduction in exports will add to U.S. economic problems, will be one more factor in the problem of providing full employment.

Yet, to assure even $7,000,000,000 of postwar exports probably will mean a rather large program of dollar loans if that level is to be sustained.

Mr. Roosevelt, as a result, is fostering a program of loans; is striving to build a base for a broad foreign trade that eventually would rest upon a volume of U.S. imports sufficient to permit nations to pay for what they buy.

It isn't wise to be too optimistic over long-range success of this plan. Among the reasons why there may be hitches.....

France is planning to control imports, to direct exports, to run what will look like a managed economy, not a free-trading economy.

Great Britain is prepared to do more managing of her economy, to limit imports, to develop Empire preference, to use controls to meet U.S. competition.

Russia is thinking in terms of one-time purchases, of heavy buying of capital equipment while reconstructing her industry, then of limiting imports.

In fact, the whole world is inclined to be wary of U.S., to feel that this country is due to hit a postwar slump and to drag the rest of the world into that slump if ways and means for insulation are not devised. The idea is that U.S. will have a boom for a few postwar years, then a bust.

In other fields, the outlook is this.....

Debt limit increase to $300,000,000,000 will get approval of Congress. There isn't any alternative if bills are to be paid, if war plans go ahead.

Gold backing for the dollar will be cut from 40 per cent to 25 per cent after an argument, after a verbal display of concern over the dollar's future.

Insurance will be exempt from antitrust action until Jan. 1, 1948, when Roosevelt signs the bill he will get from Congress. Insurance still will be subject to State tax and regulatory laws. It will not be subject to federal Robinson-Patman Act or to the Federal Trade Commission regulations.

Interest rates will be slightly lower on next long-term Treasury issues.

Idea of treating banks separately from other bond purchasers, of paying a service charge for credit that banks advance the Government, will be talked about, but not acted upon in Congress. That is an old idea that crops up rather regularly when Congress gets to worrying about the interest charge on debt.

Any serious move to eliminate interest charges, to finance war or postwar plans with noninterest-bearing notes, will be a signal of currency inflation.

Any labor draft that comes out of Congress will be mild in its terms.

It is improbable that draft boards or Manpower Commission offices will get power to order individuals to take specific jobs in specific industries.

Emphasis of any new controls will be on voluntary action.



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100% FINE JAMAICA RUM
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Put one lump sugar in Old-Fashioned glass; Add a few drops of Angostura Bitters; Moisten with 2 teaspoons of water; Add two ice cubes and a jigger of Myers's Jamaica Rum; Decorate with maraschino cherry, a slice of orange, a slice of lemon.

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People of the Week

Title Reg U.S. Pat. Off.

Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher held key assignments in the first and in the latest attack on Tokyo. Admiral Mitscher commanded the carrier *Hornet* when, in April, 1942, Maj. Gen. James Doolittle's planes took off from her flight deck for their famous stroke at the enemy capital. Now, Admiral Mitscher is in command of the vast and bristling force of carriers and combat vessels that has just hurled 1,200 or more planes at Tokyo, the first truly smashing blow at that city. In between the two bombardments, the Admiral was involved in almost every important sea-air battle of the Pacific war.



—Acme

ADMIRAL MITSCHER

Obviously, he is a fighting man whom America should know better.

Pioneer flier. Admiral Mitscher came to his present post in the logical way. He is one of the Navy's air pioneers. He was a Navy flier even before the first World War. He has stayed in the air arm ever since. He helped develop the carrier and perfect carrier tactics. Now, Admiral Mitscher is turning the product of 30 years of thought, study, and experience in aerial warfare against the Japanese.

Pearl Harbor found him in command of the *Hornet*. He and the *Hornet* were in the Battle of Midway. For a while, the Admiral was in charge of air patrols in a Pacific area, and then he was sent to Guadalcanal as air commander.

Then came carrier duty again, and, as American strength in the Pacific developed, the famous Task Force 58 was organized, with Admiral Mitscher in direct charge, but under the over-all command of Ad-

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•

In the future, it may be just as valuable for you. If you are trying to determine the best location for a new plant, it can help you compare one site with another quickly and without field work, and it will give you many types of information about all the sites you are considering in Pennsylvania.

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

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Floyd Chalfant, *Secretary of Commerce*

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miral R. A. Spruance. For the last year Admiral Mitscher has ranged the Pacific with this tremendously powerful armada, and with breath-taking success. Japanese forces were blasted at Truk, in the Marianas, the Palau Islands, Saipan and a dozen other enemy strongholds—raids that paid big dividends in ships sunk, aircraft downed, or preparation for invasion.

Ranging far to the southward, the force supported Gen. Douglas MacArthur's seizure of Hollandia and later covered the landing on Leyte. In between, the enemy was dispersed at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and, more recently, there was a sweep against enemy installations from Saigon, French Indo-China, to Amoy, China. In 1944, carrier planes from Admiral Mitscher's force downed 6,650 Japanese aircraft.

Admiral Mitscher personally. The man in direct charge of these operations is small and unostentatious. With all the naval tradition of an Annapolis graduate behind him, Admiral Mitscher still dislikes the ceremonious pomp that sometimes, even in war, goes with Navy life. In the files of the Navy Department is a picture of the Admiral coming on board a flagship to take command of a force of carriers. Officers and men are lined up at spick-and-span attention. The Admiral himself appears as a little man in a rumpled, tie-less, khaki uniform and an informal garrison cap. Under his arm is a book, and, in the picture, the title can be read as "Send Another Coffin." He likes detective stories.

In action, the Admiral sits in an easy chair on the bridge, facing in the opposite direction from that in which the ship is traveling. There, he receives messages and reports, and issues necessary orders, usually a few words, spoken in a slow, easy voice. At sea, he customarily wears the long-visored jockey cap, popular with some officers. Once, after a bomb had exploded nearby, he replaced this with a steel helmet, but soon resumed the jockey cap. He is usually imperturbable, but when he is excited the only outward indication is that he puffs more energetically on his cigarette. He is an incessant smoker.

The Admiral is stiff on discipline, but amiable and cordial in normal circumstances. There is a Navy story of how he spent a half hour blowing up a young officer for some breach of discipline. Finally, the Admiral paused and said: "Whew! Young man, come on and let's have a soft drink."

Task Force 58, which Admiral Mitscher commands, is becoming a legend of the Pacific. It pops up almost anywhere. Whenever it finds a Japanese target, there inevitably is action, and inevitably news.

Not long ago, the Japanese were telling their people that Task Force 58 had been beaten and scattered, and Admiral Mitscher killed. The Japanese probably will be reminded for a long while to come of how fallacious that bit of propaganda was.

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

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The "Off Board Market"

American investors today are probably better informed concerning the operations of the nation's financial structure than at any other time in history. Curiously enough, however, few understand completely the workings of the "off board" or "over-the-counter" market, although new issues of United States Government bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds and stocks, railroad equipment trust issues, bank and insurance stocks, investment trust shares and foreign bonds are all initially distributed through the "off board" market. A financial Gallup Poll would show a low percentage even of investors who could give accurate answers to such questions as: What role do dealers play in this market? What are the steps in the handling of various types of "off board" transactions? What provisions, both self-regulatory and governmental, exist for the protection of investors?

THE OFF BOARD SECURITIES MARKET: It Clears the Way for Action

Because in practice the "off board" market often offers attractive investment opportunities which are overlooked by the average investor, the nationwide investment firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane has prepared an unusually interesting booklet on the subject entitled "THE OFF BOARD SECURITIES MARKET". It answers pertinent questions concerning the functioning of this branch of finance, cuts through misconceptions and presents a comprehensive picture of this market in all its major phases, including Underwriting, "Secondary Distributions" and Trading.

Readers will find "THE OFF BOARD SECURITIES MARKET"* a practical handbook which provides the answers to many vexing questions and one that will be of practical value in determining its investment possibilities.

*Copies of "THE OFF BOARD SECURITIES MARKET" will be sent without cost or obligation. Address requests to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 70 Pine Street, New York 5, N. Y.

"The Yeas and Nays"

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Brief letters of comment and suggestions are invited. Those not intended for publication, and those with which writers desire to have only initials used, should be so marked.*

Turning War Scrap Into Jobs

Sir:—May I suggest as a postwar unemployment project, and for a possible future national emergency, that, as we send Europe food, we haul back all of our military equipment, that we stock-pile this scrap, that the title remain with the U. S. Government.

The Europeans can pay for part of the relief we send them by dismantling and transporting this scrap to ports. Employment for them, employment, training and ballast for our merchant marine, and the weapons shipped back instead of shot back!
Bomber Village, Dalhart, Texas H. W. B.

* * *

On Social Security for GI's

Sir:—Unless I have been misinformed, nothing has been done to protect the man who entered the service in regard to Social Security. A man had a job in civilian life and contributed monthly, with the outlook of a monthly income at the age of 65; now, while he is in the service he must go through a period of years in which no contribution is being made, and when he returns to his job he will start again to pay Social Security. Although he will be given credit for what he had paid into Social Security before entering the service, there will be this interrupted term that will lower his amount at the age of 65.
Fleet Post Office, D. S. LEVINSON,
New York, N. Y. Chief Yeoman, USNR.

* * *

A Peace Plan for Germany

Sir:—The Germans are a proud, arrogant people. Perhaps if they were given something they could be proud of, they might turn their thoughts from conquest.

Suppose Germany were made the center of culture, science, art, literature etc., with every nation contributing and people from all over the world going there to study. The Germans not to be allowed to manufacture anything but civilian goods; their agriculture to go on as usual.

If people from all countries came and went freely, there wouldn't be much chance for the Germans to plan anything without people knowing it and they won't be afraid to attack because, if all countries had a stake in it, none would desire to attack.
Binghamton, N. Y. P. E. L.

HOME FIRE HAZARD NO. 2
WATCH THAT CIGARETTE!
There's blood on the souls of many careless smokers. Homes totally destroyed, apartments burned out. Factories made idle, and most tragic, innocent persons killed. Fires started by smoldering cigarettes can usually be stopped in seconds with a Pyrene extinguisher. Put Pyrene on guard in your home today. You'll have some peace of mind!
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BY THE WAY: WHEN DID YOU LAST TEST THE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS IN YOUR HOME?
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This lad his mowing used to shirk,
But now his Toro does the work.

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
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More nurses are needed for the U.S. ARMY NURSE CORPS
WORLD'S FASTEST COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Finch Telecommunications, Inc., Passaic, N. J.

Norm Tessner, 403 E. Center St., Anaheim, Calif.

Norm Tessner has a $35,000 kit of tools



1 Norm Tessner is a Union Oil well puller. Like any other skilled workman, Norm has to have tools. The principal "tool" in his case is a portable rig which pulls the tubing and the pump out of the wells. Without that rig Norm simply couldn't practice his trade.

2 So in order to use his skill, Union first had to provide him with a portable derrick and machine that cost $35,000. At first glance this may seem like a lot of money. But it takes even more than that to provide working equipment *for each employee in the Union Oil Company.*

3 Of course, it only takes a $90 typewriter to provide the working equipment for a stenographer. But on the other hand, it takes a $4,000,000 refining unit to make jobs for just 25 stillmen. And if the company is going to function as a unit, one phase of the work is just as necessary as the other.



4 So the Union Oil stockholders have actually invested $39,504 (in refineries, ships, tools, rigs, oil lands, etc.) for *every one* of the 7,869 employees in the company. This figure shows how drastically the machine age has altered American life.

5 75 years ago almost any man could buy what simple tools he needed himself. Today, in many industries tools cost so much the *individual* simply cannot finance them. The answer is *multiple ownership*—pooling the money of a lot of people. (In Union's case, 31,375 stockholders have helped finance our equipment.)

6 Of course, some countries form these pools by *government ownership.* But in America we form them under legal agreements known as *corporations.* For that way, we can preserve the *freedom* of the individual, the *efficiency* of a free economy and that all-important human incentive—*competition.*

UNION OIL COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA

This series, sponsored by the people of Union Oil Company, is dedicated to a discussion of how and why American business functions. We hope you'll feel free to send in any suggestions or criticisms you have to offer. Write: The President, Union Oil Company, Union Oil Bldg., Los Angeles 14, Calif.

AMERICA'S FIFTH FREEDOM IS FREE ENTERPRISE

Washington Whispers

Title Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

Split Over Command in Pacific . . . Wayne Taylor As Loan Chief? . . . FBI Fear of Losing Spy Duties

Unless machinery is included in the United Nations organization to be shaped formally at San Francisco that will permit revision of interim agreements reached at Yalta by Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin, there is strong prospect the Senate will not approve the charter of that organization. A few important Senators do not agree with commitments Mr. Roosevelt made.

★ ★ ★

Henry Morgenthau's plan for dealing with Germany was adopted in its basic essentials by Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin. It called for stripping Germany of possession or control over industries that could be used for warmaking.

★ ★ ★

Josef Stalin held the principal bargaining cards at his meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, which accounts for the fact that the agreements reached, as they affected Poland and all of Eastern Europe, were in rather close accord with Russian wishes.

★ ★ ★

There was no argument among the Big Three over a Moscow location for the commission that will impose and administer reparations on Germany. Russians suffered the greatest damage from German armies and will have the biggest reparations bill.

★ ★ ★

Gen. Charles de Gaulle of France tried, but did not succeed in his effort to get a central trading position for France by playing off Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill one against the other. Agreements reached in the Crimea Conference reduce the chance of discord among the Big Three.

★ ★ ★

Senator Connally is not pleased that the White House gave the House equal representation with the Senate on the delegation that will represent U. S. in the full-dress meeting to form a United Nations organization.

J. Edgar Hoover's FBI is concerned by the possibility that Maj. Gen. William Donovan's Office of Strategic Services, under a postwar spy plan proposed by General Donovan, may gobble up the intelligence functions of the FBI. The present U. S. spy system is lacking in co-ordination.

★ ★ ★

San Francisco was chosen for the site of the full-dress conference to create a new league of nations because that city is farthest removed from Washington and its influences and because the tight living accommodation conditions there will restrict the number of outside visitors who will crowd in.

★ ★ ★

Gen. Dwight Eisenhower's commission as Supreme Allied Commander over British and French as well as U. S. troops expires when the German war ends. At that time, General Eisenhower either will become U. S. representative on the Allied commission that will rule Germany or will give way to another American military man, who may be Robert Patterson, now Under Secretary of War. Mr. Patterson, in that event, would be given rank of a full general inasmuch as German occupation is to be military

★ ★ ★

U. S. Navy is not yet convinced that the Army's Gen. Douglas MacArthur should be given the job of supreme commander to direct the grand-scale operations that now will be conducted to bring about final defeat of Japan. The U. S. Army, with MacArthur as its No. 1 man in the Pacific, however, appears slated for the top command.

★ ★ ★

There still is a chance that Jesse Jones will legally continue to be Loan Administrator if and when Congress approves the bill separating this job from the Commerce Department. This possibility is in the minds of members of Congress, some of whom hope that Mr. Jones will stay on in the office unless specifically asked by Mr. Roosevelt to vacate it.

★ ★ ★

Wayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of Commerce, is being mentioned along with Fred Vinson, Economic Stabilizer, as successor to Jesse Jones as Loan Administrator when and if he does leave that job. Mr. Vinson seems to have inside track on the appointment, however.

★ ★ ★

There is some official eyebrow raising over one section of Leo Crowley's annual report as head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., which appears to suggest that maybe the Federal Government could do just as well by issuing currency to finance the war rather than by issuing interest-bearing bonds. FDIC draws $70,000,000 a year from interest on Government bonds, causing interested officials to be somewhat amazed at the implications of the statement in the report.

★ ★ ★

Edward Stettinius, Secretary of State, has put into operation a "needling" system that is jolting the State Department. Under this system each of several aides is made personally responsible to see that an action is taken. Each aide, in turn, has his assistants who are made personally responsible for the action. The result has been that as many as 25 or 30 persons pounce upon the unsuspecting official who is supposed to carry out an action desired by the Secretary.

★ ★ ★

The French think that they have the promise of Russia to back their demand for return to France of Indo-China without strings tied to that return, although U. S. and Britain want some understanding as a result of the readiness with which French officials turned Indo-China over to Japan for use against this country and Britain.

Trapper to Trading Post

. . . in Minutes instead of Months

Despite the development of modern fur farms, much of the world's supply of fine furs still comes from wild animals—trapped in remote areas in the Arctic. And many a trapper's cabin is months away from a trading post by dog team —the only transportation available.

But such points—no matter how remote—will be easily accessible by helicopter—postwar. Operated by professional pilots, it will provide swift, safe transportation and cargo service to many locations heretofore accessible only by dog team, pack mule, portage and canoe.

And, on the basis of *low cost* per *ton-mile*, the helicopter is almost unrivaled as a cargo carrier to inaccessible points. For it requires neither roads, rails, nor landing facilities. Therefore, its commercial applications for both cargo and passenger service to isolated areas—in addition to its utility for short haul and shuttle service—are almost endless.

At McDonnell, *right now*, we're doing everything possible to turn out more planes, parts, and plastics for war. But we're engaged too, in comprehensive helicopter development work . . . work which will make available to you and your organization *postwar*— this swift, safe, economical and highly adaptable transportation service.

McDONNELL *Aircraft Corporation*

Manufacturers of PLANES · PARTS · PLASTICS ★ SAINT LOUIS-MEMPHIS ★

Easy-pouring containers.....Plastic lures that gleam



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Did you know that Continental is the 2nd largest producer of crown caps? Has complete and up-to-date facilities for fabricating plastics? Makes a full line of paper and fiber containers?

Why, then, do we still call ourselves the Continental *Can* Company? Well, we're pretty proud of that name. Thousands of businessmen have learned to rely on it for products and service of the highest quality.

Our main job now is making products for war. But when it's won, keep your eye on Continental and on the Continental trademark, too, You'll be seeing the Triple-C more and more in industry and in your home.

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OPERATING DIVISIONS: The Container Co. Van Wert, Ohio · Keystone Drum Company, Pittsburgh, Pa. · Boothby Fibre Can Division, Roxbury, Mass. · Mono Containers, Newark, N. J. — Plastics Division, Cambridge, Ohio. Bond Crown & Cork Co., Wilmington, Del. Cameron Can Machinery Co., Chicago, Ill.

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U.S. NAVY AT WAR

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Second Official Report

by

FLEET ADMIRAL
ERNEST J. KING

Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations

★ ★

Covering Combat Operations
March 1, 1944, to March 1, 1945

Compliments of

THE United States NEWS



FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas



ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY, JR.
Commander Third Fleet

ADMIRAL RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE
Commander Fifth Fleet

UNITED STATES NAVY AT WAR

Second Official Report
to the Secretary of the Navy

Covering combat operations March 1, 1944, to March 1, 1945

BY FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING

Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations

☆

12 March 1945

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Twelve months ago I presented to the late Secretary Knox a report of the progress of our naval operations and the expansion of our naval establishment since the beginning of the war.

Long before the war Frank Knox saw clearly and supported strongly the necessity for arming the United States against her enemies. He knew that a powerful Navy is essential to the welfare of our country, and fought with all his energies to build a Navy that could carry the attack to the enemy. How well he succeeded is now a matter of history.

The manner in which the Navy has carried the attack to the enemy during the twelve months from 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945 is the subject of the report which I present to you at this time.

In reading this report, attention is especially invited to the significant role of amphibious operations during the entire period. In fact, amphibious operations have initiated practically all of the Allied successes during the past three years.

Ernest J. King

Fleet Admiral
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations

The Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

☆

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☆

COVER ART:
Front—Official U. S. Navy Colorphoto
Inside—Official U. S. Navy Photos
Back—Associated Press, by Joe Rosenthal

—Official U. S. Navy Photo

I—*Introduction*

My previous report presented an account of the development of the Navy and of combat operations up to 1 March 1944. This report covers the twelve months from 1 March 1944 until 1 March 1945. Within this period the battle of the Pacific has been carried more than three thousand miles to the westward—from the Marshall Islands into the South China Sea beyond the Philippines—and to the Tokyo approaches. Within this same period the invasion of the continent of Europe has been accomplished. These successes have been made possible only by the strength and resolution of our amphibious forces, acting in conjunction with the fleet.

During these twelve months, there occurred the following actions with the enemy in which the United States Navy took part:

20 March 1944
Landings on Emirau Island, St. Matthias Group, northeast of New Guinea
Bombardment of Kavieng, New Ireland

30 March—1 April 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Western Carolines

22 April 1944
Landings in Hollandia Area, New Guinea

29 April—1 May 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Central and Eastern Carolines

17 May 1944
Landings in Wakde Island Area, New Guinea

19-20 May 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Marcus Island

23 May 1944
Carrier Task Force Attack on Wake Island

27 May 1944
Landings on Biak Island, Dutch New Guinea

6 June 1944
Invasion of Normandy

11-14 June 1944
Preliminary Carrier Task Force Attacks on Marianas Islands

13 June 1944
Bombardment of Matsuwa Island, Kurile Islands

15 June 1944
Landings on Saipan, Marianas Islands

15-16 June 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, Volcano and Bonin Islands

17 June 1944
Capture of Elba, Italy

19-20 June 1944
Battle of the Philippine Sea

23-24 June 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Pagan Island, Marianas Islands

24 June 1944
Carrier Task Force Attack on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands

25 June 1944
Bombardment of Cherbourg, France

26 June 1944
Bombardment of Kurabu Zaki, Paramushiru, Kurile Islands

2 July 1944
Landings on Noemfoor Island, Dutch New Guinea

4 July 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, Volcano and Bonin Islands

21 July 1944
Landings on Guam, Marianas Islands

24 July 1944
Landings on Tinian, Marianas Islands

30 July 1944
Landings in Cape Sansapor Area, Dutch New Guinea

4-5 August 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, Volcano and Bonin Islands

15 August 1944
Invasion of Southern France

31 August—2 September 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, Volcano and Bonin Islands

6-14 September 1944
Preliminary Carrier Task Force Attacks on Palau Islands

7-8 September 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Yap

9-10 September 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Mindanao, Philippine Islands

12-14 September 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on the Visayas, Philippine Islands

14-15 September 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Mindanao, Celebes and Talaud

15 September 1944
Landings on Peleliu, Palau Islands
Landings on Morotai

17 September 1944
Landings on Angaur, Palau Islands

21-22 September 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Manila, Philippine Islands

23 September 1944
Landings on Ulithi

24 September 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on the Visayas, Philippine Islands

28 September 1944
Landings on Ngesebus, Palau Islands

9 October 1944
Bombardment of Marcus Island

10 October 1944
Carrier Task Force Attack on Okinawa Island, Nansei Shoto

11 October 1944
Carrier Task Force Attack on Aparri, Luzon, Philippine Islands

12-15 October 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Formosa and Luzon

18-19 October 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Northern and Central Philippines

20 October 1944
Landings on Leyte, Philippine Islands

21 October 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Luzon and the Visayas, Philippine Islands

23-26 October 1944
Battle for Leyte Gulf

5, 6, 13, 14, 19, 25 November 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Luzon, Philippine Islands

11 November 1944
Carrier Task Force Attack on Ormoc Bay, Leyte, Philippine Islands

11-12 November 1944
Bombardment of Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands

21 November 1944
Bombardment of Matsuwa Island, Kurile Islands

7 December 1944
Landings at Ormoc Bay, Philippine Islands

8, 24, 27 December 1944
Air-surface Attacks on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands

14, 15, 16 December 1944
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Luzon, Philippine Islands

15 December 1944
Landings on Mindoro, Philippine Islands

3-4 January 1945
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Formosa

5 January 1945
Bombardment of Suribachi Wan, off Paramushiru, Kurile Islands
Air-surface Attack on Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, Volcano and Bonin Islands

6-7 January 1945
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Luzon, Philippine Islands

9 January 1945
Landings at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Philippine Islands
Carrier Task Force Attack on Formosa

12 January 1945
Carrier Task Force Attack on French Indo-China Coast

15 January 1945
Carrier Task Force Attack on Formosa

16 January 1945
Carrier Task Force Attack on Hong Kong, Canton and Hainan, China

21-22 January 1945
Carrier Task Force Attack on Formosa and Nansei Shoto

24 January 1945
Air-surface Attack on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands

29-30 January 1945
Landings in Subic Bay Area, Luzon, Philippine Islands

31 January 1945
Landings at Nasugbu, Luzon, Philippine Islands

13-15 February 1945
Bombardment of Manila Bay Defenses, Philippine Islands

14 February 1945
Landings at Mariveles, Luzon, Philippine Islands

16 February 1945
Landings on Corregidor Island, Luzon, Philippine Islands

16-17 February 1945
Carrier Task Force Attack on Tokyo

19 February 1945
Landings on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands
Bombardment of Kurabu Zaki, Paramushiru, Kurile Islands

25-26 February 1945
Carrier Task Force Attack on Tokyo and Hachijo Jima

28 February 1945
Landings on Palawan, Philippine Islands

[All dates are given as of local time of the area of the action.]

No listing of actions with the enemy, however complete, can include the ceaseless and unrelenting depredations of our submarines in the Pacific. In the earlier phases of the war they operated by themselves far beyond the range of any of our surface ships or aircraft. Their constant presence in the westernmost reaches of the Pacific limited the freedom of the enemy's operations: their frequent and effective attacks depleted his shipping and diminished his logistic as well as his combatant strength. The rapid advance of our other forces, both sea and air, has been due in no small measure to the outstanding success with which our submarine activities have been carried on in waters where nothing but submarines could go. During the current phases of the war, our submarines are not only continuing independent operations, but are also working in concert with the task fleets which are now exerting such heavy pressure on the Japanese.

The account of combat operations in this report is

based on special summaries recently made by the fleet commanders concerned. In some instances, this information will be found to differ slightly from communiques previously issued, due to the subsequent accumulation of additional facts. However, it should be understood that there has been no opportunity yet for an exhaustive analysis from an historian's point of view of the great mass of operational reports in my files. I can furnish at this time no more than outline sketches of the highlights of combat operations. The preparation of carefully documented historical studies is underway, but the results will not be available during the progress of the war.

Limits of space further require that this account of combat operations be restricted to those actions which have had a significant or decisive effect upon the progress of the war. Similarly, because of the greatly magnified scale of the operations described, it has been impossible to cite the names of individual ships and commanders in most cases. To retain any semblance of continuity, it has been necessary to omit the details of the constant activity of many naval air, surface, and shore-based units which have performed invaluable services of patrol, supply and maintenance on a vast scale. Land-based planes and PT boats have incessantly harassed the beleagured Japanese garrisons which have been by-passed in our progress across the Pacific. Seabees and other naval forces on shore have made great contributions to the conversion of islands seized in amphibious operations into useful bases for further attack upon the enemy. Countless ships and planes have contributed to the safe progress of troops and supplies along far-flung lines of communications. The operations of these forces, which have frequently involved bitter combat with the enemy, cannot, because of the nature of this report, be further elaborated upon.

II—*Command and* Fleet Organization

UNITED STATES FLEET

The basic organization of the United States Fleet has remained unchanged during the twelve months covered by this report.

The Headquarters of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, located in Washington since December 1941, has continued to function as originally conceived, but with the growth in complexity and volume of work, I felt the need of assistance in matters of military policy concerning both the United States Fleet and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Consequently the post of Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations was created, and on 1 October 1944, Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards reported for duty in that capacity. On the same date Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., reported as Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Rear Admiral B. H. Bieri reported as Deputy Chief of Staff.

ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

United States Pacific Fleet

Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas continue under the command of Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. As the scene of operations moved into the far western Pacific, Fleet Admiral Nimitz's headquarters at Pearl Harbor became increasingly remote. Therefore in January 1945 advance headquarters were established at Guam, from which the Commander in Chief could supervise operations more closely.

Seventh Fleet

The Seventh Fleet (Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Commander) continues to operate in the Southwest Pacific Area. Vice Admiral Kinkaid is under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of that Area.

Sea Frontiers

On 15 April 1944 a series of changes in the command organization of waters along the Pacific coast of the United States was made. The Northwest Sea Frontier, which had been composed of the Northwestern Sector (Oregon and Washington) and the Alaska Sector, was abolished. The Northwestern Sector was incorporated into the Western Sea Frontier, and the Alaska Sector was established as the Alaskan Sea Frontier (Vice Admiral F. J. Fletcher, Commander). At the same time the 17th Naval District was created including the Territory of Alaska and its waters. This change consolidated all sea frontier and correlated activities on the west coast of the United States under the Commander, Western Sea Frontier (Vice Admiral D. W. Bagley), and incidentally brought the jurisdictional limits of the naval sea frontiers into conformity with the Army defense organizations on the Pacific coast of the United States.

On 8 November 1944, the functions of the Commander, Western Sea Frontier, were greatly enlarged in scope in order to afford more effective logistic support for war operations of United States forces in the Pacific. On 17 November 1944, Admiral R. E. Ingersoll assumed duties as Commander, Western Sea Frontier, relieving Vice Admiral Bagley.

On 28 November 1944, Vice Admiral Bagley relieved Vice Admiral R. L. Ghormley as Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier.

The Philippine Sea Frontier (Rear Admiral J. L. Kauffman, Commander) was established as a separate command under Commander Seventh Fleet (Southwest Pacific Area) on 13 November 1944.


THE PACIFIC OFFENSIVE
LINE OF FARTHEST JAPANESE ADVANCE 7 AUGUST 1942
PROGRESS: 7 AUGUST 1942 – 1 MARCH 1944
PROGRESS: 1 MARCH 1944 – 1 MARCH 1945
SEA OF OKHOTSK
SEA OF JAPAN
JAPAN
HONSHU
TOKYO
NANPO SHOTO
NANSEI SHOTO
BONIN ISLANDS
CHICHI JIMA
HAHA JIMA
TWO JIMA
OKINAWA JIMA
VOLCANO ISLANDS
MARCUS
FORMOSA
CHINA
PEIPING
KOREA
SHANGHAI
FOOCHOW
CANTON
HONG KONG
FRENCH INDO CHINA
THAILAND
INDIA
CALCUTTA
BAY OF BENGAL
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
NICOBAR ISLANDS
CEYLON
GULF OF THAILAND
SOUTH CHINA SEA
LUZON
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MARIANAS ISLANDS
SAIPAN
TINIAN
GUAM
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PELELIU
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

—Official U. S. Navy Map

ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN THE ATLANTIC–MEDITERRANEAN

United States Atlantic Fleet

The U. S. Atlantic Fleet (Admiral Ingersoll, Commander in Chief, until 15 November 1944, when relieved by Admiral J. H. Ingram) consists of the forces operating in the United States area of strategic responsibility, which is, roughly, the western half of the Atlantic Ocean. The Fourth Fleet, operating in the South Atlantic, is a unit of U. S. Atlantic Fleet. Vice Admiral (now Admiral) Ingram was Commander Fourth Fleet until November 1944, when relieved by Vice Admiral W. R. Munroe.

United States Naval Forces, Europe

U. S. Naval Forces, Europe (Twelfth Fleet), Admiral H. R. Stark, Commander, is an administrative command, embracing all United States naval forces assigned to British waters and the Atlantic coastal waters of Europe. Admiral Stark is responsible for the maintenance and training of all United States naval units in his area. For operations connected with the invasion of the continent of Europe, he assigns appropriate task forces to the operational control of the British Admiral commanding the Allied naval contingent of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower's supreme command, which embraces all Army, Navy and Air elements involved in activities connected with the Western Front.

United States Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters (Eighth Fleet), Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, Commander, includes all United States naval forces in the Mediterranean. Vice Admiral Hewitt is under the British naval Commander in Chief of the Allied naval forces in the area, who is, in turn, under the command of the Supreme Commander of the area (formerly General of the Army Eisenhower, later Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson, at present Field Marshal Alexander of the British Army).

Sea Frontiers

There are four sea frontiers in the Western Atlantic. The Eastern Sea Frontier (Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, Commander) consists of the coastal waters and adjacent land areas from the Canadian border to Jacksonville. The Gulf Sea Frontier (Rear Admiral [now Vice Admiral] Munroe, Commander, until 17 July 1944, when relieved by Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson) consists of the coastal waters from Jacksonville westward, including the Gulf of Mexico, and adjacent land areas. The Caribbean Sea Frontier (Vice Admiral A. B. Cook, Commander, until 14 May 1944, when relieved by Vice Admiral R. C. Giffen) consists of eastern Caribbean and adjacent land and water areas. The Panama Sea Frontier (Rear Admiral H. C. Train, Commander, until 1 November 1944, when relieved by Rear Admiral H. C. Kingman) consists of western Caribbean waters, adjacent land areas, and those waters of the Pacific constituting the western approaches to the Panama Canal. The Commander of the Panama Sea Frontier is under the Commanding General at Panama. The other western Atlantic sea frontier commanders are directly under Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

The Moroccan Sea Frontier (Commodore B. V. McCandlish, Commander) is under Commander Eighth Fleet.

III—*Combat Operations: Pacific*

During the year 1944, the whole of the United States Navy in the Pacific was on the offensive. My previous report, summarizing combat operations to 1 March 1944, showed the evolution by which we had passed from the defensive, through the defensive-offensive and offensive-defensive stages, to the full offensive. To understand the significance of our operations in the account which follows, the reader must be aware of the basic reasons behind them.

The campaign in the Pacific has important elements of dissimilarity from the campaign in Europe. Since the "battle of the beaches" was finally won with the landings in Normandy last June, the naval task in Europe has become of secondary scope. The European war has turned into a vast land campaign, in which the role of the navies is to keep open the trans-Atlantic sea routes against an enemy whose naval strength appears to be broken except for his U-boat activities. In contrast, the Pacific war is still in the "crossing the ocean" phase. There are times in the Pacific when troops get beyond the range of naval gun support, but much of the fighting has been, is now, and will continue for some time to be on beaches where Army and Navy combine in amphibious operations. Therefore, the essential element of our dominance over the Japanese has been the strength of our fleet. The ability to move troops from island to island, and to put them ashore against opposition, is due to the fact that our command of the sea is spreading as Japanese naval strength withers. As a rough generalization, the war in Europe is now predominantly an affair of armies, while the war in the Pacific is still predominantly naval.

The strategy in the Pacific has been to advance on the core of the Japanese position from two directions. Under General of the Army MacArthur, a combined Allied Army-Navy force has moved north from the Australian region. Under Fleet Admiral Nimitz, a United States Army-Navy-Marine force has moved west from Hawaii. The mobile power embodied in the major combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet has, sometimes united and sometimes separately, covered operations along both routes of advance, and at the same time contained the Japanese Navy.

In November 1943 South Pacific forces secured a beachhead on Bougainville, on which airfields were con-

structed for the neutralization of the Japanese base of Rabaul on New Britain. Simultaneously Southwest Pacific forces were working their way along the northern coast of New Guinea.

In November 1943 Pacific Ocean Areas forces attacked the Gilbert Islands, and at the end of January 1944 the Marshall Islands—the first stepping stones along the road from Hawaii. To control the seas and render secure a route from Hawaii westward, it was not necessary to occupy every atoll. We could and did pursue a "leap frog" strategy, the basic concept of which is to seize those islands essential for our use, by-passing many strongly held intervening ones which were not necessary for our purposes. This policy was made possible by the gradually increasing disparity between our own naval power and that of the enemy, so that the enemy was and still is unable to support the garrisons of the by-passed atolls. Consequently, by cutting the enemy's line of communicating bases, the isolated ones became innocuous, without the necessity for our expending effort for their capture. Therefore, we can with impunity by-pass numerous enemy positions, with small comfort to the isolated Japanese garrisons, who are left to meditate on the fate of exposed forces beyond the range of naval support.

This strategy has brought the Navy into combat with shore-based air forces. It has involved some risks and considerable difficulty, which we have overcome. However, as we near the enemy's homeland, the problem becomes more and more difficult. During the first landing in the Philippines, for example, it was necessary to deal with the hundred or more Japanese airfields that were within flying range of Leyte. This imposed on our carrier forces a heavy task which we may expect to become increasingly heavy from time to time. While shore-based air facilities are being established as rapidly as possible in each position we capture, there will always be a period following a successful landing when control of the air will rest solely on the strength of our carrier based aviation.

The value of having naval vessels in support of landings has been fully confirmed. The renewed importance of battleships is one of the interesting features of the Pacific war. The concentrated power of heavy naval guns is very great by standards of land warfare, and the artillery support they have given in landing operations has been a material factor in getting our troops ashore with minimum loss of life. Battleships and cruisers, as well as smaller ships, have proved their worth for this purpose.

As I pointed out above, our advance across the Pacific followed two routes. At the opening of the period covered by this report, General of the Army MacArthur's forces were working their way along the northern coast of New Guinea, while Fleet Admiral Nimitz, by the capture of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, had taken the first steps along the other route. The narrative which follows begins with the operations leading to the capture of Hollandia on the north coast of New Guinea.

HOLLANDIA AND FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE COVERING OPERATIONS

On 13 February 1944 the final occupation of the Huon Peninsula in Northeast New Guinea was completed. The occupation of the Admiralty Islands on 29 February 1944 by General of the Army MacArthur's forces and of Emirau in the St. Matthias group, north of New Britain, by Admiral W. F. Halsey's forces on 20 March had further advanced our holdings. In these two operations, the amphibious attack forces were commanded respectively by Rear Admiral W. M. Fechteler and Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) T. S. Wilkinson. On 20 March battleships and destroyers bombarded Kavieng, New Ireland.

The enemy had concentrated a considerable force at Wewak, on the northern coast of New Guinea, several hundred miles west of the Huon Peninsula. Hollandia, more than two hundred miles west of Wewak, had a good potential harbor and three airstrips capable of rehabilitation and enlargement. In order to accelerate the reconquest of New Guinea, it was decided to push far to the northwest, seize the coastal area in the vicinity of Aitape and Hollandia, thus by-passing and neutralizing the enemy's holdings in the Hansa Bay and Wewak areas. This operation was made possible by the availability of the fast carrier task force of the Pacific Fleet to perform two functions, namely to neutralize enemy positions in the Western Carolines from which attacks might be launched against our landing forces or against our new bases in the Admiralties and Emirau, and to furnish close cover for the landing.

Carrier Task Force Attacks on Western Carolines

Under command of Admiral R. A. Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet, a powerful force of the Pacific Fleet, including carriers, fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, attacked the Western Carolines. On 30 and 31 March, carrier-based planes struck at the Palau group with shipping as primary target. They sank 3 destroyers, 17 freighters, 5 oilers and 3 small vessels, and damaged 17 additional ships. The planes also bombed the airfields, but they did not entirely stop Japanese air activity. At the same time, our aircraft mined the waters around Palau in order to immobilize enemy shipping in the area.

Part of the force struck Yap and Ulithi on 31 March and Woleai on 1 April.

Although the carrier aircraft encountered active air opposition over the Palau area on both days, they quickly overcame it. Enemy planes approached the task force on the evenings of 29 March and 30 March but were destroyed or driven off by the combat air patrols. During the three days' operation our plane losses were 25 in combat, while the enemy had 114 planes destroyed in combat and 46 on the ground. These attacks were successful in obtaining the desired effect, and the operation in New Guinea went forward without opposition from the Western Carolines.

Capture and Occupation of Hollandia

The assault on Hollandia involved a simultaneous three-pronged attack by Southwest Pacific forces. Landings at Tanahmerah Bay and, 30 miles to the eastward, at Humboldt Bay trapped the Hollandia airstrips situated 12 miles inland. The third landing, an additional 90 miles to the eastward at Aitape, provided a diversionary attack, wiped out an enemy strong point, and won another airstrip. Approximately 50,000 Japanese were cut off and the complete domination of New Guinea by Allied forces was hastened. The operation was under the



—Official U. S. Navy Map

command of General of the Army MacArthur. Three separate attack groups operated under a single attack force commander, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) D. E. Barbey, who also commanded the Tanahmerah Bay attack group. Rear Admiral Fechteler commanded the Humboldt Bay group and Captain (now Rear Admiral) A. G. Noble the Aitape group. This amphibious operation was the largest that had been undertaken in the Southwest Pacific Area up to that time. Over 200 ships were engaged. A powerful force of carriers, fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers from the Pacific Fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) M. A. Mitscher, covered the landings.

Throughout 21 April, the day before the landings, the carriers launched strikes against the airstrips in the Aitape-Hollandia area, which had previously been bombed nightly since 12 April by land-based aircraft. On the night of 21-22 April, light cruisers and destroyers bombarded the airfields at Wakde and Sawar. The amphibious landing took place on the 22nd, and on that and the following day planes from the Pacific Fleet carriers supported operations ashore, while keeping neighboring enemy airfields neutralized. Prepared defenses were found abandoned at Aitape; at Hollandia and Tanahmerah Bay there were none. The enemy took to the hills and the landings were virtually unopposed. Once ashore, all three groups encountered difficulties with swampy areas behind the beaches, lack of overland communications, and dense jungles. In spite of these obstacles, satisfactory progress was made. At the end of the second day the Aitape strip had been occupied and fighters were using it within twenty-four hours. The Hollandia strips fell a few days later.

As soon as the airstrips were in full operation and the port facilities at Hollandia developed, we were ready for further attacks at points along the northwestern coast of New Guinea.

Carrier Task Force Attacks on Central and Eastern Carolines

Returning from support of the Hollandia landings, the fast carrier task force attacked Truk on 29 and 30 April. Initial fighter sweeps overcame almost all enemy air opposition by 1000 on the morning of the 29th, and thereafter over 2200 sorties, dropping 740 tons of bombs, were flown against land installations on Truk Atoll. Our planes encountered vigorous and active antiaircraft fire, but did exceedingly heavy damage to buildings and installations ashore. One air attack was attempted on our carriers on the morning of the 29th, but the approaching planes were shot down before they could do damage. Our plane losses in combat were 27 against 63 enemy planes destroyed in the air and at least 60 more on the ground.

For over two hours on 30 April a group of cruisers and destroyers bombarded Satawan Island, where the enemy had been developing an air base. Although existing installations were of little importance, the bombardment served to hinder the enemy's plans and furnished training for the crews of our ships. Similarly, a group of fast battleships and destroyers, returning from Truk, bombarded Ponape for 80 minutes on 1 May. There was no opposition except for antiaircraft fire against the supporting planes.

MARIANAS OPERATIONS

During the summer of 1944, Pacific Ocean Areas forces captured the islands of Saipan, Guam and Tinian, and neutralized the other Marianas Islands which remained in the hands of the enemy.

The Marianas form part of an almost continuous chain of islands extending 1350 miles southward from Tokyo. Many of these islands are small, rocky, and valueless from a military viewpoint, but others provide a series of mutually supporting airfields and bases, like so many stepping stones, affording protected lines of air and sea communications from the home islands of the Japanese Empire through the Nanpo Shoto [Bonin and Volcano Islands] and Marianas to Truk; thence to the Eastern Carolines and Marshalls, as well as to the Western Carolines, the Philippines and Japanese-held territory to the south and west. Our occupation of the Marianas would, therefore, effectively cut these admirably protected lines of enemy communication, and give us bases from which we could not only control sea areas further west in the Pacific but also on which we could base aircraft to bomb Tokyo and the home islands of the Empire.

As soon as essential points in the Marshall Islands had been secured, preparations were made for the Marianas operation. Admiral Spruance, who had already conducted the Gilberts and Marshalls operations, was in command. Amphibious forces were directly under Vice Admiral R. K. Turner and the Expeditionary Forces were commanded by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC. Ships were assembled, trained, and loaded at many points in the Pacific Ocean Areas. More than 600 vessels ranging from battleships and aircraft carriers to cruisers, high-speed transports and tankers, more than 2,000 aircraft, and some 300,000 Navy, Marine and Army personnel took part in the capture of the Marianas.

Enemy airbases on Marcus and Wake Islands flanked on the north our approach to the Marianas. Consequently, a detachment of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers from the Fifth Fleet attacked these islands almost a month before the projected landings in order to destroy aircraft, shore installations, and shipping. Carrier planes struck Marcus on 19 and 20 May and Wake on 23 May. They encountered little opposition and accomplished their mission with very light losses due to antiaircraft fire.

From about the beginning of June, land-based aircraft from the Admiralties, Green, Emirau and Hollandia kept enemy bases, especially at Truk, Palau, and Yap well neutralized. The fast carriers and battleships of the Fifth Fleet, under Vice Admiral Mitscher, prepared the way for the amphibious assault. Carrier planes began attacks on the Marianas on 11 June with the object of first destroying aircraft and air facilities and then concentrating on bombing shore defenses in preparation for the coming amphibious landings. They achieved control of the air over the Marianas on the first fighter sweep of 11 June and thereafter attacked air facilities, defense installations, and shipping in the vicinity.

Initial Landings on Saipan

Saipan, the first objective, was the key to the Japanese defenses; having been in Japanese hands since World



—Official U. S. Navy Photo

TRUK

During carrier task force attack, 29-30 April 1944

War I, its fortifications were formidable. Although a rugged island unlike the coral atolls of the Gilberts and Marshalls, Saipan was partly surrounded by a reef which made landing extremely difficult. To prepare for the assault scheduled for 15 June, surface ships began to bombard Saipan on the 13th. The fast battleships fired their main and secondary batteries for nearly 7 hours into the western coast of Saipan and Tinian Islands. Under cover of this fire, fast mine sweepers cleared the waters for the assault ships, and underwater demolition teams examined the beaches for obstructions and cleared away such as were found.

The brunt of surface bombardment for destruction of defenses was borne by the fire support groups of older battleships, cruisers and destroyers, which preceded the transports to the Marianas and began to bombard Saipan and Tinian on 14 June.

Early on the morning of 15 June the transports, cargo ships, and LST's of Vice Admiral Turner's amphibious force came into position off the west coast of Saipan. The bombardment ships delivered a heavy, close range pre-assault fire, and carrier aircraft made strikes to destroy enemy resistance on the landing beaches. The first troops reached the beaches at 0840, and within the next half hour several thousand were landed. In spite of preparatory bombing and bombardment, the enemy met the landing force with heavy fire from mortars and small calibre guns on the beaches. Initial beachheads were established not without difficulty, and concentrated and determined enemy fire and counterattacks caused some casualties and rendered progress inland slower than was anticipated.

The 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions landed first and were followed the next day by the 27th Army Infantry Division. Although Saipan had an area of but 72 square miles, it was rugged and admirably suited to delaying defensive action by a stubborn and tenacious enemy. The strong resistance at Saipan, coupled with the news of a sortie of the Japanese fleet, delayed landings on Guam.

Battle of the Philippine Sea

This sortie of the Japanese fleet promised to develop into a full scale action. On 15 June, the very day of the Saipan landings, Admiral Spruance received reports that a large force of enemy carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers was headed toward him, evidently on its way to relieve the beleaguered garrisons in the Marianas. As the primary mission of the American forces in the area was to capture the Marianas, the Saipan amphibious operations had to be protected from enemy interference at all costs. In his plans for what developed into the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Admiral Spruance was rightly guided by this basic mission. He therefore operated aggressively to the westward of the Marianas, but did not draw his carriers and battleships so far away that they could not protect the amphibious units from any possible Japanese "end run" which might develop.

While some of the fast carriers and battleships were disposed to the westward to meet this threat, other carriers on 15 and 16 June attacked the Japanese bases of Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. During this strike to the northward our carrier planes destroyed enemy planes in the air and on the ground, and set fire to buildings, ammunition and fuel dumps, thus temporarily neutralizing those bases, and freeing our forces from attack by enemy aircraft coming from the Bonins and Volcanoes. The forces employed in the northward strike were recalled to rendezvous west of Saipan, as were also many of the ships designated to give fire support to the troops on Saipan.

On 19 June the engagement with the Japanese fleet began. The action on the 19th consisted of two air battles over Guam with Japanese planes, evidently launched from carriers and intended to land for fueling and arming on the fields of Guam and Tinian, and a large scale lengthy attack by enemy aircraft on Admiral Spruance's ships. The result of the day's action was some 402 enemy planes destroyed out of a total of 545 seen, as against 17 American planes lost and minor damage to 4 ships.

With further air attacks against Saipan by enemy aircraft unlikely because of the enemy's large carrier plane losses, and with its basic mission thus fulfilled, our fleet headed to the westward hoping to bring the Japanese fleet to action. Air searches were instituted early on the 20th to locate the Japanese surface ships. Search planes did not make contact until afternoon and, when heavy strikes from our carriers were sent out, it was nearly sunset. The enemy was so far to the westward that our air attacks had to be made at extreme range. They sank 2 enemy carriers, 2 destroyers and 1 tanker, and severely damaged 3 carriers, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 3 tankers. We lost only 16 planes shot down by enemy antiaircraft and fighter planes. Precariously low gasoline in our planes and the coming of darkness cut the attack short. Our pilots had difficulty in locating their carriers and many landed in darkness. A total of 73 planes were lost due to running out of fuel and landing crashes, but over 90 per cent of the personnel of planes which made water landings near our fleet were picked up in the dark by destroyers and cruisers. The heavy damage inflicted on the Japanese surface ships, and prevention of enemy interference to operations at Saipan, made these losses a fair price to pay in return.

The enemy continued retiring on the night of the 20th and during the 21st. Although his fleet was located by searches on the 21st, planes sent out to attack did not make contact. Admiral Spruance's primary mission precluded getting out of range of the Marianas. and on the night of the 21st, distance caused the chase to be abandoned. The Battle of the Philippine Sea broke the Japanese effort to reinforce the Marianas; thereafter, the capture and occupation of the group went forward without serious threat of enemy interference.

Conquest of Saipan

During the major fleet engagement, land fighting on Saipan continued as bitterly as before. Between 15 and 20 June the troops pushed across the southern portion of the island, gaining control of two enemy airfields. During the next ten days, from the 21st to the 30th, the rough central section around Mount Tapotchau was captured. The Japanese, exploiting the terrain, resisted with machine guns, small arms and light mortars from caves and other almost inaccessible positions. This central part of the island was cleared of organized resistance, and the last stage of the battle commenced. By 1 July, the 2nd Marine Division had captured the heights overlooking Garapan and Tanapag Harbor on the west coast, while

the 4th Marine Division and 27th Army Division had advanced their lines to within about five miles of the northern tip of the island. From 1 to 9 July the enemy resisted sporadically, in isolated groups, in northern Saipan. On 4 July the 2nd Marine Division captured Garapan, the capital city of the island. One desperate "banzai" counterattack occurred on 7 July, but this was stemmed and all organized resistance ceased on the 9th. Many isolated small groups remained, which required continuous mopping up operations; in fact, some mopping up still continues.

While the campaign ashore went on, it was constantly supported by surface and air forces. Surface ships were always ready to deliver gunfire, which was controlled by liaison officers ashore in order to direct the fire where it would be of greatest effectiveness. Carrier aircraft likewise assisted. Supplies, ammunition, artillery and reinforcements were brought to the reef by landing craft and were carried ashore by amphibious vehicles until such time as reef obstacles were cleared and craft could beach. The captured Aslito airfield was quickly made ready for use, and on 22 June Army planes began operation from there in patrols against enemy aircraft. Tanapag Harbor was cleared and available for use 7 July.

Japanese planes from other bases in the Marianas and the Carolines harassed our ships off Saipan from the time of landing until 7 July. Their raids were not large and, considering the number of ships in the area, these attacks did little damage. An LCI was sunk and the battleship MARYLAND damaged. An escort carrier, 2 fleet tankers, and 4 smaller craft received some damage, but none serious enough to require immediate withdrawal from the area.

While these activities went on in Saipan, the fast carriers and battleships continued to afford cover to the westward, and also to prevent the enemy from repairing his air strength in the Bonins and Volcanoes. On 23 and 24 June, Pagan Island was heavily attacked by carrier planes. Iwo Jima received attacks on 24 June and 4 July and Chichi Jima and Haha Jima on the latter date. The 4 July attack on Iwo included bombardment by cruisers and destroyers. These attacks kept air facilities neutralized and destroyed shipping.

Reoccupation of Guam

As has been seen, the unexpectedly stiff resistance on Saipan, together with the sortie of the Japanese fleet, had necessitated a postponement of landings on Guam. This delay permitted a period of air and surface bombardment which was unprecedented in severity and duration. Surface ships first bombarded Guam on 16 June; from 8 July until the landing on the 21st the island was



—Official U. S. Navy Photo

BATTLE OF PHILIPPINE SEA
A burning Japanese plane plunges toward the sea

under daily gunfire from battleships, cruisers and destroyers, which destroyed all important emplaced defenses. This incessant bombardment was coordinated with air strikes from fields on Saipan and from fast and escort carriers. The destruction of air facilities and planes on Guam and Rota, as well as the neutralization of more distant Japanese bases, gave us uncontested control of the air. The forces engaged in the reoccupation of Guam were under the command of Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly.

Troops landed on Guam on 21 July. As at Saipan the beach conditions were unfavorable and landing craft had to transfer their loads to amphibious vehicles or pontoons at the edge of the reef. With the support of bombarding ships and planes, the first waves of amphibious vehicles beached at 0830. There were two simultaneous landings: one on the north coast east of Apra Harbor and the other on the west coast south of the harbor. Troops received enemy mortar and machine gun fire as they reached the beach. The 3rd Marine Division, the 77th Army Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade, under command of Major General R. S. Geiger, USMC, made the landings; from 21 to 30 July they fought in the Apra Harbor area, where the heaviest enemy opposition was encountered.

The capture of Orote Peninsula with its airfields and other installations, made the Apra Harbor area available for sheltered and easier unloading. Beginning on 31 July, our forces advanced across the island to the east coast and thence pushed northward to the tip of Guam. While enemy opposition was stubborn, it did not reach the intensity encountered on Saipan, and on 10 August 1944 all organized resistance on the island ceased. Air and surface support continued throughout this period.

The elimination of isolated pockets of Japanese opposition was a long and difficult task even after the end of organized resistance. As at Saipan, the rough terrain of the island, with its many caves, made the annihilation of the remaining small enemy forces a difficult task. The enemy casualty figures for Guam illustrate the character of this phase. By 10 August the total number of Japanese dead counted was 10,971 and 86 were prisoners of war. By the middle of November, these numbers had increased to 17,238 enemy killed and 463 prisoners.

Occupation of Tinian

The capture of Tinian Island, by forces commanded by Rear Admiral H. W. Hill, completed the amphibious operations in the Marianas in the summer of 1944. Located across the narrow channel to the southward of Saipan, Tinian was taken by troops who had already participated in the capture of the former island. Intermittent bombardment began at the same time as on Saipan and continued not only from sea and air, but from artillery on the south coast of Saipan. A joint naval and air program for "softening" the defenses of Tinian went on from 26 June to 8 July, and thereafter both air and surface forces kept the enemy from repairing destroyed positions. There were heavy air and surface attacks on 22 and 23 July, the days immediately preceding the landing, and these completed the destruction of almost all enemy gun emplacements and defense positions. The landings, which took place on beaches at the northern end of Tinian, began early on 24 July. Beach reconnaissance had been conducted at night and the enemy was surprised in the location of our landing. Troops of the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions landed in amphibious vehicles from transports at 0740 on the 24th. They met only light rifle and mortar fire, and secured a firm beachhead. Like Saipan and Guam, Tinian presented a difficult terrain problem, but enemy resistance was much less stubborn than on the other islands. On 1 August the island was declared secure, and the assault and occupation phase ended on the 8th.

Throughout this period, surface and air units provided constant close support to the ground troops. In addition, on 4 and 5 August units of the fast carrier task force virtually wiped out a Japanese convoy, and raided airfields and installations in the Bonin and Volcano Islands. Damage to the enemy was 11 ships sunk, 8 ships damaged, and 13 aircraft destroyed; our losses were 16 planes.

PROGRESS ALONG NEW GUINEA COAST

Before and during the Marianas operations, Southwest Pacific forces under General of the Army MacArthur engaged in a series of amphibious landings along the north coast of New Guinea. These operations were undertaken to deny the Japanese air and troop movements in western New Guinea and approaches from the southwest to our lines of communication across the Pacific, thus securing our flank. Unlike the Hollandia operation, which was supported by carriers and battleships of the Fifth Fleet, they involved the use of no ships larger than heavy cruisers.

Occupation of the Wakde Island Area

In order to secure airdromes for the support of further operations to the westward, an unopposed landing was made on 17 May 1944 by U. S. Army units at Arara, on the mainland of Dutch New Guinea, about 70 miles west of Hollandia. Under command of Captain (now Rear Admiral) Noble, a naval force of cruisers, destroyers, transports and miscellaneous landing craft landed the 163rd Regimental Combat Team reinforced. Extending their beachhead on D-day along the coast from Toem to the Tor River, the troops made shore-to-shore movements to the Wakde Islands on 17 and 18 May. By 19 May, all organized enemy resistance on the Wakde Islands had ceased.

Occupation of Biak Island

Because of the need for a forward base from which to operate heavy bombers, an amphibious assault was made on Biak Island, beginning on 27 May. The attack force, under the command of Rear Admiral Fechteler, composed of cruisers, destroyers, transports and landing craft, departed Humboldt Bay on the evening of 25 May and arrived off the objective without detection. Initial enemy opposition was weak and quickly overcome, but subsequently the landing force encountered stiff resistance in the move toward the Biak airfields. Air support and bombardment were furnished by B-24's, B-25's and A-20's, while fighter cover was provided by planes from our bases at Hollandia and Aitape.

After the initial landing on Biak Island, the enemy, entrenched in caves commanding the coastal road to the airstrips, continued stubborn resistance and seriously retarded the scheduled development of the air facilities for which the operation had been undertaken. Further-

more, it became apparent that the enemy was planning to reinforce his position on Biak. To counter this threat, a force of 3 cruisers and 14 destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, RN, was given the mission of destroying enemy naval forces threatening our Biak occupation. On the night of 8-9 June, a force of 5 enemy destroyers attempting a "Tokyo Express" run was intercepted by Rear Admiral Crutchley's force. The Japanese destroyers turned and fled at such high speed that in the ensuing chase only one of our destroyer divisions, commanded by Commander (now Captain) A. E. Jarrell, was able to gain firing range. After a vain chase of about three hours the action was broken off.

Occupation of Noemfoor Island

On 2 July 1944, a landing was made in the vicinity of Kaimiri Airdrome on the northwest coast of Noemfoor Island, southwest of Biak Island. The amphibious attack force, under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Barbey, consisted of an attack group, a covering group of cruisers and destroyers, a landing craft unit, and a landing force built around the 148th U. S. Infantry Regimental Combat Team reinforced. Landing began at 0800, and all troops and a considerable number of bulk stores were landed on D-day. Prior to the landing nearby Japanese airfields were effectively neutralized by the 5th Air Force.

Enemy opposition was feeble, resistance not reaching the fanatical heights experienced on other islands. There were not more than 2000 enemy troops on Noemfoor Island and our casualties were extremely light, only 8 of our men having been killed by D-plus-6 day. Again, forward air facilities to support further advance to the westward had been secured at a relatively light cost.

Occupation of Cape Sansapor Area

On 30 July 1944 an amphibious force, under the command of Rear Admiral Fechteler, carried out a landing in the Cape Sansapor area on the Vogelkop Peninsula in western New Guinea. Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey commanded the covering force.

The main assault was made without enemy air or naval resistance. Beach conditions were ideal and within a short time secondary landings had been made at Middleberg Island and Amsterdam Island, a few thousand yards off shore.

Prior to D-day Army Air Force bombers and fighters had neutralized enemy areas in the Geelvink- Vogelkop area and the main air bases in the Halmaheras. On D-day, when it became evident that the ground forces would encounter no resistance, Army support aircraft from Owi and Wakde were released for other missions and naval bombardment was not utilized. Again, casualties sustained were light: one man killed, and minor damage to small landing craft.

This move brought our forces to the western extremity of New Guinea. It effectively neutralized New Guinea as a base for enemy operations, and rendered the enemy more vulnerable to air attack in Halmahera, the Molukka Passage and Makassar Strait. Enemy concentrations had been by-passed in our progress up the coast, but due to the absence of roads, the major portion of enemy transport was of necessity water-borne. Here our PT boats did admirable service, roaming east and west along the coast, harassing enemy barge traffic, and preventing reinforcements from being put ashore.

WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATIONS

Following closely upon the capture of the Marianas, Fleet Admiral Nimitz's forces moved to the west and south to attack the Western Caroline Islands. Establishment of our forces in that area would give us control of the southern half of the crescent shaped chain of islands which runs from Tokyo to the southern Philippines. It would complete the isolation of the enemy-held Central and Eastern Carolines, including the base at Truk.

Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr., Commander Third Fleet, commanded the operations in the Western Carolines. Additions to the Pacific Fleet from new construction made an even larger force available to strike the Western Carolines than the Marianas. Nearly 800 vessels participated. Vice Admiral Wilkinson commanded the joint expeditionary forces which conducted landing operations. Major General J. C. Smith, USMC, was Commander Expeditionary Troops, and Vice Admiral Mitscher was again commander of the fast carrier force. Troops employed included the 1st Marine Division and the 81st Army Infantry Division.

Preliminary Strikes by Fast Carrier Task Force

Prior to the landings in the Western Carolines, wide flung air and surface strikes were made to divert and destroy Japanese forces which might have interfered. Between 31 August and 2 September, planes from the fast carriers bombed and strafed Chichi Jima, Haha Jima and Iwo Jima. Cruisers and destroyers bombarded Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima. They destroyed 46 planes in the air and on the ground, sank at least 6 ships, and damaged installations, airfields and supply dumps. Our forces lost 5 aircraft. On the 7th and 8th, planes from the same carriers attacked Yap Island.

Simultaneously, other groups of fast carriers devoted their attention to the Palau Islands where the first Western Carolines landings were to take place. In attacks throughout the group from 6 to 8 September, they did extensive damage to ammunition and supply dumps, barracks and warehouses.

The plan was for Pacific Ocean Areas forces to land on Peleliu Island in the Palau group on 15 September, simultaneously with a landing on Morotai by Southwest Pacific forces. In order to neutralize bases from which aircraft might interfere with these operations, carrier air strikes on Mindanao Island in the southern Philippines were made. These attacks began on 9 September and revealed the unexpected weakness of enemy air resistance in the Mindanao area. On 10 September there were further air attacks, as well as a cruiser-destroyer raid off the eastern Mindanao coast, which caught and completely destroyed a convoy of 32 small freighters.

The lack of opposition at Mindanao prompted air strikes into the central Philippines. From 12 to 14 September, planes from the carrier task force attacked the Visayas. They achieved tactical surprise, destroyed 75 enemy planes in the air and 123 on the ground, sank many ships, and damaged installations ashore.

In direct support of the Southwest Pacific landing at Morotai, carrier task force planes attacked Mindanao, the Celebes, and Talaud on 14-15 September. On the

—Official Coast Guard Photo

WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATION
Amphibious tanks moving ashore towards Angaur, 17 September 1944

14th destroyers bombarded the eastern coast of Mindanao. There was little airborne opposition and our forces destroyed and damaged a number of aircraft and surface ships.

Landings on Peleliu and Angaur

Ships and troops employed in the Western Carolines landings came from various parts of the Pacific. Three days of surface bombardment and air bombing preceded the landing on Peleliu. During this time mine sweepers cleared the waters of Peleliu and Angaur Islands and underwater demolition teams removed beach obstructions. The Peleliu landing took place on 15 September, the landing force convoys arriving off the selected beaches at dawn. Following intensive preparatory bombardment, bombing and strafing of the island, units of the 1st Marine Division went ashore. Despite difficult reef conditions, the initial landings were successful. The troops quickly overran the beach defenses, which were thickly mined but less heavily manned than usual. By the night of the 16th, the Peleliu airfield, which was the prime objective of the entire operation, had been captured. After the rapid conquest of the southern portion of the island, however, progress on Peleliu slowed. The rough ridge which formed the north-south backbone of the island was a natural fortress of mutually supporting cave positions, organized in depth and with many automatic weapons. Advance along this ridge was slow and costly. The Japanese used barges at night to reinforce their troops, but naval gunfire dispersed and destroyed many of them. Enemy forces had been surrounded by 26 September, although it was not until the middle of October that the assault phase of the operation was completed.

The 81st Infantry Division went ashore on Angaur Island, six miles south of Peleliu, on 17 September. Fire support ships and aircraft had previously prepared the way for the assault transports. Beach conditions here were more favorable than at Peleliu. Opposition also was less severe, and by noon of 20 September the entire island had been overrun, except for one knot of resistance in rough country. Prompt steps were taken to develop a heavy bomber field on Angaur. Part of the 81st Division went to Peleliu on 22 September to reinforce the 1st Marine Division, which had suffered severe casualties.

The southern Palau Islands offered no protective anchorage. Before the landings of the 15th, mine sweepers had been clearing the extensive mine fields in Kossol Roads, a large body of reef-enclosed water 70 miles north of Peleliu. Part of this area was ready for an anchorage on 15 September, and the next day seaplane tenders entered and began to use it as a base for aircraft operation. It proved to be a reasonably satisfactory roadstead, where ships could lie while waiting call to Peleliu for unloading, and where fuel, stores and ammunition could be replenished.

Marine troops from Peleliu landed on Ngesebus Island, just north of Peleliu, on 28 September, by a shore-to-shore movement. The light enemy opposition was overcome by the 29th. Later several small islands in the vicinity were occupied as outposts.

No landing was made on Babelthuap, the largest of the Palau group. It was heavily garrisoned, had rough terrain, would have required a costly operation, and offered no favorable airfield sites or other particular advantages. From Peleliu and Angaur the rest of the Palau group is being dominated, and the enemy ground forces on the other islands are kept neutralized.

As soon as it became clear that the entire 81st Division would not be needed for the capture of Angaur, a regimental combat team was dispatched to Ulithi Atoll. Mine sweepers, under cover of light surface ships, began work in the lagoon on 21 September and in two days cleared the entrance and anchorage inside for the attack force. The Japanese had abandoned Ulithi and the landing of troops on the 23rd was without opposition. Escort carrier and long range bombers kept the air facilities at Yap neutralized so that there was no aerial interference with landing operations. Although Ulithi was not an ideal anchorage, it was the best available shelter for large surface forces in the Western Carolines, and steps were taken at once to develop it.

Landings on Morotai

Occupation of the southern part of Morotai Island was carried out by the Southwest Pacific forces of General of the Army MacArthur to establish air, air warning and minor naval facilities. This action was further designed to isolate Japanese forces on Halmahera, who would otherwise have been in a position to flank any movement into the southern Philippines. It was timed simultaneously with the seizure of Palau by Pacific Ocean Areas forces. On 15 September 1944 an amphibious task force composed of escort carriers, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, attack transports and miscellaneous landing ships and craft, all under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Barbey, approached Morotai. Practically no enemy opposition was encountered, and personnel casualties were light; difficulty was experienced, however, in beaching and unloading, due to coral heads and depressions in the reef adjacent to the landing areas.

Prior to D-day Army land-based planes from Biak and Noemfoor carried out heavy strikes on enemy air facilities in Ceram, Halmahera, northern Celebes, Vogelkop and southern Philippine areas. Carrier fighter sweeps combined with further bombing operations prevented hostile aircraft from reaching Morotai on D-day. Naval gunfire support was furnished by destroyers and two heavy cruisers. During subsequent covering operations we sustained our first naval loss in the Southwest Pacific Area, except for planes and minor landing craft, since the Cape Gloucester operations in December 1943; the destroyer escort SHELTON was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine.

REOCCUPATION OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

After providing support for the Palau landings, the Third Fleet fast carrier task force returned to the attack on enemy power in the Philippines. From waters to the east, they conducted the first carrier attack of the war on Manila and Luzon. Under cover of bad weather the carriers approached without detection. On 21 and 22 September planes from the carriers attacked Manila and other targets on Luzon, inflicting severe damage on the enemy and suffering only light losses.

On 24 September carrier planes struck the central Philippines. They completed photographic coverage of the area of Leyte and Samar, where amphibious landings were to take place in October, and reached out to Coron Bay, a much used anchorage in the western Visayas. Many enemy planes and much shipping were destroyed. The light air opposition revealed how effective the first Visayas strikes of 10 days previous had been. Following the strikes of the 24th, the fast carrier task force retired to forward bases to prepare for forthcoming operations.

Initial plans for re-entry into the Philippines intended securing Morotai as a stepping stone with a view to landings by the Seventh Amphibious Force on Mindanao some time in November. The decision to accelerate the advance by making the initial landings on Leyte in the central Philippines was reached in middle September when the Third Fleet air strikes disclosed the relative weakness of enemy air opposition. It was decided to seize Leyte Island and the contingent waters on 20 October and thus secure airdrome sites and extensive harbor and naval base facilities. The east coast of Leyte offered certain obvious advantages for amphibious landings. It had a free undefended approach from the east, sufficient anchorage area, and good access to the remainder of the central islands in that it commanded the approaches to Surigao Strait. Moreover, the position bypassed and isolated large Japanese forces in Mindanao. The accelerated timing of the operation and choice of the east coast for landing required, however, the acceptance of one serious disadvantage—the rainy season. Most of the islands in the Philippines are mountainous and during the northeast monsoon, from October to March, land areas on the east sides of the mountains have torrential rains.

Forces under General of the Army MacArthur carried out the landings in the Philippine Islands. For this purpose many transports, fire support ships and escort carriers were temporarily transferred from the Pacific Fleet to the Seventh Fleet, which is a part of the Southwest Pacific command.

The Central Philippine Attack Force, composed of Seventh Fleet units, greatly augmented by Pacific Fleet forces, was under the command of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid. This large force was divided into the Northern Attack Force (Seventh Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral [now Vice Admiral] Barbey commanding) and the Southern Attack Force (Third Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral Wilkinson commanding), plus surface and air cover groups, fire support, bombardment, mine sweeping and supply groups. It comprised a total of more than 650 ships, including battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, escort carriers, transports, cargo ships, landing craft, mine craft, and supply vessels. Four army divisions were to be landed on D-day.

The Third Fleet, operating under Admiral Halsey, was to cover and support the operation by air strikes over Formosa, Luzon and the Visayas, to provide protection for the landing against heavy units of the Japanese fleet, and to destroy enemy vessels when opportunity offered.

Preliminary Strikes by Fast Carrier Task Force

Preparatory strikes to obtain information on installations, and to destroy air and surface strength which might hinder our success in the Philippines, lasted from 9 to 20 October.

While a cruiser-destroyer task group bombarded and damaged installations on Marcus Island on 9 October, ships of the fast carrier forces were approaching the Nansei Shoto [Ryukyu Islands]. Long range search-planes and submarines "ran interference" for the force, attacking and destroying enemy search-planes and picket boats, so that our heavy forces achieved tactical surprise at their



—Official U. S. Navy Map

objective. Carrier aircraft attacked Okinawa Island in the Nansei Shoto on 10 October. The Japanese apparently were taken by surprise. Not only was little airborne opposition met, but shipping had not been routed away from the area. Many enemy ships were sunk and airfields and facilities severely damaged.

On 11 October while the force was refueling, a fighter sweep against Aparri on the northern end of Luzon disorganized the relatively underdeveloped and lightly garrisoned fields there.

The next attack, on Formosa and the Pescadores, took place on 12 and 13 October. These strikes on aviation facilities, factory warehouses, wharves and coastal shipping, were expected by the enemy and, for the first time in this series of operations, a large number of enemy planes were over the targets and antiaircraft fire was intense. In spite of opposition, 193 planes were shot down on the first day and 123 more were destroyed on the ground.

At dusk on the 13th, part of the task force was skillfully attacked by aircraft and one of our cruisers was damaged. Although power was lost, the ship remained stable, due to prompt and effective damage control, and was taken in tow. With a screen of cruisers and destroyers, and under air cover from carriers, the slow retirement of the damaged ship began. At that time the group was 120 miles from Formosa and within range of enemy aircraft on Okinawa, Luzon, and Formosa. Enemy planes kept the group under constant attack and succeeded in damaging another cruiser on the evening of the 14th. She also was taken in tow, and both vessels were brought safely to a base for repairs.

In order to prevent further air attacks while the damaged ships retired, the carriers launched repeated fighter sweeps and strikes over Formosa and northern Luzon on 14 and 15 October.

Beginning on 18 October the carrier planes again struck the Philippines. In strategical as well as direct tactical support of the landings of Southwest Pacific forces at Leyte on the 20th, the strikes of the 18th and 19th were aimed at the northern and central Philippines. On 20 October some of the fast carriers furnished direct support to the Leyte landing and others conducted long-range searches for units of the enemy fleet. Thus, Japanese airfields in and around Manila and in the Visayas were kept neutralized during the initial assault phase of the Leyte landing, while at the same time carrier planes from the Third Fleet furnished direct support to the landings by bombing and strafing beaches and interior areas on Leyte throughout the day. On 21 October there were sweeps and strikes to southern Luzon and the Visayas, including an attack as far west as Coron Bay. Carrier planes also continued long-range searches with negative results.

Leyte Landings

During the 9 days preceding the landing on Leyte, the task groups sortied from New Guinea ports and the Admiralties and moved toward Leyte Gulf. On 17 October (D-minus-3 day) preliminary operations commenced under difficult weather conditions. By D-day the islands guarding the eastern entrances to Leyte Gulf were secured. The approach channels and landing beaches were cleared of mines and reconnaissance of the main beaches on Leyte had been effected.

After heavy bombardment by ships' guns and bombing by escort carrier planes had neutralized most of the enemy opposition at the beaches, troops of the 10th and 24th Corps were landed as scheduled on the morning of 20 October. The landings were made without difficulty and were entirely successful. Our troops were established in the central Philippines, but it remained for the naval forces to protect our rapidly expanding beachheads from attack by sea and air.

In the amphibious phase of the Leyte operation, YMS 70 sank in a storm during the approach and the tug SONOMA and LCI (L) 1065 were sunk by enemy action. The destroyer ROSS struck a mine on 19 October and the light cruiser HONOLULU was seriously damaged by an aerial torpedo on 20 October.

Battle for Leyte Gulf

The Leyte landings were challenged by Japanese naval forces determined to drive us from the area. Between 23 and 26 October a series of major surface and air engagements took place with far reaching effect. These engagements, which have been designated the Battle for Leyte Gulf, culminated in three almost simultaneous naval actions, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Samar, and the Battle off Cape Engaño. They involved the battleships, carriers, and escort carriers, cruisers, destroyers and destroyer escorts of the Third and Seventh Fleets, as well as PT boats and submarines.

Three enemy forces were involved. One of these, referred to hereinafter as the Southern Force, approached Leyte through Surigao Strait and was destroyed there by Seventh Fleet units on the night of 24-25 October. A second, or Central Force, passed through San Bernardino Strait in spite of previous air attacks by Third Fleet carrier planes and attacked Seventh Fleet escort carriers off Samar on the morning of the 25th. Finally, a Northern Force approached the Philippines from the direction of Japan and was attacked and most of it destroyed by the Third Fleet fast carrier force on the 25th.

On the early morning of 23 October, two submarines, DARTER and DACE, in the narrow channel between Palawan and the Dangerous Ground to the westward discovered the Central Force, then composed of 5 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, 1 or 2 light cruisers, and about 15 destroyers. These submarines promptly attacked, reporting four torpedo hits in each of three heavy cruisers, two of which were sunk and the third heavily damaged. DARTER, while maneuvering into position for a subsequent attack, grounded on a reef in the middle of the channel, and had to be destroyed after her crew had been removed. Other contacts were made later in the day in Mindoro Strait and off the approach to Manila Bay, resulting in damage to an enemy heavy cruiser.

On the 24th carrier planes located and reported the Central Force (in the Sibuyan Sea) and the Southern Force (proceeding through the Sulu Sea) sufficiently early to permit aircraft from Vice Admiral Mitscher's fast carriers to inflict substantial damage.

The third enemy force, the Northern, was not located and reported until so late on the afternoon of the 24th that strikes could not be launched against it until the next morning. While these searches and strikes were being made, the northernmost of our fast carrier task groups was subjected to constant attacks by enemy land-based planes.

Although about 110 planes were shot down in the vicinity of the group, one of the enemy aircraft succeeded in bombing the light carrier PRINCETON. Large fires broke out on the damaged carrier and despite heroic efforts of cruisers and destroyers to combat them, PRINCETON suffered a series of devastating explosions which also caused damage and casualties to ships alongside. After hours of effort to save the ship, it became necessary to move the task group to meet a new enemy threat (the reported sighting of the Northern Force), and PRINCETON was sunk by torpedo fire from our own ships. It should be noted that PRINCETON was the first fast carrier lost by the United States Navy since the sinking of HORNET in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October 1942.

Battle of Surigao Strait

A part of of the enemy's Southern Force entered Surigao Strait in the early hours of 25 October. 7 ships (2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser and 4 destroyers) advanced in rough column up the narrow strait during darkness toward our waiting forces. The enemy was first met by our PT boats, then in succession by three coordinated destroyer torpedo attacks, and finally by devastating gunfire from our cruisers and battleships which had been disposed across the northern end of the strait by the officer in tactical command, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) J. B. Oldendorf. The enemy was utterly defeated. This action is an exemplification of the classical naval tactics of "crossing the T". Rear Admiral Oldendorf had deployed his light forces on each flank of the approaching column and had sealed off the enemy's advance through the strait with his cruisers and battleships. By means of this deployment he was able to concentrate his fire, both guns and torpedoes, on the enemy units before they were able to extricate themselves from the trap. The Japanese lost 2 battleships and 3 destroyers almost before they could open fire. The heavy cruiser and one destroyer escaped, but the cruiser was sunk on the 26th by our planes. Other ships of the Southern Force which did not engage in the night battle were either later sunk or badly damaged by aircraft attack. In the night action, the destroyer ALBERT W. GRANT was severely damaged by gunfire; our other ships suffered no damage.

Battle off Samar

Throughout the 24th the Third Fleet carriers launched strikes against the Central Force which was heading for San Bernardino Strait. This force consisted of 5 battleships, 8 cruisers and 13 destroyers. As they passed through Mindoro Strait and proceeded to the eastward, our planes launched vigorous attacks which sank the new battleship MUSASHI—pride of the Japanese Navy, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer, and heavily damaged other units, including the battleship YAMATO, sister ship of MUSASHI, with bombs and torpedoes. In spite of these losses and damage which caused some of the enemy ships to turn back, part of the Central Force continued doggedly through San Bernardino Strait and moved southward unobserved off the east coast of Samar. Our escort carriers with screens, under the command of Rear Admiral T. L. Sprague, were dispersed in three groups to the eastward of Samar, with the mission of maintaining patrols and supporting ground operations on Leyte. Shortly after daybreak on 25 October the Japanese Central Force, now composed of 4 battleships, 5 cruisers and 11 destroyers, attacked the group of escort carriers commanded by Rear Admiral C. A. F. Sprague. A running fight ensued as our lightly armed carriers retired toward Leyte Gulf.



—Official U. S. Navy Photo

BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF

Japanese battleship *YAMATO* receiving two bomb hits from a Third Fleet carrier dive bomber, 25 October 1944

The 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers and 4 destroyer escorts of Rear Admiral C. A. F. Sprague's task group fought valiantly with their planes, guns and torpedoes. Desperate attacks were made by planes and escorts, and smoke was employed in an effort to divert the enemy from the carriers. After two and one-half hours of almost continuous firing the enemy broke off the engagement and retired towards San Bernardino Strait. Planes from all three groups of escort carriers, with the help of Third Fleet aircraft, which struck during the afternoon of the 25th, sank 2 enemy heavy cruisers and 1 destroyer. Another crippled destroyer was sunk and several other enemy ships were either sunk or badly damaged on the 26th as our planes followed in pursuit.

In the surface engagement, the destroyers HOEL and JOHNSTON, the destroyer escort ROBERTS and the escort carrier GAMBIER BAY were sunk by enemy gunfire. Other carriers and escort ships which were brought into the fray sustained hits; these included SUWANEE, SANTEE, WHITE PLAINS and KITKUN BAY. Enemy dive bombers on the morning of 25 October sank the escort carrier SAINT LO. Approximately 105 planes were lost by Seventh Fleet escort carriers during the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

Battle Off Cape Engaño

Search planes from Third Fleet carriers had located the enemy Southern and Central Forces on the morning of 24 October, and had ascertained that they were composed of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, without aircraft carriers. As it was evident that the Japanese Navy was making a major effort, Admiral Halsey reasoned that there must be an enemy carrier force somewhere in the vicinity. Consequently he ordered a special search to be made to the north, which resulted in the sighting by one of our carrier planes on the afternoon of the 24th of the enemy Northern Force—a powerful collection of carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers—standing to the southward.

During the night of the 24th-25th, our carrier task force ran to the northward and before dawn launched planes to attack the enemy. Throughout most of 25 October the Battle off Cape Engaño (so named from the nearest point of land at the northeastern tip of Luzon Island) went on with carrier aircraft striking the enemy force, which had been identified as consisting of 1 large carrier, 3 light carriers, 2 battleships with flight decks, 5 cruisers, and 6 destroyers. Beginning at 0840 air attacks on these ships continued until nearly 1800. Late in the day a force of our cruisers and destroyers was detached to finish off ships which had been crippled by air strikes. In that day's work all the enemy carriers, a light cruiser, and a destroyer were sunk, and heavy bomb and torpedo damage was inflicted on the battleships and other Japanese units.

Early on the morning of the 25th, Admiral Halsey received the report that the Central Force, which his carrier planes had attacked the day before, had pushed on through San Bernardino Strait, had turned southward along the coast of Samar and was attacking Rear Admiral Sprague's escort carriers. Consequently, Admiral Halsey dispatched a detachment of fast battleships and carriers to the assistance of these Seventh Fleet units. Meanwhile the Central Force had turned away and begun to retire northward to San Bernardino Strait in the face of the heroic defense put up by the escort carriers and the expectation of attack by other of our forces. Third Fleet aircraft reached this Central Force after it had begun to retire and inflicted additional serious damage. On the afternoon of 25 October our carrier planes probably sank 2 heavy cruisers and a light cruiser, blew the bow off a destroyer, and damaged 4 battleships and other cruisers and destroyers. Fast surface ships of the Third Fleet reached the scene of action after the enemy had re-entered San Bernardino Strait. However, they encountered a straggler on the 26th, which was promptly sunk. This straggler was identified as either a cruiser or destroyer.

On 26 October aircraft from Third Fleet carriers attacked the retiring Japanese forces again, doing further damage to the surviving battleships. By the end of that day, the Battle for Leyte Gulf was over and the three enemy forces were either destroyed or had retreated out of range of our ships and planes. Thus the major Japanese threat to our initial Philippine landing was averted and the enemy's total surface power severely crippled. The losses of our Third Fleet in the action amounted to 40 planes in combat, in addition to the light carrier PRINCETON.

November Carrier Task Force Strikes

While part of the fast carrier task force retired to fuel and reprovision at forward bases, the remainder continued in action in support of the Leyte campaign. During this period the fast carrier task force was commanded by Vice Admiral J. S. McCain. On 27 October planes from carriers bombed and strafed a cruiser and a destroyer off Mindoro.

No major naval actions developed during the remainder of 1944, but the Third Fleet was constantly active in providing vigorous support for the operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. Although Japanese installations in the Philippines and to the northward had been heavily damaged by the September and October strikes, they were not destroyed. On 2 November enemy planes attacked a carrier task group of the Third Fleet and although 10 of the Japanese aircraft were shot down, several ships were damaged and some personnel casualties were suffered.

Carrier aircraft of the Third Fleet struck at Manila and the airfields in the vicinity on 5 and 6 November. They destroyed 439 planes, sank a cruiser, a destroyer, a destroyer escort, a submarine chaser, an oiler, 2 transports and a freighter, as well as damaging 44 vessels. They hit numerous ground installations and destroyed railroad facilities.

On 11 November planes from the fast carriers attacked and destroyed a Japanese convoy entering Ormoc Bay on the west coast of Leyte Island. They sank 4 transports, 5 destroyers and 1 destroyer escort, and shot down 13 enemy aircraft. This effectively ended one major attempt by the enemy to reinforce his Leyte garrison.

Another two-day series of strikes on Luzon by aircraft from the fast carriers occurred on 13 and 14 November. Antiaircraft fire over the targets was light on the first day, but increased the second. Carrier aircraft sank 3 transports, 3 freighters, and 3 destroyers, and damaged 43 vessels. 84 enemy planes were destroyed in the two days' raid.

Another air attack on Luzon targets came on the 19th.

There was little airborne opposition, only 16 planes being shot down at the target, but 100 were destroyed on the ground and with those shot down near the carriers, 124 enemy planes were eliminated during the day. Few shipping targets could be located and the total in that category was 1 freighter and 2 small craft sunk with 13 vessels damaged.

On 25 November the last strike in support of the Leyte operation was launched against Luzon. This time, a light cruiser, a mine layer, a destroyer escort, 6 freighters, and a tanker were sunk, and 29 vessels were damaged. Over the target our planes shot down 25 aircraft and destroyed 32 on the ground. Enemy air attacks on the carriers were heavier than usual, and 31 enemy planes were shot down near our ships.

During the November strikes the air combat losses of the fast carrier task force were 97 planes.

Landings at Ormoc Bay

In order to cut the enemy overwater lines of supply and reinforcement and to separate enemy ground forces on Leyte, an additional amphibious landing was made at Ormoc Bay, on the west coast of the island, on 7 December. Naval forces commanded by Rear Admiral A. D. Struble put Army troops ashore 3 miles southeast of Ormoc against sporadic resistance. The destroyer MAHAN and destroyer transport WARD were, however, so heavily damaged by enemy aerial torpedoes that it was necessary for them to be sunk by our own forces. Several days prior to the landing, the destroyer COOPER was lost in a night action, while engaged in an antishipping sweep in this vicinity, and on 11 December the destroyer REID was sunk during an enemy air attack on a supply convoy en route to Ormoc Bay.

Landings on Mindoro

On 15 December Southwest Pacific forces landed on the southwest coast of Mindoro Island, nearly 300 miles northwest of Leyte, in order to seize the San Jose area and establish air facilities there. Enemy air on Luzon, not having been entirely neutralized, attacked the convoy en route. Our ships suffered some damage but continued the approach. The landing was without opposition from shore but sporadic air attacks resulted in the sinking of a few LST's. In moving from Leyte to Mindoro, our forces obtained the advantages of more favorable weather for airfield construction and aircraft operations.

Occupation of southwest Mindoro presented a more serious threat to Manila and to Japan's shipping lanes through the South China Sea. As an immediate and strong reaction by the enemy was expected, carrier planes of the Third Fleet promptly began making Manila Bay untenable. Securing tactical surprise, they struck at dawn 14 December, the day before the Mindoro landings. Local air control was gained and held continuously for three days. In attacks on 14, 15 and 16 December our carrier aircraft sank or destroyed 27 vessels and damaged 60 more, destroyed 269 Japanese planes, and bombed air and railroad facilities. Enemy aircraft did not molest the carriers during this strike, but 20 of our planes were lost in combat.

On 17 December sea conditions began to deteriorate east of Luzon where the Third Fleet was scheduled to refuel: a typhoon of severe intensity developed with great rapidity along an erratic course. Although the main body of the fleet escaped the center of the storm, the destroyers HULL, SPENCE and MONAGHAN were lost.

Landings at Lingayen Gulf

The mid-December carrier strikes on Manila Bay had led the enemy to expect further landings in that area. When we by-passed southern Luzon and landed on the south and southeast coast of Lingayen Gulf on 9 January, the enemy was again taken by surprise.

Luzon, the largest of the Philippine Islands, with an area roughly the size of Virginia, is generally mountainous, but is cut by two large valleys. The central plain, extending from Lingayen to Manila Bay—about 100 miles long and from 30 to 50 miles wide—contains Manila, the capital, the major concentration of the population and wealth, numerous airfields, and a network of roads and railways. Prompt seizure of this area would strike at the heart of the enemy defenses in the Philippines, provide bases for the support of further operations against the Japanese, and deny the enemy the freedom of the South China Sea. The most vulnerable part of the central plain is at Lingayen, where the low land does not offer the same opportunities for defense as do the approaches to Manila Bay.

The Luzon Attack Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Kinkaid, under the over-all command of General of the Army MacArthur, was composed of Seventh Fleet units largely augmented by Pacific Fleet forces, and numbered more than 850 ships. This was divided into the Lingayen Attack Force (Vice Admiral Wilkinson commanding), the San Fabian Attack Force (Vice Admiral Barbey commanding), a reinforcement group (Rear Admiral Conolly commanding), a fire support and bombardment group (Vice Admiral Oldendorf commanding) and surface and air covering groups (Rear Admiral Berkey and Rear Admiral C. T. Durgin respectively commanding). The Luzon Attack Force was to transport, put ashore and support elements of the 6th United States Army (Lieutenant General Walter Krueger commanding) to assist in the seizure and development of the Lingayen area.

The Third Fleet, operating under Admiral Halsey, with its fast carrier task force commanded by Vice Admiral McCain, was to cover and protect the operation by air strikes over Luzon, Formosa and the Nansei Shoto. Complete surprise was attained in attacks on Formosa and the southern Nansei Shoto on 3 and 4 January. There was little airborne opposition, but unfavorable weather conditions somewhat reduced the toll of enemy ships, planes and facilities destroyed. Luzon was hit 6 January, with the zone of operations extending southward to the Manila Bay area in order to give special attention to enemy airfields. Overcast weather prevented blanketing of the northern Luzon fields, and the attack was consequently renewed on the 7th.

Landings in Lingayen Gulf were scheduled for 9 January. During the passage of the attack force to Lingayen there was no enemy surface opposition. One Japanese destroyer put out from Manila Bay, and was sunk by our escorting destroyers. There was, however, intensive air attack both during the passage and the preliminary operations in Lingayen Gulf, which resulted in the loss of the escort carrier OMMANEY BAY, the fast mine sweepers LONG, HOVEY and PALMER, and consider-

Official Coast Guard Photo

LANDINGS AT LINGAYEN GULF

able topside damage to other ships. For three days prior to the assault, Vice Admiral Oldendorf's battleships, cruisers and destroyers bombarded the area, while mine sweepers were at work and beach obstacles were being cleared. Immediately prior to the landings the bombardment by heavy ships and the air strikes from escort carriers were intensified; the assault waves were preceded by rocket-firing and mortar-carrying landing craft, which took up the frontal fire against the beaches, while the heavier calibre fire was directed inland and to the flanks.

The Lingayen Attack Force landed the 14th Army Corps on the southern shore of Lingayen Gulf, while the San Fabian Attack Force simultaneously put the 1st Army Corps ashore on beaches in the Damortis area to the northeastward. Only very light resistance was met at the beaches, and the troops advanced rapidly inland in spite of unfavorable terrain conditions. Bombardment and bombing had already silenced or destroyed the great majority of fixed defenses and dispersed their personnel.

While the troops were going ashore in Lingayen Gulf on 9 January, the Third Fleet fast carrier task force was striking Formosa. This target was chosen to lessen the enemy air strength which had been operating against Seventh Fleet forces on earlier days. As a result of this operation there was little enemy air interference with the actual Lingayen landings: the Third Fleet in addition netted 15 enemy ships sunk and 58 damaged for its day's work.

Although the troops pressed rapidly southward on Luzon, and were soon out of range of naval fire support, a heavy force of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and escort carriers remained in Lingayen Gulf for a considerable length of time to cover the landing of reinforcements and supplies and prevent enemy surface, subsurface, and air interference.

Third Fleet Covering Operations

In continued support of the Lingayen operations, the Third Fleet fast carrier task force made a thrust into the South China Sea, especially seeking the destruction of any major units of the Japanese Fleet that might be encountered there. None were found, but the air strikes of 12 January on the coast between Saigon and Camranh Bay achieved much shipping destruction. One enemy convoy was entirely destroyed and two others were severely mauled: the shipping tally totaled 41 ships sunk and 31 damaged. 112 enemy planes were destroyed and docks, oil storage and airfield facilities were heavily damaged. Air opposition was negligible.

Formosa was struck again on the 15th, against very slight opposition, while fighter sweeps and searches were made to Amoy, Swatow, Hong Kong and Hainan. Poor weather, however, greatly reduced the score of shipping destruction.

To complete the Third Fleet's visit to the China coast, Hong Kong, Canton and Hainan were struck in force on 16 January. A considerable amount of shipping was damaged or destroyed. Extensive destruction was inflicted on docks, refineries and the naval station in the Hong Kong area, while huge oil fires were started at Canton. Air opposition was again negligible.

In the course of this thrust into waters that the enemy had hitherto considered his own, 3800 miles were traversed in the South China Sea with no battle damage to our ships. No enemy aircraft had been able to approach the fast carrier task force closer than 20 miles.

Formosa and the southern Nansei Shoto were again attacked on 21 January under favorable weather conditions. Heavy damage was inflicted on aircraft, shipping, docks and the industrial area at Takao. On the following day Okinawa in the Nansei Shoto was struck. The destruction of enemy aircraft and airfield facilities in all these strikes led to a marked lessening of Japanese air effort against the Luzon assault forces.

Operations Against Manila

During the remainder of January, General of the Army MacArthur's troops pressed steadily southward from Lingayen Gulf down the central plain. To accelerate the progress of operations against Manila and to open sea access to its harbor, additional amphibious landings were carried out in southwestern Luzon at the end of the month. On 29 January an amphibious assault force, commanded by Rear Admiral Struble, put the 11th Army Corps ashore in the San Narciso area, northwest of Subic Bay. This move, which was designed to cut off Bataan Peninsula, was entirely unopposed. Mine sweepers made exploratory sweeps off the landing beaches with negative results, and as it was evident that no enemy forces were present the scheduled bombardment of the area was not

carried out. The troops moved rapidly inland and reached Subic by noon. On the following day, the 30th, troops were landed on Grande Island in Subic Bay, again without opposition. Mine sweeping of Subic Bay continued, with negative results, and this fine harbor was made available for further operations against the Manila entrance.

An assault force commanded by Rear Admiral Fechteler landed elements of the 11th Airborne Division at Nasugbu, 15 miles directly south of the entrance to Manila Bay, on 31 January. In this instance also the naval bombardment was dispensed with because of the obvious lack of shore resistance. Although the troops reached their objective without opposition, a number of small high-speed craft attacked the naval force, and PC-1129 was sunk in the ensuing action.

On 13 February a force of light cruisers and destroyers, commanded by Rear Admiral Berkey, commenced a preliminary bombardment of the entrances to Manila Bay, and on the following day continued to shell Corregidor Island and the southern portion of Bataan Peninsula. Mine sweepers began clearing Manila Bay. On the 15th, while the bombardment of Corregidor and the mine sweeping continued, troops landed at Mariveles on Bataan against very light opposition, and on the 16th landings were made on Corregidor itself.

The ability to place troops ashore in protected and mined waters was made possible by naval gunfire against the fixed defenses of Corregidor, and the sweeping of mines in the channel between Corregidor and Mariveles. In considerably less than two months from the initial landings at Lingayan Gulf, General of the Army MacArthur's forces had covered the ground that had required more than four months for the Japanese in 1942. In comparing the methods used by the two invaders for seizing positions controlling the entrance to Manila Bay, it is interesting to note that in both cases the attacking forces had control of the sea and air. The Japanese relied principally on field artillery from Bataan against our guns on Corregidor. Our method employed naval strength as the spearhead of amphibious assault, thus allowing the ground force commander flexibility in selecting the time and place of the attack.

Landings on Palawan

At the close of February various operations against enemy holdings in different parts of the Philippines were in progress, in which forces of the Seventh Fleet were participating. On the 28th, the last day covered by this report, a force of cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs bombarded Puerto Princesa, on the east coast of Palawan. An amphibious attack group, commanded by Rear Admiral Fechteler, put troops ashore shortly after. No opposition was encountered: the town and two near-by airfields were quickly seized. This landing secured virtual control of the westernmost of the Philippine Islands, and provided the sites for air bases that will assist in hindering enemy water transport from the Netherlands East Indies.

ASSAULT ON INNER DEFENSES OF JAPAN

The amphibious operations of the spring, summer and autumn of 1944 carried our forces such great distances across the Pacific that in February 1945 they were enabled to begin the assault upon the inner defenses of the Japanese Empire itself.

The occupation of Saipan, Tinian and Guam had established shore-based air forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas in positions from which continuing air attacks could be made against the Volcano and Bonin Islands, and from which long-range bombers could operate against Japan. To operate with the greatest effectiveness and a minimum of losses, long-range bombers should be provided with fighter support. Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands, 750 miles from Tokyo, provided three sites for airfields, and was admirably situated for the establishment of a fighter base for supporting Marianas-based B-29's operating over the home islands of the Empire. The possession of Iwo Jima would also permit medium bombers to attack Japan, deprive the enemy of an important aerial lookout station, and reduce his air attacks on our Marianas bases.

The operations for the capture of Iwo Jima were under the command of Admiral Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet. Vice Admiral Turner was in over-all command of the amphibious forces, and the Expeditionary Forces were commanded by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC. Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC, commanded the Fifth Amphibious Corps; Major General Clifton B. Cates, USMC, the 4th Marine Division; Major General Keller E. Rockey, USMC, the 5th Marine Division; and Major General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, the 3rd Marine Division. The fast carrier task force, operating in support of the assault, was once more commanded by Vice Admiral Mitscher.

It was anticipated that enemy resistance would be severe. Iwo Jima had been heavily fortified by the Japanese over a period of many years because it is the only island in this strategically important group which lends itself to construction of airfields. As the island is only five miles long and less than two miles wide, the enemy could cover the whole shoreline with artillery and machine gun fire and could concentrate on the only two landing beaches. There was no opportunity for maneuver to select an undefended landing place, and hence there could be no surprise once we had begun reduction of the major defenses of the island. Consequently preparations had to be made for the most intensive ground fighting yet encountered in the Pacific. Landing forces of 60,000 Marines, put ashore by a naval force of more than 800 ships, manned by approximately 220,000 naval personnel, are evidence of the scale of the attack and the determination of opposition expected.

Preliminary Air-Surface Attacks on Iwo Jima

For seven months prior to the February 1945 assault, Iwo Jima was subjected to air attacks and surface bombardments, which increased in frequency and intensity from December 1944 onward. Planes from the fast carrier task force struck the island on 15, 16, 24 June, 4 July, 4-5 August and 31 August-2 September; on 4 July and 2 September bombardment by surface ships was carried out.

Beginning just before midnight on 11 November and continuing until 0100 on the 12th, cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral A. E. Smith bombarded Iwo Jima, making special efforts to damage air installations. There was moderate shore battery fire during the first part of the bombardment, but none of our ships suffered damage. Numerous explosions were seen and several large fires were started.

Early in December bombers of the 7th Army Air Force, operating under the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, began daily attacks on Iwo Jima, and Marine Corps bomber squadrons, based in the Marianas, began a daily series of night harassing flights against enemy shipping in the area. These constant raids were supplemented periodically by intensified air attack and surface bombardment.

On 8 December and again on 24 December attacks by P-38's, B-29's and B-24's were followed by over an hour's bombardment by Rear Admiral Smith's cruisers and destroyers. A number of large fires were started ashore during each attack. The bombarding ships suffered no damage.

On 27 December Army B-29's and P-38's bombed Iwo Jima once more, and the same surface ships returned to fire on shore targets for an hour and a half. Little opposition was encountered on either day, although one of our ships received slight damage from shore batteries. Light personnel casualties aboard one of our destroyers resulted from a hit from an enemy destroyer escort which was pursued and sunk at sea.

Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonin Islands, as well as Iwo Jima, were bombarded on 5 January 1945 by Rear Admiral Smith's surface ships, while Army aircraft of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, bombed airstrip installations on Iwo. Fire from enemy shore batteries was meager.

A battleship-cruiser-destroyer force, commanded by Rear Admiral O. C. Badger, attacked Iwo Jima on 24 January in a coordinated action with Strategic Air Force bombers and B-29's of the 21st Bomber Command. Air installations and shipping were attacked, with no interception by enemy planes and only slight antiaircraft fire. One Japanese cargo vessel blew up and two others were left burning.

Attack on Tokyo

Carrier aircraft of the Fifth Fleet attacked Tokyo on 16 February, exactly one year after the first carrier strike on Truk. Fleet Admiral Nimitz's communique announcing the strike stated: "This operation has long been planned and the opportunity to accomplish it fulfills the deeply cherished desire of every officer and man in the Pacific Fleet."

Landings on Iwo Jima were scheduled for 19 February. Consequently on the 16th pre-invasion bombardment and bombing of Iwo Jima began, while the fast carrier task force struck Tokyo. This attack on the enemy's capital was designed to provide strategic cover for the operations against Iwo by destroying air forces, facilities and manufacturing installations, as well as to bring to the Japanese home front a disrupting awareness of the progress of the war.

Approaching the coast of Japan under cover of weather so adverse as to handicap enemy air operations, our forces obtained complete tactical surprise; our attack was vigorously pressed for two days. All enemy efforts to damage our ships were unsuccessful. Against a loss of 49 of our planes, 322 enemy aircraft were shot out of the air and 177 destroyed on the ground. A Japanese escort carrier at Yokohama was bombed and set on fire; she went down by the bow and was left lying on her side. 9 coastal vessels, a destroyer, 2 destroyer escorts and a cargo ship were sunk. Hangars, shops and other installations at numerous airfields were destroyed; the Ota aircraft factory was damaged; and the Musashine Tama and Tachigawa engine plants were heavily bombed. Upon completion of the 17 February strike, the fast carrier task force retired towards Iwo Jima to give more direct support of the landing operations.

Landings on Iwo Jima

After three days of intensive bombardment by surface ships of the Fifth Fleet and bombing by Navy carrier and Army shore-based planes, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions began landing operations at 0900, 19 February, on the southeast shore of Iwo Jima. This bombardment and bombing made initial opposition light, except for some mortar and artillery fire at LST's and boats, but resistance rapidly developed in intensity during the day. The enemy was soon laying down a devastating curtain of artillery, rocket and mortar fire on the beaches, and the remainder of the day saw bitter fighting as the Marines inched ahead against determined resistance from heavily fortified positions. The troops who came ashore encountered an intricate system of defenses, as well as some of the most modern weapons that the enemy has employed in the present war. The defending garrison, estimated at 20,000 was emplaced in an interlocking system of caves, pillboxes and blockhouses, with both the guns on Mount Suribachi (at the southern tip of the island) and in the high northern area commanding the Marines' positions, the beaches and the sea approaches. By the end of the first day, the Marines had advanced across the width of the island at its narrow southwestern tip, isolating the Japanese on Mount Suribachi from the main enemy forces in the north.

During the early morning hours of 20 February, an enemy counterattack was broken up by the 27th Marines; by the end of the day our troops had captured Motoyama Airfield No. 1.

Desperate fighting continued during the third day: by 1800 more than 1200 Japanese dead had been counted, and one had been captured. The 3rd Marine Division landed, as reserves, and moved into line between the 4th and 5th Divisions. Although enemy air strength was generally light, it succeeded in sinking the escort carrier BISMARCK SEA. During the night of 21-22 February, the enemy counterattacked again and again, but each assault was hurled back. The following morning the Marines renewed the attack; by noon they were advancing slowly under adverse weather conditions, knocking out enemy strongpoints. During the afternoon the enemy counterattacked again, exerting maximum pressure on both flanks of the Marine spearhead which was pointed toward Motoyama Airfield No. 2; the attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

The southern part of Motoyama Airfield No. 2 was occupied on 23 February. Simultaneously other troops stormed the steep slopes of Mount Suribachi, capturing the summit and winning gun positions which commanded the island. At 1035 the 28th Marine Regiment hoisted the United States flag over the extinct volcano. The capture of these heights eliminated some of the enemy mortar and artillery fire which had been directed against our troops on the previous days, while mortar fire from Kangoku Rock, northwest of the island, was eliminated by a destroyer. Throughout the entire period, close support was constantly furnished by carrier aircraft and



—Official U. S. Navy Photo

IWO JIMA LANDINGS

Landing craft approaching the beach, 19 February 1945

naval gunfire. Unloading continued on the beaches; roads were being constructed, and the captured airstrips being restored to operational condition.

By 25 February, Marines of the three divisions, spearheaded by tanks, had captured approximately half of the island, including Motoyama Airfield No. 2, and were closing in on the main village. The advance was made against fanatical resistance from rockets, bazooka-type guns, pillboxes and interlocking underground strongholds. On one flank alone, 100 caves, 30 to 40 feet deep, had to be knocked out one by one.

By the end of February, Marine Corps observation and artillery spotting planes were operating from Motoyama Airfield No. 1; the 3rd and 4th Marine Division had captured hills which further reduced the enemy's fire power and allowed a freer supply flow on the beaches. The Japanese, despite heavy losses, continued to offer maximum resistance, but the Marines were established on high ground, and the conquest of Iwo Jima was assured.

Renewed Attack on Tokyo

Tokyo was again attacked on 25 February by Vice Admiral Mitscher's fast carrier task force, which struck the island of Hachijo, off the coast of Honshu, the following day. Weather conditions were extremely adverse, but at least 158 planes were destroyed and 5 small vessels sunk. Numerous ground installations were attacked. The Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants were heavily damaged; radar installations, aircraft hangars, and 2 trains were demolished. Our forces lost 9 fighter planes in combat; the ships of the task force suffered no damage during the attack, but minor damage was inflicted upon two light units during retirement.

On 1 March 1944 our forces were in the Marshall Islands and Northeast New Guinea. On 1 March 1945 they were established in Iwo Jima, 750 miles from Tokyo.

CONTINUING OPERATIONS

In addition to the great battles and the major combats, there were many vital continuing operations against the Japanese in the Pacific. Although less spectacular, they were none the less significant in exerting pressure on the enemy at every possible point. These activities, with the exception of those by submarines, took place in areas where campaigns had already been fought and where the fruits of those campaigns were now capitalized on. Favorable positions and bases gained from the enemy became points of attack on his more remote holdings.

Northern Pacific

From bases in the Aleutians our air and surface forces kept up a constant attack on Japanese positions in the northern and central Kurile Islands. In spite of chronically bad weather, Army and Navy planes flew both attack and photographic missions to the Kuriles many times each month. They not only observed Japanese activity, but also destroyed important installations, supply dumps and shipping units. A task force of cruisers and destroyers commanded by the late Rear Admiral E. G. Small bom-

barded Matsuwa Island in the Kuriles on 13 June and Kurabu Zaki, an important enemy air base on the southeast tip of Paramushiru, on 26 June. Matsuwa Island was again bombarded on 21 November by a task force commanded by Rear Admiral J. L. McCrea. On 5 January 1945, Rear Admiral McCrea's forces bombarded Suribachi Wan, off Paramushiru, returning on 19 February to bombard Kurabu Zaki.

Submarines

The activities of Pacific Fleet and Seventh Fleet submarines grew more extensive and varied after 1 March 1944. As previously, they operated aggressively against enemy combat ships and commerce. No waters of the Pacific were too remote for their operations and their patrols carried them to the interior lines of Japanese sea communication, where they have littered the bottom of the ocean with the sunken wrecks of a large part of Japan's once great merchant fleet, as well as many naval vessels. Their contribution to the success of our advance in the Pacific is noteworthy. Besides their combat patrols, the submarines have rendered invaluable service on reconnaissance missions and have rescued many aviators shot down during strikes against various Japanese bases. Pacific Fleet submarines have been under the command of Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., during the period covered by this report. Seventh Fleet submarines were under the command of Rear Admiral R. W. Christie until 30 December 1944, when he was relieved by Rear Admiral J. Fife, Jr.

The British Pacific Fleet

Recently we have had the pleasure of welcoming the arrival in the Pacific of a strong task force of the Royal Navy, commanded by Admiral Sir Bruce A. Fraser, G.C.B., K.B.E. This potent addition to the Allied naval power in the Far East has been placed under the operational control of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and will work side by side with our armed forces in the common effort against the Japanese. Australian cruisers, destroyers and attack transports—under the command of Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, V.C., D.S.O., RN, later Commodore J. A. Collins, C.B., RAN, and now Commodore H. B. Farncomb, M.V.O., D.S.O., RAN—have continued to operate as an integral part of our naval task forces, as they have in previous years.

IV-*Combat Operations: Atlantic-Mediterranean*

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

During the past year the combat operations of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet have been concerned primarily with antisubmarine activities, in coordination with the sea frontier commands. Escort systems in certain trans-Atlantic convoy routes are also the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. As was announced in the monthly statements of the President and the Prime Minister, the antisubmarine war has been on a fairly low scale during the past year. The German submarine force apparently has been engaged in "licking its wounds" after the rough handling it received in 1943. Its operations were badly interfered with by the invasion of the Continent in June, which knocked out the many U-boat bases on the French coast and forced the Germans to use bases less conveniently located in Norway and the Baltic. It is assumed that the long period of relative quiescence has been employed for building more effective types of submarines. The possibility of a renewed outbreak of submarine activity must, therefore, be guarded against. The remarks in my previous report as to the necessity for complete secrecy concerning our antisubmarine methods still hold. I consider it of the greatest importance that the material and technique we have developed for dealing with the submarine menace be kept to ourselves until the conclusion of the war, to the end that the Japanese may not be able to apply our antisubmarine methods against our submarines operating in the Pacific.

An important duty of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet has been the maintenance of what might be called a general reserve of battleships, cruisers and other ships needed to make up a balanced task force. While possibility of a break-out of what was left of the German surface fleet remained, this force was held in readiness to deal with surface raids on Atlantic commerce. From time to time, particularly during the landings in northern and southern France, these ships were assigned first to the invasion of Normandy and then to the Eighth Fleet for the invasion of southern France. With the successful accomplishment of these operations, the need for heavy surface ships in the Atlantic area was reduced, and a large part of this general reserve has been shifted to the Pacific Fleet.

One of the little publicized but valuable tasks of the Atlantic Fleet has been to train for service elsewhere the large number of ships and landing craft built on the Atlantic coast. This has enabled the best use to be made of the facilities on the east coast, and has prevented overcrowding of the congested harbors on the Pacific coast. The same system is used in training patrol plane squadrons, which insofar as is practicable are fully trained in the Atlantic Fleet before being transferred to combat duty in the Pacific. The fact that during the past year some 3300 ships and craft were "shaken down" in the Atlantic Fleet operational training command indicates the magnitude of these training operations. An important element in this activity is the preparation of new submarines for war, carried on by the Submarine Force of the Atlantic Fleet, and the education of submarine officers and men in the schools at the Submarine Base at New London. The outstanding success of our submarines in the Pacific is in a large measure due to the sound preliminary training they receive in the schools and the school submarines in the Atlantic.

The Atlantic Fleet has worked in close cooperation with the British, Canadian, French, Brazilian and Neth-



—Official U. S. Navy Map

—Official Coast Guard Photo

CONVOY DUTY

erlands Navies. The Brazilians have developed a very efficient antisubmarine force of surface ships and aircraft which, operating as an integrated part of the South Atlantic detachment of the Atlantic Fleet, took its full share of the task of knocking out the German submarine effort directed against the convoy routes off the east coast of South America. Netherlands vessels have continued to serve with distinction in our antisubmarine forces.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE—THE NORMANDY INVASION

After a long period of careful planning, the assembly of United States Army and Air forces in Great Britain for the invasion of France began early in 1943. The military organization set up for the cross-channel invasion involved ground, naval and air forces of a number of our Allies. The United States naval contingent was assembled and trained under the Commander Twelfth Fleet (Admiral Stark), who at the appropriate time turned it over to the operational control of the Allied Naval Commander in Chief.

The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General (now General of the Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower, arrived in London and assumed command in January 1944. Meanwhile, his three principal subordinates had already been appointed: Allied Naval Commander in Chief, the late Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, RN; Commander in Chief 21st Army Group, General (now Field Marshal) Sir Bernard Montgomery, RA; and Air Commander in Chief, the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, RAF.

The success of our amphibious operations in North Africa, Sicily and Italy had demonstrated that, given air and sea superiority, there would be small doubt of our initial success, even against so strongly fortified a coast as northern France. The critical factor was whether, having seized a beachhead, we would be able to supply and reinforce it sufficiently fast to build an army larger than that which the enemy was certain to concentrate against ours. The operation thus had two phases of almost equal importance—the assault and the build-up. In both, the Navy would play a key part.

The Baie de la Seine beaches in Normandy were selected for the assault because of their proximity to the relatively undamaged ports of southern and western England, and because they were within easy range of fighter plane bases in England. The region was not so heavily fortified as the Pas de Calais area, and could be more easily isolated from other German forces by destruction of the Seine River bridges. The major deficiency of this region was the lack of a good harbor for a quick build-up after the assault. Thus artificial harbors had to be devised to meet the deficiency.

The date of the assault was determined chiefly by weather and tide conditions. The late spring or early summer presented the most favorable weather prospects, and the long days enhanced our air superiority. A spring tide was desirable so that as many as possible of the beach obstacles would be exposed at low water and landing craft could be floated far up the beach at high tide. The time of day was determined so as to allow some daylight for preliminary bombardment before the troops landed, and a half-tide for beaching the first wave, in order to enable the landing craft to pass over rocks which existed at certain of the beaches.

There was little chance of effecting substantial surprise. The final assembly of ships and craft in British ports was so large as to be beyond concealment. All that could be done was to confuse the enemy as to the time and place of the landing.

Joint Army-Navy training began in September 1943. In the spring of 1944 several large scale rehearsals were conducted in order to perfect our technique and to achieve effective coordination between the troops and the vessels of the expeditionary force.

The general scheme of the operation provided for landing United States troops in United States vessels on the western half of the area to be attacked, while the British and Canadians took the eastern half. The naval assault force was consequently divided into the Western [United States] Task Force and the Eastern [British] Task Force. The Western Naval Task Force, under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) A. G. Kirk, transported and landed the 1st U. S. Army, commanded by Lieutenant General O. N. Bradley. This task force was comprised of two assault forces: "O", commanded by Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr., and "U", commanded by the late Rear Admiral D. P. Moon, and a follow-up force commanded by Commodore C. D. Edgar. Each assault force in turn contained the necessary transports, bombardment ships, landing craft, escort craft, gunfire support craft, mine sweepers and control craft required to transport and land Army forces. Force "O" was designated to land elements of the 5th Corps, including the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions on "Omaha" beach, which was the Vierville-Colleville sector of the Baie de la Seine, extending from Porten-Bessin to Carentan Estuary. Force "U" landed elements of the 7th Corps on "Utah" beach, near St. Martin-de-Varreville.

The U. S. 8th Army Air Force, the U. S. 9th Army Air Force and the Royal Air Force were available in the United Kingdom at the time of the invasion. During the

final preparatory period (D-minus-90 to D-day) air bombing commitments included industrial, strategic and coast defense targets in northern France, the low countries and western Germany. As D-day approached, attacks were intensified until the maximum effort of planned heavy, medium and fighter bomber missions were executed the night of 5-6 June. A low ceiling on the morning of 6 June hampered the scheduled pre-landing bombing of "Omaha" beach by heavy bombers; to which some of the difficulty later experienced in gaining a foothold on "Omaha" beach may be attributed. The fighter cover throughout the operation limited the German air force to ineffective sporadic night attacks. The old United States battleships ARKANSAS, TEXAS and NEVADA delivered naval gunfire support, beginning with the preliminary bombardment, and continuing until the troops had advanced beyond range of their major calibre guns. The cruisers TUSCALOOSA and QUINCY and some 30 United States destroyers functioned as fire support ships, together with units of the British, Free French and Dutch Navies. Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo commanded the fire support group of Force "U" and Rear Admiral C. F. Bryant the comparable group in Force "O".

About 124,000 United States naval officers and men participated directly or indirectly in the invasion. Of these, 87,000 were aboard landing craft and small escort vessels, 15,000 were aboard the combatant ships, and 22,000 were attached to the amphibious bases in England.

By 1 June, when the loading of troops began, 2,493 United States Navy ships and craft had been assembled for the operation, and of these only 14 were unable to take part because of material difficulties.

On 3 June all troops had been loaded and briefed, but because of weather conditions the timing of the operation was still undetermined. At least four days of good weather were needed, commencing with D-day, which was initially set for 5 June. It was apparent on 3 June that unfavorable weather was developing, and early on 4 June the order for a postponement of 24 hours was broadcast. By the evening of 4 June, much improved conditions were forecast for the morning of the 6th, although there was some doubt as to how long the favorable condition would continue. However, because of tide and light considerations, the uncertainty of the weather immediately following D-day was accepted, and on the evening of 4 June, a confirmation of 6 June as D-day was broadcast.

The terrain where the landings were made was of great natural defensive strength, augmented by many strongly protected and cleverly concealed gun emplacements, machine gun nests and pill boxes, together with slit trenches, tank traps, and antitank ditches. In addition, between the high and low water levels on the beaches there were installed several rows of underwater obstacles consisting of hedgehogs, tetrahedrons and pole ramps interconnected by barbed wire and thickly sown with mines. Artillery and machine guns were placed for enfilading fire along the beaches, and in some cases were completely concealed and protected from seaward by concrete walls covered with earth.

The assault plans contemplated overcoming these defenses by the employment of naval gunfire and air bombardment to destroy or neutralize as many of the emplaced installations as possible, to breach the underwater obstacles under cover of an assault by infantry and tanks, and to storm the remaining defenses with succeeding waves of infantry supported by naval gunfire.

The Assault on "Omaha" Beach

Force "O", the larger of the two American assault forces, had as its target the Vierville-Colleville sector of the Normandy beaches, called for the purpose of these landings beach "Omaha". On its eastern flank was Port-en-Bessin, which marked the dividing line between the British and American areas. On its western flank was the Carentan estuary, which separated it from Force "U's" beach, "Utah", on the Cherbourg peninsula.

The ships and craft of Force "O" loaded at Portland, Weymouth and Poole on the south coast of England. Cross-channel convoys began moving on 5 June, and were joined by Rear Admiral Bryant's fire support group, which had assembled at Belfast. No enemy action hindered the movement, but a choppy sea with a 20-knot wind from the southwest made landing operations difficult, though possible. Mine sweepers cleared channels, and ARKANSAS, TEXAS and other combat ships opened their scheduled fire on shore batteries. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the planned air bombing was badly hampered by weather conditions, and certain LCT(A)'s [landing craft armed with M-4 tanks] and amphibious tanks failed to reach the beach on schedule. In addition, the 352nd Field Divisions of the German Army happened to be holding exercises in the area, and immediately joined the coastal defense troops in opposing our attack.

The tanks, infantry and demolition parties which landed at H-hour were subjected at once to a heavy cross-fire from artillery, mortars and machine guns, and losses were severe. Troops continued, however, to move in toward the beach, and by 1030 the entire landing force had been committed, though numerous personnel

—Official U. S. Navy Photo

INVASION OF NORMANDY

Heavy cruiser *AUGUSTA* and landing craft

both of the assault waves and the Army-Navy shore party were pinned down on the beach just above high water by enemy fire. Destroyers and gunfire support craft stood in as close to the beach as the depth of water would allow and engaged all enemy guns which they could observe. The first encouraging news came at 1100 when German soldiers began to leave their posts and surrender. At 1300 Colleville was taken, and by 1330 our troops had begun a general advance up the slopes of the beach. At about 1430 Commodore Edgar's follow-up force arrived with the remaining regiments of the 1st and 29th Divisions; by late afternoon, except for sniping and occasional artillery and mortar fire, hostile action against the beach area had ceased, and the work of organizing the beaches for further unloading was progressing in orderly fashion.

Our heavy ships had no trouble in putting the enemy's major shore batteries out of action promptly. Our chief difficulties came from the light artillery and machine guns which the enemy had sited to fire up and down the beach instead of out to sea. These guns, which were very difficult to detect, waited for our troops to land before opening fire. Specially trained Navy Shore Fire Control Parties attached to Army units were put ashore early in the assault to inform our ships by radio of the location of such targets, but many of them were unable to set up their radio equipment because of casualties and enemy fire. At this juncture 8 United States and 3 British destroyers closed the beach and took many enemy positions under fire. This unplanned bombardment, which was directed in part from the ships and in part from those Shore Fire Control Parties which had succeeded in establishing communications, deserves great credit. The battleships and cruisers for the most part fired with air spot at targets designated by Shore Fire Control Parties or by planes which were busily searching for enemy guns inland from the beaches. By 1300 on 6 June the Shore Fire Control Parties had begun to function according to schedule. Acting on their directions, TEXAS and the other ships repeatedly took enemy troops, tanks and vehicles under fire several miles inland. On D-plus-2 day, for example, TEXAS' 14-inch guns demolished the railway station at Isigny and effectively scattered a convoy of German vehicles moving through the town square. It is not surprising that a German Government broadcast on 16 June, recorded by the BBC, expressed admiration of the military value of this naval gunfire. These "floating batteries", it said, "enabled the invaders to achieve overpowering artillery concentrations at any point along the coast." By D-plus-4 day, when the Army's forward line reached the forest of Cerisy, the enemy was beyond the range of our ships.

On the morning of 7 June, the first of the build-up personnel convoys of transports arrived off the beach. Just to seaward of the assault area the transport SUSAN B. ANTHONY struck a mine and eventually sank, though all personnel aboard were taken off. During the forenoon, surveys for the establishment of the artificial harbor and the small craft shelters were begun.

The Assault on "Utah" Beach

The mission of Force "U" was to establish tank-supported infantry on the beach area, designated "Utah", near St. Martin-de-Varreville. Consisting of approximately 865 vessels and craft, Force "U" was organized in ports along the English coast between Plymouth and Torquay, although the fire support group of heavier ships assembled at Belfast.

Official Coast Guard Photo

INVASION OF NORMANDY
Supplies coming ashore from LSTs

The safety of Force "U's" cross-channel movement lay with three squadrons of United States and three flotillas of British mine sweepers. In general, all waters through which our convoys were to pass were suitable for mining, and the final leg of the course assigned Force "U" lay squarely across a very probable mine field on Cardonnet Bank. The only casualty occurred when the mine sweeper OSPREY was sunk.

The assault on "Utah" beaches progressed substantially as planned. Bombardment by the fire support ships, supplemented by aerial bombing, preceded the landing of waves of amphibious tanks and landing craft carrying troops of the 8th Infantry Division, which were supported by rocket-firing landing craft. Our forward troops encountered no small arms fire, and the little artillery fire directed against the beach from several distant batteries proved inaccurate and ineffectual. Main battery fire from NEVADA and QUINCY had breached the seawall in five places, materially aiding our advance inland. Our amphibious tanks, proceeding through rough waters under their own power, managed to survive the heavy swells, engaged enemy installations on the forward beachhead and pressed on inland.

Following the initial assault against "Utah" beach, the landing of subsequent waves proceeded with but slight deviation from schedule. Nearly all of the beach obstacles were exposed and Army engineers and Navy demolition teams were able to clear lanes for the passage of subsequent waves of troops and vehicles. Although our concentrated air and naval bombardment had temporarily neutralized the enemy's coastal batteries, thus affording the earlier assault waves a reasonably safe landing, the enemy from 1100 onwards brought the beach under accurate artillery fire. Aided by Shore Fire Control Parties, our support ships replied. Some of the enemy batteries were extremely hard to knock out, but

by early afternoon all but three had been silenced. These tended to come to life unexpectedly and to fire a few rounds when landing craft offered good targets. Otherwise they caused little hindrance to the work on the beaches. During the first twelve hours we landed 21,328 troops, 1742 vehicles and 1695 tons of supplies.

In the course of the "Utah" landings the destroyers MEREDITH and GLENNON, the destroyer escort RICH, the mine sweeper TIDE, and several landing craft were lost.

During the next few days the batteries of the fire support ships were turned against targets well inland and to the west as the 7th Corps fought its way toward Cherbourg, and requests for these support missions continued until the Army had advanced beyond the ships' range. Our troops were now more than half way across the Cotentin peninsula, and were advancing northwest along the coast towards Cherbourg against stubborn opposition.

The Normandy Build-up

Once the Army had been successfully established on the beaches, the Navy's primary responsibility was supply. The enemy had fortified and defensively manned the ports to such an extent as to make the military cost of direct attack upon them extreme. On the other hand, to attempt the assault of a continent over open beaches, affording no protection from the vagaries of the weather, would place the entire operation in jeopardy.

The solution of this problem was one of the most dramatic creations of the war—the artificial harbors, or "Mulberries", and the small boat shelters, or "Gooseberries". There were to be two of the former—"Mulberry A" in the American sector (at St. Laurent in "Omaha" area), and "Mulberry B" in the British sector at Arromanches—and five "Gooseberries", three in the British sector and one on each of the two American beaches.

The "Gooseberries", created by sinking a number of old warships and merchant ships in a line in 2.5 fathoms of water just off the beaches, were to provide a refuge for small craft in rough weather. The blockships were to proceed to the beaches under their own power, and be sunk quickly by internally placed explosives. The "Gooseberries" were a relatively simple undertaking.

The "Mulberries" were much more complicated. Conceived by the British, the tremendous task of manufacturing and assembling the many components had to be carried out with complete secrecy, lest the enemy gain a clue as to our intention to assault a harborless part of the French coast.

It was necessary to tow "Mulberry" units and other essential parts of the invasion armada across the channel. This inconspicuous but important role was carried out by a large pool of British and American tugs. The latter had come across the Atlantic under their own power, many of them manned by civilian masters and crews who had had little experience with naval or military operations. TUG CONTROL operated from Lee Tower, Lee-on-Solent and was headed by Captain (now Commodore) Edmond J. Moran, USNR.

On 7 June all elements had been towed from England, and Rear Admiral Hall, Commander of Force "O" at "Omaha" beach, gave permission to begin "operation Mulberry". Specially trained Seabees sank hollow concrete caissons, each mounting an AA gun, in designated positions by flooding through built-in valves. Inside the breakwater thus formed were established two Loebnitz floating pierheads. These were connected to the beach by a floating roadway composed of bridgework mounted on pontoons, and two sunken causeways constructed of the same material used in pontoon causeways and Rhino barges. Protecting both the breakwater and the blockships of the nearby "Gooseberry" was a line of steel caissons secured end to end and moored to buoys. The work of installation and construction of "Gooseberries" and "Mulberries" progressed rapidly and smoothly, with all blockships in place by D-plus-4 day.

By this time the delays caused by the unfavorable weather and by the failure of the assault at "Omaha" to proceed as planned had been overcome, and the build-up began to move rapidly and on schedule. At "Utah", in spite of the problems of handling a great number of ferry craft in a small area, often under shell fire, unloading was nearly up to schedule by D-plus-4 day. On the 8th the first pontoon causeway had been successfully established at "Utah", although at the outset it could not be employed because of shell fire. During the first week of occupation we succeeded in landing approximately 74,000 troops, 10,000 vehicles, and 17,000 tons of supplies.

Then came the storm. During the night of 18 June the wind began to freshen, and by mid-afternoon of the 19th it was blowing a moderate gale from the northeast. Ferry service ceased, all craft took shelter inside the "Gooseberry" or "Mulberry", and unloading of almost every type was brought to a halt. It continued to blow steadily for the next three days, with the seas making up to destructive proportions. When the storm ended on the morning of 22 June, the beach was a shambles. More than 300 craft had been washed up high and dry, many of them damaged beyond salvage. The only ferry craft undamaged were the DUKW's, which had remained safely parked ashore during the storm.

The blockships of the "Gooseberry" shelter had held



—Official U. S. Navy Photo

INVASION OF NORMANDY

"Mulberry"—Unloading at a Loebnitz pierhead

together, although several of them had broken their backs and all had settled, but the storm had been disastrous to the "Mulberry". The concrete caissons had either broken apart or had become submerged in the bottom sands. The roadway to one of the Loebnitz pierheads had been smashed by the impact of LCT's driven against it, and many of its pontoons were flooded. The causeway had held together but was twisted. Many of the steel caissons had carried away from their moorings and had drifted about as a menace to shipping. Others were flooded and half submerged.

The British "Mulberry" suffered less from the storm than the American, which was exposed to heavier seas and had been built on deeper sands, where the scour was far more severe. Consequently, it was decided to abandon the American harbor. The British one was completed, partly with material salvaged from the American.

A major port was absolutely necessary if unloading schedules were to be maintained through the fall and winter. The first to fall to our troops was Cherbourg.

Bombardment of Cherbourg

To assist the 7th Corps, which was advancing on the port of Cherbourg from the land side, the fire support group of the Western Naval Task Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Deyo, bombarded the shore batteries which commanded the waters leading to Cherbourg harbor. These enemy coastal defenses consisted of 20 casemated batteries [guns covered by steel and concrete walls and roofs], three of which had 280mm guns with an estimated range of 40,000 yards [approximately 20 miles].

The force, consisting of the battleships NEVADA, TEXAS and ARKANSAS, U. S. cruisers QUINCY and TUSCALOOSA, British cruisers GLASGOW and ENTERPRISE, and 11 destroyers, approached the coast shortly before noon on 25 June. The intention was to avoid engaging the enemy batteries as long as possible in order to close the shore and provide the support requested by our troops. The Germans, waiting until our ships arrived well within range, opened fire. The destroyers interposed with smoke, but the enemy fire increased in volume, and shortly afterwards the mine sweepers, which had preceded the force, were obliged to withdraw to the northward.

By 1230 the enemy's fire had become so heavy and accurate that our ships were directed to maneuver independently, and they steamed back and forth in a line ranging from four to eight miles offshore. While the heavy ships fired at targets inland designated by Shore Fire Control Parties and spotting planes, the destroyers endeavored to silence the enemy coastal batteries. The latter were only partly successful, and our ships continued to be under shore fire until, having completed their mission, they retired shortly before 1500. This abnormal exposure of ships to heavy shore guns, without adequate counterfire, was well warranted by the urgent need of supporting our invading troops. The Army later reported that of 21 firings requested on inland targets 19 were successful.

Of the seven heavy ships engaged (battleships and cruisers) all but one were either hit or had fragments on board, and all were closely missed frequently. The destroyer O'BRIEN was considerably damaged, and the destroyers BARTON and LAFFEY slightly damaged. Personnel casualties—14 dead and 28 wounded for the entire force—were remarkably small. The 7th Corps occupied Cherbourg two days later, assaulting and capturing the remaining shore batteries from the rear.

Under the command of Commodore W. A. Sullivan, task forces composed of British and American salvage and fire fighting units did phenomenal work repairing ships and craft, and clearing the major ports for dockside unloading of cargo. This important but difficult task was performed with rapidity. Cherbourg's port facilities were in operation early in July. Although we soon secured several minor ports, a second major port was not available until Le Havre surrendered on 12 September. It was opened to small craft in three days, and was in full operation within a month. For some time, however, shipping in the approaches to Le Havre was seriously harassed by enemy mining. Although organized resistance in Brest ended on 19 September, its facilities were so damaged, and it was then so distant from the battle front, that it did not appear worthwhile to restore the port.

With the approach of winter, it became apparent that only three liberated ports in northern France could be operated on a year round basis. These were Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Rouen, unloading having begun at the last port in mid-October. Antwerp in Belgium, a British commitment, became early in December an important avenue of supplies to our troops. A U. S. Naval Port Office was opened there, and daily unloadings of up to 22,000 tons of U. S. stores were handled.

EIGHTH FLEET—ITALY

Support of the Anzio Beachhead

On 22 January 1944 a combined British-American operation secured a beachhead at Anzio on the west coast of Italy, some 60 miles behind the German lines. The landing progressed as scheduled against slight initial opposition; however, the enemy reacted strongly, and rapidly assembled a powerful force around the beachhead. Resistance and counter-attacks were so severe that extraordinary effort was required to maintain and support the Army in this area; the capacity of the small captured port of Anzio and the adjoining beaches was so small that scarcely any part of the Army was free from enemy observation and artillery fire. The beachhead was raided by enemy aircraft 277 times during the first twelve weeks after landing. On 25 May the beachhead forces joined those advancing from the main front; throughout the four months preceding this junction, cruisers and destroyers constantly furnished gunfire support by bombardment of enemy targets on shore. Screening and patrol vessels guarded the anchorage from air-surface attack and amphibious craft transported supplies and fresh troops from the Naples area to Anzio, returning with prisoners and other personnel.

Continuously throughout the year British and U. S. Eighth Fleet motor torpedo boats were on patrol to intercept enemy corvettes, torpedo boats and the barges with which the enemy desperately sought to carry on coastwise support of his armies in Italy. Destruction of enemy naval strength and coastal commerce in the Ligurian Sea was the prime objective.

Capture of Elba

An amphibious assault resulting in the capture of the island of Elba was carried out on 17 June by a naval task force under the command of Rear Admiral T. H. Troubridge, RN. United States destroyers, mine sweepers, patrol and landing craft formed part of the combined force. One of the immediate objects in securing the island, which is situated only five miles from the coast of Italy, was to set up a heavy battery opposite the mainland to curtail the movement of enemy supply convoys which hugged the coast. The army forces to be landed comprised the French 9th Colonial Division and support elements totaling 11,200 more under the command of General of Army Corps Henri Martin, French Army. Although the attacking forces outnumbered the defenders about five to one, the strongly defended beaches were well alerted and several hours of severe fighting were required to secure the initial beachhead. All organized resistance ended on 19 June.

EIGHTH FLEET— INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

Landings in southern France were an integral part of the over-all Allied strategy in Western Europe, and as conceived were a logical sequence to the invasion of northern France. By the beginning of 1944, planning was underway and Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, Commander Eighth Fleet, had been appointed naval commander for the operation with the designation of Commander Western Task Force. Beaches finally selected for landings were east of Toulon, in the Cavalaire-Frejus area, since the necessary forces and supplies required for a quick thrust up the Rhone valley could be advantageously landed there.

The general situation in the western Mediterranean was favorable for amphibious operations during the summer. The submarine menace was rapidly being brought under control, and enemy naval surface strength was not a serious threat. As a result of losses sustained in the invasion of Normandy, the enemy air force was no longer able to operate in strength in the Mediterranean. The coast to be assaulted had fair beaches with strong enemy defenses; however, these defenses lacked depth, and the enemy had few available reserves for counter-attack.

All forces allocated for the invasion of southern France were included in the Western Task Force under the over-all command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, General (now Field Marshal) Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson. Tactical command was jointly exercised by the Naval Commander, Vice Admiral Hewitt; the Army Commander, Major General (now Lieutenant General) A. M. Patch; and the Air Commander, Brigadier General G. P. Saville. Command of the joint Army and Navy forces of the Western Task Force after embarkation was vested in the Naval Commander until the Commanding General landed and assumed command of the Army forces on shore.

Intensive bombing of targets in southern France in support of the invasion commenced on 29 April with a damaging raid on the airport installations of Toulon. Thereafter, according to a plan carefully coordinated with the allied bombing of Europe from England, the assault area was isolated by destruction and damage to bridges, tunnels, viaducts and railroad yards, without definite indication to the enemy of the precise location of the projected landings. This bombing was carried out by the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force and comprised about 5,400 sorties which dropped 6,700 tons of bombs.

On 9 August the first of the assault convoys sailed from Naples, and thereafter further convoys left other ports in order to arrive in the assault area on the morning of the 15th. All convoys arrived on schedule, and 880 ships and craft and 1,370 shipborne landing craft were present. This allied naval force included 515 United States, 283 British, 12 French and 7 Greek ships and craft and 63 merchant ships of various nationalities.

About eight hours before the main landings, French commandos and units of the First Special Service Forces were landed near Cape Negre and on the Hyeres Islands by forces under command of Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson. Rear Admiral T. E. Chandler (subsequently killed in the Philippine Islands in January 1945) commanded

—Official U. S. Navy Photo

INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE
LSTs loading at an Italian port for the assault

a group of gunfire support ships of this force. No resistance was met on the islands and only inaccurate machine gun and small arms fire on the mainland.

In the meantime, diversionary groups were operating to the eastward in the Nice-Cannes area and to the westward between Toulon and Marseille, where a mock landing and repulse were staged at LaCiotat, producing considerable enemy reaction.

The bombing in tactical support of the landings commenced before daylight on D-day. This was followed at dawn with heavy and medium bombing for one hour and twenty minutes by more than 1,300 aircraft along a 40 mile front. The execution of this plan, in conjunction with naval gunfire and barrages of rockets, appeared to paralyze the enemy defenses on all the initial assault beaches.

Preceded by this coordinated neutralizing attack of 1,300 aircraft and 53 gunfire support ships, the assault took place at 0800, about two hours after daylight, on

15 August. The main amphibious landings were carried out in three principal sectors. The attack in the Frejus-St. Raphael sector was made by forces under command of Rear Admiral S. S. Lewis; the St. Maxine-St. Tropez area under the command of Rear Admiral B. J. Rodgers; and the attack on the beaches in Pampelonne and Cavalaire Bays under the command of Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry. Gunfire support groups for these main landing forces were commanded by Rear Admiral Deyo, Rear Admiral Bryant and Rear Admiral R. M. Mansfield, RN, respectively. Two escort carrier groups operating off the coast furnished airplane spotters for the shore bombardment, provided protection for our assault forces against air attack, and assisted the Army Air Force in its attack upon the enemy. This naval air force was under command of Rear Admiral Troubridge, RN, with Rear Admiral Durgin commanding one of the groups.

The amphibious assaults of 15 August established a firm beachhead. Eleven army divisions were used in the operation. The U. S. Army 3rd, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions and the French 1st Armored Division comprised the assault forces. The remaining divisions, landed during the follow-up and build-up periods, were entirely French. With strong air support, the Army continued vigorous and rapid thrusts inland and successfully kept the enemy from making a concerted stand. The weakened German defense was stunned by the power and effectiveness of coordinated blows from sea and air.

On the morning of 17 August an operation by a light diversion force was carried out in the Ciotat area. Returning from this operation the destroyer ENDICOTT and two small British gunboats encountered two German corvettes, which were engaged and sunk about 13 miles from Cape Croisette Light; 211 survivors were taken prisoner.

On 18 August, rapid progress by the Army continued, and sustained naval effort was required to speed up unloading to meet the requirements of our rapidly advancing forces.

In the days that followed, United States ships engaged German coast defense batteries along the coast and repulsed attacks by light enemy forces. By 29 August the last defenders of Toulon and Marseilles had surrendered. With the capture of these ports, naval emphasis was shifted to mine sweeping and port clearance. Ships and craft were released from duty in the assault area as rapidly as their services could be spared. On 1 September U. S. Naval Detachment Marseille was established. While Army engineers were clearing the land side of the port of Marseille with full Navy cooperation, additional Seabee personnel were engaged in the rehabilitation of part of the port of Toulon. On 25 September, with the closing of the last beaches used for maintenance, the amphibious phase of the campaign was considered ended. During this phase, naval vessels carried out 850 separate shore bombardment missions, with more than 54,000 rounds fired, and mine sweeping forces swept 550 mines. The invasion of southern France achieved highly satisfactory results with comparatively small losses. As no further large scale amphibious operation appeared in prospect in the Mediterranean, forces were returned as rapidly as practicable to the United States for use in other war areas.

V—*Fighting Strength*

SHIPS, PLANES AND ORDNANCE

Naval accomplishments in this mechanized age are dependent upon production. The best officers and men can do little without an adequate supply of the highly specialized machinery of warfare. Our guiding policy is to achieve not mere adequacy, but overwhelming superiority of material, thereby insuring not only victory, but early victory with the least possible loss of American lives. The excellence of our material is unquestioned. The genius of American research and industry has put us a long step ahead of our naval enemies in effectiveness of ships, planes and weapons. As regards quantity of ships, planes and weapons, the balance of power is, also, decisively on our side. The magnificent productive capacity of the United States has given us the greatest navy in all history.

The Navy is deeply grateful to industry for its accomplishments, which have enabled the Navy to play a large and effective part in the landings of the Allied armies in Europe, as well as to prosecute the Pacific war with a vigor evidenced by the rapid advance towards Japan in recent months. We have gone ahead rapidly because we have been able to keep steady pressure on the enemy. It is of the utmost importance that we not only maintain this pressure but intensify it. There must be no relaxation of the fighting effort, nor of the industrial effort that makes the fighting effort possible. I make a special point of this because of recent indications that industry is having difficulty in meeting the needs of the armed services. This is cause for concern, since, if the industrial output falls off, the effect will be to prolong the war at great cost in American lives as well as money.

Ship Production Program

As the war develops, the changing nature of operations results in shifting of production emphasis from vessels of one type to another. For example, during the first five months of 1944, the need for landing craft was paramount. After the landings in France and the capture of Saipan and Guam, large assault transports had the right-of-way in preparation for operations in the far reaches of the Pacific. Some of the small ship programs have come to completion during the past year, while the construction of the larger vessels goes on with undiminished intensity.

The ship construction program is under constant re-

NAVSHIPS (501)

NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

DELIVERIES 1942-1944



Plate 1 —Official U. S. Navy Chart

view. The effect of building too many vessels of any particular type would be as serious as building too few, since the construction of unnecessary craft would involve waste of manpower and critical materials urgently needed for other parts of the war effort. It is not easy to keep the shipbuilding program in balance. It has been necessary to cut back certain programs and to expand others with little warning. This has been embarrassing to industry, but I am convinced that the overall result has been good. Within reasonable limits, we have obtained what we needed without drawing on the productive capacity of the country for things that we do not need.

Since last March, two new IOWA Class battleships — MISSOURI and WISCONSIN — have joined the fleet. Aircraft carriers have come into service with a steady flow. The small escort carriers, built for the Navy by the Maritime Commission, have been tested in battle and found to be effective fighting units within the expected limitations imposed by their relatively small size, power and speed. The first two 12-inch large cruisers—ALASKA and GUAM—were commissioned during 1944. Heavy cruisers of the BALTIMORE Class, as well as many light cruisers, have been added to the fleet. Destroyers have come into service in large numbers. Auxiliary vessels have been built and acquired in quantity, so that ever increasing demands for transports, supply ships, repair ships, tenders, tankers, tugs, and floating hospitals have almost been met. Many of these auxiliary vessels have been built by the Maritime Commission through designs developed by the Navy Department. The success of our widespread operations in the Pacific is due in no small measure to our good fortune in having an increasing supply of well designed and well built auxiliary vessels.

Plate 3 Official U. S. Navy Chart



Among the smaller types, landing craft have been all important. During the past 12 months, the Navy has

acquired 6,000 of these, ranging in size from tank lighters to the 457-foot landing ship (dock). In addition, more than 29,000 smaller landing boats of all types have been produced. The effectiveness of our landing craft has been demonstrated from the shores of Normandy to the beaches of Iwo Jima.

Our landing craft, initially conceived merely as carriers of troops and cargo, have been found capable of considerable combat value of their own, due to recent developments in rocket armament and light-weight rapid-fire guns.

The so-called amphibious vehicles, craft that are equally at home on water and on land, have proved their value and are under constant improvement.

As new ships are added daily to the fleet, the maintenance problem grows more difficult. The skilled crews of our vessels do much to keep their ships in repair. Fully equipped repair units follow the fleet as one advanced base after another is captured. The huge machine shops in our repair ships are always near at hand when a man-of-war needs help. By these means, much is done in forward areas to effect battle repairs and normal upkeep.

However, really serious repair problems must be dealt with in our navy yards. Here, manpower shortage has begun to present a critical problem. Battle damage repair has kept some of our combatant ships out of the fighting line for far too long a time. Plate numbers 1 and 2 graphically illustrate the vast increase in hulls and machinery to be maintained. Plate number 3 shows the fall in shipyard employment. The possibility that the situation may get worse is cause for concern.

Aircraft

At the beginning of the current year, most of our fighters were either *Hellcats* or *Corsairs*, while a greatly improved version of the *Wildcat* was operative from escort carriers. In production are still newer fighters, including those which are jet-propelled. One of the most important innovations of the year has been the employment in combat of night fighters armed with machine guns, cannon and rockets.

The *Sea Hawk* is now replacing the *Seagull* as our standard scout observation plane. The *Seagull* had previously replaced in part the *Kingfisher*.

The *Helldiver*, which has proved its worth time and again in the Pacific campaigns, is now our dive-bomber. It carries, over considerably longer ranges and at much higher speeds, twice the bomb load of the older *Dauntless*. Experimentation is being vigorously pushed to produce dive-bombers with even better performance.

The *Avenger*, a torpedo-bomber, has replaced the *Devastator*, and is in turn about to be supplanted by new models now in production. All are designed to increase the load, range and rates of climb of the present torpedo-plane. A new night torpedo-bomber has already come into use.

The *Catalina*, a long range twin-engine patrol plane, still in great demand for air-sea rescue work, has been generally supplanted for patrol work by the larger *Mariner* and the *Liberator*. Its bombing work has been taken over in part also by the *Ventura* and the *Privateer*. Experimental patrol planes now envisaged will carry great-

—Official U. S. Navy Chart





HELLDIVERS HEAD OUT ON A MISSION

ESCORT CARRIERS



—Official U. S. Navy photos

BATTLESHIP *MISSOURI* FIRING FORWARD GUNS



—Official U. S. Navy Photo

ROCKETS FIRED BY LANDING CRAFT PREPARATORY TO LANDINGS ON MINDORO, 15 DECEMBER 1944

er loads of fuel or bombs at considerably higher speeds than those of the present day.

The *Mars*, which entered regular service this past year, has proved to be a most efficient cargo carrier in terms of cost per ton-mile. Plans for the experimental transport program now contemplate pressurized cabin planes for high-speed, high-altitude transports.

Amphibious gliders, rotary wing devices, and target aircraft for the improvement of antiaircraft fire, are also under intensive development.

Ordnance

The present technique of amphibious operations has imposed upon the fleet the role of acting as support artillery for our ground forces. Today this artillery support is of major importance, as landings are normally preceded by terrific naval bombardments. After landings have been effected, naval gunfire is often called upon for the destruction of specific targets, to assist the advance of our troops.

Engagements with other sea-going targets are usually relatively brief. Shore bombardment, however, is a tremendously heavy consumer of ammunition, and has increased enormously the volume requirements for firepower. For example, our bombardments from 7 December 1941 to July 1944 (not including the shelling of Saipan) used approximately 40,000 tons of projectiles. During the one-month bombardment of Saipan, from 13 June to 12 July, the ships of the attacking task force fired 11,000 tons of shells. In many cases in the Pacific it has been found possible to neutralize enemy installations before our troops have landed. For example, in an official report of the Guam action it was stated that "coastal defense guns, heavy and light AA guns, dual-purpose guns and all types of defense installations were rendered impotent prior to the landing of troops. . . . . It is believed that not one fixed gun was left in commission on the west coast that was of greater size than a machine gun."

These shore bombardments have changed ordnance requirements and standards affecting high-capacity shells, rockets, bombs, and fuses. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy had virtually no high-capacity ammunition [so-called because it contains an extremely high amount of explosive]. Since then, production of this type of projectile has risen rapidly, and currently accounts for 75 per cent of the output of shells from six to sixteen inches in calibre. Monthly naval production of all types of major calibre ammunition now exceeds the total quantity delivered during World War I.

The multiplicity of tasks which must be performed in rendering impotent an enemy-held shore involves far more than volume of fire, however. There are many different types of projectiles and many different types of fuses, but the nature of the objective is the major factor in determining their employment. For example, armor-piercing shells (the only type effective against armored ships) are relatively ineffective against personnel or light structures ashore.

During the year the rocket has become a major weapon. Beach barrage rockets, first used by the Navy in the invasion of North Africa in the fall of 1942, have assisted our landing craft, as well as our heavier ships, to act as support artillery for ground forces. Their great usefulness begins when the barrage and bombing by big guns and planes cease. At this time, when landing troops are most exposed to enemy mortars and machine guns, rockets provide effective fire support. Seven main types of rockets, ranging from 2.25 inches to 5 inches and larger, are now being produced in quantity. Production this year will be approximately ten times that of 1943.

Approximately nine hundred ordnance research projects are currently in progress. Although combat experience has proved the efficiency of our ordnance, it has also emphasized the necessity for the greatest possible concentration on research and development.

The weekly procurement of ordnance equipment during 1944 equalled the total yearly production during 1938. In addition to equipping our naval vessels, we have armed approximately 5500 merchant ships. Although a number of construction programs are due for completion shortly, heavy demand for such expendable items as high-capacity ammunition and rockets will continue until final victory is won.

PERSONNEL

On 19 July 1944 the President authorized the Navy to base its plans upon a total strength of 3,389,000 by 30 June 1945. On 31 December 1944, the personnel strength of the Navy consisted of 300,101 officers, 2,833,904 enlisted men and women, 84,627 officer candidates, and 8,893 nurses. The growth of all branches of the naval service has been as follows:

	7 Dec. 1941	*31 Dec. 1942*	*31 Dec. 1943*	*31 Dec. 1944*
Navy	337,349	1,259,167	2,381,116	3,227,525
Marine Corps	66,048	238,423	405,169	472,682
Coast Guard	25,336	141,769	171,941	169,832

The enormous increase in enlisted personnel is graphically indicated in Plate 4.

Within the past twelve months the Navy has gained by the experience of its personnel, from flag officers to gun pointers. A large number of senior commanders have been tried and tested in combat, as have many of the Reserve officers, whose continued professional improvement and excellent performance of duty have made them not only an indispensable but an integral part of the Navy team.

Training

Of the personnel on active duty on the last day of February 1945, only about 10 per cent were in service before Pearl Harbor. It is not surprising, therefore, that in June 1944 we were conducting no less than 947 training schools with a daily average attendance of 303,000. Because the peak of recruitment was reached and passed during the year under consideration, it has been possible to eliminate, consolidate, or adapt to other purposes, a few of the training facilities.

In the early months of the war, when the need was most urgent for large numbers of trained personnel, it was frequently impossible to provide the degree of specialization desired. To some extent this has been remedied by the institution of operational and precommissioning training ashore; this development has become invaluable in molding crews into integrated combat units. The time required to reach petty officer rank varies according to rating, branch, length of specialized training, and vacancies in the complement of the ship or activity to which

the man is assigned. The trend is in the direction of still more training ashore, starting with a recruit training period of at least 10 weeks.

One of the most important aspects of our training program is the urgent need for turning over to the fleet men who are familiar not only with the fundamental skills, but with the very latest practices required in the jobs they are to fill. This means that there must be accurate and up-to-date information on the duties and responsibilities of men in fleet assignments. Job analysis specialists are serving aboard combatant vessels to observe and tabulate the operations performed in various billets, the skills required, and the equipment used. This information is used in writing the qualifications for the various rates; in establishing curricula for schools training men for particular rates; and in preparing self-study training courses.

As the war has progressed, many new ratings and subdivisions have been added. There are now more than 450 petty officer ratings and enlisted specialties. To overcome the lack of opportunity for training while at sea and to utilize to best advantage time spent ashore while ships undergo repairs, a program of refresher training has recently been organized at special training centers. These courses serve to bring personnel up to date with the latest advances in tactics and equipment, and thereby promote the efficiency of operating units.

Of officers commissioned since Pearl Harbor, approximately 131,000 were appointed directly from civilian life, 97,000 from officer candidate programs, and 58,000 from enlisted sources. By direct commissioning it was generally possible from 1942 to mid-1944, the period of greatest expansion, to meet the immediate requirements of the service.

Procurement of officers from civilian life for general sea duty was closed on 17 August 1944; since then our principal source of young sea-going officers has been the six Reserve Midshipmen's Schools. Towards the end of 1944, a General Line School at Hollywood, Florida, was opened to provide already commissioned officers with an eight weeks' course of training of sufficient scope to qualify them as junior division officers. The procurement of chaplains, doctors and electrical engineers from civilian life still continues, in order to meet urgent needs.

It is anticipated that we will be able to meet most of our developing needs for new officers through the officer candidate programs—aviation cadet (V-5), reserve midshipmen (V-7), college (V-12)—and by commissioning enlisted personnel of the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve. These appointments to commissioned rank from within the service have steadily increased.

At the end of February 1945 approximately 12,500 aviation cadets were under instruction. During the year ending 28 February 1945, approximately 20,000 officers were commissioned after completing four months' deck and engineering training at the Reserve Midshipmen's Schools: 91 per cent of these were products of the Navy college program (V-12). At the end of February 1945, reserve midshipmen numbered 8,600; the V-12 program was operating 269 units at 185 colleges and universities, with an attendance of 52,000. Through the active assistance and guidance of university authorities, V-12 curricula have been designed to meet our operating needs; the methods used in selecting candidates have enabled us to obtain the most promising material available. Recent congressional authorization has made possible the institution of a plan of transition from the V-12 to an expanded NROTC program.

The Seabees [Construction Battalions] now number approximately 235,000 men and 8,500 Civil Engineer Corps officers. Of these more than three-fourths are serving overseas, not only building the shore facilities required for offensive operations but also providing logistic support for combat forces. Landing with the first waves of assault troops, Seabees have participated in almost every amphibious operation yet undertaken.

During the past year the Women's Reserve has grown to a total of more than 83,000 officers and enlisted women, who are serving in nearly every type of shore activity. At 500 shore stations throughout the United States and more recently in Hawaii, permission having been given them to volunteer for overseas duty at certain non-combat bases in the American area, WAVES have been assigned as direct replacements for men or to fill expanding complements. At the peak of the WAVES training program there were approximately 40 schools preparing them for duty. Beginning on 1 December 1944, however, the Navy established revised recruiting quotas, reducing monthly enlistments to 500. This number, it is believed, will cover current requirements, although it will be increased if future needs show that additional women can be used.

During the latter part of 1944, a new system of classifying Reserve officers was established; symbols were devised to designate as accurately as possible the qualifications necessary for specific types of duty at sea and ashore.

Needs of Personnel

Faced with a war of uncertain length requiring prolonged service, it has been our responsibility to see that military spirit and efficiency are maintained at the highest possible level. In 1944 this involved increasingly close attention not only to material requirements but to the needs and aspirations of personnel. Continuing emphasis was placed upon the effective administration and extension of insurance, dependents' benefits, and family allowance programs, which support the morale of the individual by providing for his long-range welfare and for that of his dependents.

During the year the voluntary off-duty education program was also greatly expanded. It is in operation at overseas and continental bases and stations, is being extended to the fleet, and is an integral part of the rehabilitation program in naval hospitals. During 1944 about 100,000 personnel were enrolled in correspondence courses, 250,000 in courses involving class-room instruction, and self-study materials and reprints of standard texts were supplied for an additional 750,000.

Plans for Demobilization

Since there still exists a critical need for combat and seagoing officers and enlisted personnel, no demobilization of personnel can take place until the defeat of Japan is at hand. When Germany is defeated, we will be confronted with the enormous task of transporting men and material from the European theater to the Pacific.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL U.S. NAVY

1941 - 1944

FIGURES AS OF 31 DECEMBER



Plate 4

—Official U. S. Navy Chart

The end of the war in Europe will therefore result in a redistribution rather than a reduction of naval strength.

However, for more than a year, we have worked on demobilization methods and have completed tentative plans. We are considering priority for severance, and intend, when the time comes, to give due consideration to length of service, service outside the continental limits, combat service, and parenthood.

Postwar Navy

Because the postwar size of the Navy is yet to be determined, no precise estimate of the number of naval personnel that will be required is possible. The deciding factor will be the needs of the Navy in order to carry out the strategic commitments of the nation. It is assumed in all the plans now under consideration that many more officers and men will be needed than can be provided by personnel now in the Regular Navy. These comprise but 16 per cent of the wartime Navy. Accordingly, serious attention is being given to regulations under which Reserve officers may transfer to the Regular Navy, and to the organization of the Naval Reserve in the postwar period. In December 1944 a board was appointed to consider these problems and make recommendations concerning the means by which an effective and realistic Naval Reserve may be maintained, and by which Reserve officers of the highest quality and of appropriate age and rank may be attracted towards a naval career, in which they will receive the same training as and compete on an equal basis with Regular officers.

SUPPLY

The supply of combatant forces is a major problem of vital importance at sea, as it is on land. The Navy has two distinct phases of this problem with which to deal: the moving of supplies into advanced shore bases, and the supply of ships while they are at sea.

The United States Navy has for years given great attention to developing means for replenishing fuel, food and ammunition at sea. Before the war began, (even as far back as 1916) we had the so-called "Fleet Train" composed of tankers and other auxiliary vessels specially designed for this purpose. Since the war began, we have developed improved types of ships and better technique in using them, with the result that our fleet in the Pacific has been able to keep at sea for long periods of time. This has given us a decided advantage over the Japanese Navy, which is largely dependent on bases as sources of supply, and therefore has much less mobility.

The question of how to supply a fleet must be settled largely on geographical grounds. If the ocean combat area is small, as is the case in European waters, and if it is possible to set up shore-based establishments at strategic points, there is little need for a Fleet Train. However, the problem that we have had to solve in the Pacific is how to project a fleet throughout a vast ocean area initially dominated by the enemy. We are solving this problem by rapidly establishing repair and supply bases in enemy islands as we capture them, and by pushing our supplies forward in ships of the Train, now referred to as the Service Force, to supply our task forces at sea. To paraphrase Napoleon, a fleet swims on its stomach. It has to swim long distances to get at the Japanese. The success of this scheme is a tribute to the far-sighted planning of those who, with clarity of vision concerning the problem of naval logistics in the vast reaches of the Pacific, directed naval affairs during the past 30 years.

The Navy has, I think, the right to be proud of its floating supply system. It has performed its functions successfully since the beginning of the war, largely because of actual experience doing this sort of thing in peacetime exercises. The other part of the problem—the moving of supplies to advance bases—has been less successful, largely because in peacetime we had less opportunity to obtain such actual experience. Performance has, however, improved, and during the past twelve months in the advance across the Pacific the handling of the supply problem has been good. It is being further improved.

Logistic operations in the Pacific require that great quantities of material be landed with and immediately following the first wave of the assault troops. Not only must we supply the ammunition and provisions needed for the assault troops, but we must also commence to build at once the airfields necessary to secure local control of the air without carrier assistance. Immediately following, there must be moved in repair facilities for ships and depots for supplying stores for base activities, ships of the fleet, and vessels of the Fleet Train. Docks and other harbor facilities must be improvised rapidly. The amount of material that is involved is enormous. Air squadrons require living quarters, supply depots, and repair shops on a large scale. Extensive facilities are necessary for ship repairs, to the end that minor battle damage may be remedied without the necessity of returning the ships to the mainland. Large quantities of spare parts must be kept on hand and given careful and specialized handling, so that no ship may be immobilized for want of something necessary to put a vital mechanism into operating condition. Quantities of ordinary stores and ammunition must be handled and protected from the weather.

All necessary material must be provided long before an operation commences and must be stored initially in the continental United States. In consequence the naval supply system for the Pacific Ocean consists of a "pipe line", beginning hundreds of miles inland from the western coast of the United States and extending across the Pacific to the Philippines, with branches to our many ocean bases. The management of this "pipe line" is a difficult problem. The capacity of the "pipe line" is limited, and it requires careful control to insure that the most necessary things get through and that the line be not clogged by the shipment of unessential items. Care must be taken that there is an adequate reserve at the start of the "pipe line", and at intermediate points, but this reserve must not be allowed to reach undue size, since the hoarding of material in storehouses would be a very real handicap to the war effort. The loading of cargo ships must be painstakingly planned, in order to give high priority to the most important cargo. Cargo ship schedules must be carefully worked out so that ships may unload promptly when they reach their destinations; we cannot afford to waste shipping by having vessels lie idle while waiting their turn to unload at their destinations.

The Navy's trans-ocean service of supply is in many

respects like any commercial trans-ocean freight business, but it is complicated by the lack of organized ports at the distant termini, and by the fact that the urgency of certain types of cargo is constantly shifting with changes in the military situation. The problem has been attacked by taking into the Navy men of experience in the shipping world, who are bracketed together with naval officers to form teams conversant with all its phases. For the most part shipments to advanced bases are carried in commercial vessels, supplied by the War Shipping Administration, and loaded and unloaded under the direction of the Navy. Assault ships [transports and cargo ships specially fitted to support the first wave of a landing], tankers and other vessels that serve the fleet in combat areas are, as a rule, naval vessels.

On shore, in the western United States, where the flow of supplies largely originates, the problem has become more and more difficult as the scope of the Pacific operations increases. So important has this task become that recently one of the most senior officers in the Navy, Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, was shifted from the assignment of Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, in which he had served with distinction since the early days of the war, to the command of the Western Sea Frontier to handle the vital and complex operating and logistic tasks in that area. Recognition of the magnitude of the logistic problem was again emphasized in the promotion of Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, to the rank of Admiral on 29 January 1945.

It should be added that supply operations in the Pacific are not solely naval. The Army has a task of at least equal magnitude in supplying its air and ground forces. The supply systems of the two services have been merged together, as much as possible, under Fleet Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific and under General of the Army MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. In some cases, in which only one service uses an item, that item is handled entirely by the service concerned. For example, the supply of spare parts peculiar to the Super-Fortress bombers is handled entirely by the Army, while battleship ammunition, being used only by the Navy, is handled only by the Navy. Certain items in common use are pooled for handling by joint Army-Navy agencies. In other instances, it has been found convenient to have one service look out for the needs of both; fuel in the Pacific is handled entirely by the Navy, while rations for all personnel on shore are handled by the Army.

In the foregoing discussion I have stressed the problems in the Pacific, because they are the most difficult with which to deal from the naval logistic point of view, due mainly to the absence of port facilities in the island bases we have captured, and to the distances involved. In the Atlantic the problem has been easier, because of the more highly developed nature of the ports we have occupied, but the over-all volume of material to be moved and handled has required the maximum service from every ship that could be made available. Extensive logistic operations were also carried out in the Mediterranean. The most spectacular of these efforts was the creation of artificial harbors during the landings in Normandy. Here United States naval personnel installed and operated the unique breakwater caissons and flexible pier-heads (of British design and fabrication) at the beaches where United States troops landed. The Normandy operation was a striking example of close logistic support of masses of troops during the landing attack.

HEALTH

Despite the great increase in combat operations and the extremely unhealthful conditions in many occupied areas, the health record of the Navy compares favorably with past experience. In terms of total naval strength, recent tabulations indicate an estimated rate for casualty deaths of 3.3 per thousand in 1944 as compared with the final rate of 3.0 per thousand for the previous year. Again, on the basis of preliminary calculations, the total death rate from all causes is estimated at 5.8 per thousand for the year 1944 against the final figure of 5.4 per thousand in 1943.

Experience in this war indicates that of the wounded men who live until they receive medical attention, 98 out of every 100 survive. We are sparing no effort, therefore, to bring medical assistance as close to the battle lines as possible. Accordingly, battle casualties among our medical personnel have been substantial, as in many assaults they have landed simultaneously with the attacking forces. Moreover, it has been found practicable, when there are no off-shore obstacles, to beach landing craft fully equipped surgically. The use of new jeep ambulances is further keeping the handling of wounded men to a minimum. Amphibious tractors, together with newly designed elevators or davits, are being successfully employed to carry wounded promptly, despite difficult terrain conditions, to hospital ships anchored outside reef formations. The extensive use of whole blood, penicillin, plasma, new types of bandages, and serum albumen is proving effective in saving many lives.

The administrative problems which arise during a large-scale landing are considerable. Lately it has been found practicable to divide surgical landing craft in two groups—one to care for the slightly wounded, the other to care for the more serious cases. Medical personnel are correspondingly divided into specialized teams, and liaison units are formed to locate and cooperate with the beach dressing stations. Resuscitation teams are organized to appraise and diagnose injuries and treat casualties suffering from shock. Surgical teams, specializing in certain types of wounds, provide operating rooms, procure and prepare supplies, administer anaesthetics, and perform necessary operations. During several landings last year psychiatrists were assigned to medical divisions to handle cases of combat fatigue. In order to manipulate this complex organization, it has been found desirable to station a medical officer aboard the control ship where he can receive reports and transmit quickly the necessary orders. Systems have been worked out which enable ships to interchange medical equipment efficiently during combat.

On many Pacific islands disease and unsanitary conditions provide serious obstacles to the maintenance of good health. Sanitary measures must be applied as soon as territory is won. The introduction of new insect control methods during the year has brought excellent results. The incidence of dysentery and other epidemic diseases that were troublesome during earlier operations lowered markedly. Hundreds of cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, broncho pneumonia, bacillary dysentery

and malnutrition among the natives were treated. Volunteer native nurses, who were recruited in large numbers, were of considerable assistance in caring for both civilian and military patients.

The Navy has provided for the health of thousands of men aboard ships, submarines and planes, and has maintained and operated a system of fleet, advance base, base and naval hospitals, hospital ships and dispensaries. During the year a number of new hospitals and hospital ships were commissioned; several large hotel properties and estates were acquired and converted into convalescent hospitals; and numerous new fleet, advance base and base hospitals, as well as other field units, were established. Also, many new dispensaries were set up to serve the various continental shore activities.

Naval medical research during the year fell into four large divisions; that relating to naval service in general, to naval aviation, to the submarine service, and to the Marine Corps. Among the new developments were personnel selection tests and techniques, protection equipment and devices (relating to such matters as chemical warfare, flash burns, sunburn, sound, immersion and armor), aids to survivors at sea, insecticides and fungistatic agents, training devices, field equipment, and various preventive medicine and surgery techniques.

THE MARINE CORPS

In 1939 the Marine Corps comprised 19,500 officers and men, little more than the equivalent of one division. It is now composed of 478,000 men and women. There are now six full divisions of combat troops in the field, and 118,086 officers and men in Marine Corps aviation.

The greater part of this strength is devoted to the combat divisions and supporting troops, who have so notably furthered our progress in the Pacific by their participation in the amphibious operations described earlier in this report. 12,000 Marines are assigned to combatant naval vessels as integral parts of the crews. Others are on duty guarding naval establishments within the United States and at advanced bases.

Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, have carried out an intensive officer training program, including advanced studies at its new Command and Staff School, set up to train officers for staff duties in Marine battalions, regiments, and divisions. Some 400 officers have been graduated from the Command and Staff School; since 1 March 1944, the Reserve Officers' School has graduated 2,939 officers; and the Officer Candidates' School, as of 1 January 1945, has graduated 3,237 commissioned officers. The Aviation Ground Officers' School, organized in January 1944, has turned out 650 trained specialists to relieve pilots for operational duties. The elementary and specialist training of enlisted men is conducted in recruit depots, sea schools, training centers and other schools, including those of the Army and Navy, when available. In general, the policy has been to transfer basic training activities to the east coast.

The expansion of the Corps and the altered circumstances of recent operations have necessitated several changes in organization. During March and April of 1944 defense battalions were converted into antiaircraft artillery battalions and field artillery battalions; all Marine raider units were merged into the 4th Marine Regiment. On 15 April the 1st Marine Amphibious Corps was redesignated the 3rd Amphibious Corps. On 5 June Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith was designated type commander of ground forces attached to the Fleet Marine Force in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

The Marine Corps Women's Reserve, now completing its second year of service, reached its total authorized strength of 18,000 in June 1944. Approximately 1700 of their number have been requested for duty in Hawaii.

THE COAST GUARD

The Coast Guard, which is a part of the Navy in time of war, has performed a great variety of duties, both within the United States and abroad, as part of the naval combatant forces, as well as in furtherance of normal Coast Guard functions. As of 31 December 1944 Coast Guard personnel totaled 169,832.

Coast Guard personnel man nearly 300 vessels of the fleet—transports, cargo vessels, fuel ships, destroyer escorts and landing craft of various types—which have participated in numerous amphibious operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific—as well as 600 Coast Guard cutters and 3,000 small craft employed in escort service and harbor security duty. 221 cargo vessels under Army control are manned by Coast Guard crews.

Acting as volunteer port security forces, Coast Guard personnel have been assigned to safeguard the nation's ports, with their 5,000,000 linear feet of wharfage.

The Coast Guard has continued to improve aids to navigation along our inland and coastal waterways. The safe movement to the seaboard of landing craft built in the upper Mississippi River basin and on the Great Lakes has been accomplished by Coast Guard pilots, utilizing well marked channels. Intracoastal waterways, recently extended in the Gulf area, have been marked to permit safer movement of vital war materials.

A major function of the Coast Guard has been the inspection of merchant vessels and safety appliances thereon. The efforts of Coast Guard inspectors to ensure that merchant vessels carry adequate safety equipment, and that their crews attain greater efficiency in operation, has contributed to the decline of casualties among our merchant seamen. In home ports, lifeboat drills and safety instructions have been given by the Coast Guard. Marine inspectors detailed to ports in the United States and abroad have examined merchant officers and seamen for upgrading, and have administered discipline.

In carrying out its function of life saving, the Coast Guard, under direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has undertaken the task of developing improved methods and devices for rendering emergency assistance to aircraft and surface vessels in distress and to rescue survivors thereof. In connection with the recovery of these survivors, the use of helicopters from shore and surface craft is being thoroughly evaluated.

SPARS [Women's Reserve of the Coast Guard] are performing practically every type of non-combatant duty, thus releasing men for service at sea. Their enlistment, except for replacements, was terminated in November 1944; the SPAR officer training program was completed in December. As of 31 December 1944, there were 9,829 SPARS.

VI—*Conclusion*

At the conclusion of my previous report, I commented upon the successful teamwork between the Army and Navy, which has so effectively furthered the progress of the war. Within the past twelve months the character of our operations has increasingly necessitated a free and rapid interchange of forces of the several services, so that the greatest possible strength can be brought to bear against the enemy at the place and the time that will do the most good. It is a matter of basic policy to freeze the smallest possible number of forces in permanent assignment to any single area, and to leave the major portion of the fleet as a mobile unit that is ready for service where it is most vitally needed. As an example, during the past year Admirals Halsey and Spruance, in turn commanding major units of the Pacific Fleet, have been moving back and forth between the Central and Southwest Pacific in support of the westward advances of Fleet Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific Ocean Areas and of General of the Army MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific Area. As a general principle, all naval forces are placed under a naval commander of the nation that has the primary naval responsibility in the area of operations. During the invasion of Normandy and in the Mediterranean, United States naval forces operated under British naval commanders, while British and Australian naval forces are under our operational control in the Pacific.

The harmonious integration within and between the services has been particularly essential in amphibious operations, where personnel of one service have served under the command of another. In any amphibious operation, command of all forces engaged rests in the hands of the naval commander until the troops have been put ashore and have established their command organization. At this point the landing force commander advises the naval commander that he has assumed command of his troops ashore.

The function of the Navy in an amphibious operation falls into four main phases. During the "approach" phase, the Navy commands passage to the area of landings for the invasion forces, bombards shore batteries, landing beaches and supporting areas, conducts mine sweeping operations and removes beach obstacles. Frequently the bombing of landing beaches and shore defenses is a joint function of Army and Navy aircraft. In the "landing" phase, the Navy, by employment of special landing craft, puts the invasion forces and all their equipment ashore, under cover of ships' guns and carrier aircraft. In the "support" phase, after the consolidation of the beachhead, the Navy continues to provide artillery and air support to the forces ashore for as long a time as they remain within range of ships' guns, and until shore based aviation can relieve our carriers of the task of air support. In the "supply" phase, the Navy guarantees the security of the supply lines of the invasion forces and obstructs the enemy's efforts to reinforce his troops by sea.

The extent and varied character of naval participation in amphibious operations have required vast quantities of ships, men and material. Consider, for example, the Lingayen Gulf landings on 9 January 1945. The naval attack and covering forces for this operation consisted of 1,033 ships, ranging in size from battleships and carriers on down through landing craft. The naval personnel in this force numbered upwards of 273,000. The Army forces put ashore on D-day and during the following four days were slightly more than two-thirds of this number. Similarly, in the landings on Iwo Jima, approximately 800 naval vessels were involved, with a total personnel of over 220,000. Approximately 60,000 Marines were landed in the first three days of the operation, a ratio of ships' personnel to troops landed of slightly less than 4 to 1.

The experience of more than three years of war has demonstrated the soundness of our concept of a "balanced fleet", in which aircraft and ships work together as a coordinated team. There has been no dispute as to "carriers versus battleships". Aircraft can do some things that ships cannot do. Ships can do some things that aircraft cannot do. Working together, surface ships, submarines and aircraft supplement each other so that the strength of the unified team is greater than the sum of the parts.

Given the conditions under which naval war is now fought, it is impossible for a fleet to operate effectively without air power of its own. Our superiority in carrier strength has enabled us to take giant's strides across the Pacific in spite of the enemy's island network of air bases. The fast carrier task forces of the Pacific Fleet, consisting of carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers, have repeatedly made bold offensive thrusts into distant waters, inflicting significant damage on the enemy's shipping and installations. They have supported amphibious operations, controlling the air both before and after landings and until air strips could be completed. They have equally proved their worth in the two major actions with the Japanese fleet that have taken place during the past year. The clearest evidence of their effectiveness is seen in the box score of damage inflicted upon the enemy by Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet between 24 August 1944 and 26 January 1945. During these five months, while the Third Fleet was engaged in supporting the Western Carolines and Philippine Island operations, 4,370 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 82 enemy combatant ships sunk and 372 enemy auxiliaries and merchant ships sunk (excluding small craft), against a loss in combat by the Third Fleet of only 449 of our own planes and the light carrier PRINCETON.

The amphibious landings of the past twelve months have repeatedly shown the value of naval gunfire in gaining victory and in saving the lives of our assault troops. Shore bombardments in preparation for landings, during the landings, and for as long after as troops are within range of ships' guns, have been carried out on a scale not contemplated in the past. New methods, joint procedures, and new materials have been developed. A sufficient volume of fire is laid down to knock out the shore

and beach defenses and to drive off the beach defense personnel. Initially fire is carried out by heavy ships and support aircraft. Battleship fire provides the only gun (or weapon for that matter) that is sufficiently powerful and accurate to knock out reinforced concrete pillboxes eight to ten feet thick, and other similarly strong land gun emplacements. Just prior to landing, destroyers, gunboats, and rocket ships lay down heavy barrages of fire; ships and aircraft continue to give support as the troops move in. Although ships are designed primarily to fight other ships, their effectiveness against heavy shore batteries has been well proven in this war, as in the past. The risk of so exposing ships is justifiable if the object sought is sufficiently important, more especially when command of the sea is not in jeopardy. The Normandy landing was an especially convincing demonstration of the value of naval gunfire in support of troops, not only as they land but also as they move inland off the beaches. The new applications of naval gunfire in amphibious operations, as well as in fleet actions, have demonstrated that the battleship is a versatile and essential vessel, far from obsolete.

We have heard much of things being ahead of schedule in the Pacific. Actually we have had no schedule, except to go as far and as fast as the means in hand would permit. It can be said that the war today is ahead of our expectations of last year. This should stimulate rather than sap our determination to carry on with every means we can muster. I have said before, and I repeat —a quick and easy Pacific victory cannot be taken for granted, even after the European war is over. While we rejoice in the reoccupation of Guam and of the Philippines, from which our forces were driven three years ago, we must constantly realize that we are only now gaining a position from which we can assault the heart of the Japanese strength. That is our goal, and the enemy is welcome to know that we shall continue to press him with every means at our command. But the very speed of our advance has created new production problems. Our accelerated operations are placing a heavy strain upon reserves of certain vital items, while production of certain necessities is falling behind mounting requirements. It is only by unrelenting support and effort on the home front that our advance can continue.

While we contemplate with pride the accomplishments of the past twelve months—accomplishments without precedent in naval history—we must never forget that there is a long, tough and laborious road ahead.

—Official U. S. Navy Photo

A BATTLESHIP BOMBARDING GUAM


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The Flag of The United States Is Raised
Over Mt. Surabachi, Iwo Jima, February 23, 1945,
by Men of the 28th Regiment, Fifth Marine Division,
United States Pacific Fleet